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7FOREWORD
iDEMO Institute for Democracy was established with the goal of developing public policy projects 
and advancing democracy. One of the important aspects of its work is methodology design, i.e., the way 
in which the openness of society is investigated and assessed. Therefore, from the beginning of iDEMO 
Institute for Democracy we defined the Open Society Index as a key program. Our wish is to enable va-
rious institutions and individuals to refer to the results of the survey in the creation of their own pro-
grams, projects and work activities. We try to consider problems in Croatian society from the perspec-
tive of an academically oriented public while not neglecting the perception and attitudes of citizens. Our 
intention is to turn attention to the essential situations and trends in society, both positive and negative, 
from the perspective of policy research. 
Our research is based on a clear definition of an open society, which tells exactly what everyone sho-
uld know – an open society is one that acknowledges and protects the rights of individuals and minori-
ties, one that limits the power of authorities at all levels, one that functions through active, well designed 
institutions of civil society, one that draws support from a healthy market economy, and one that enables 
all, regardless of their ethnic origin, religion, race or other differences, to enjoy full participation in so-
cial, political and economic life.
The making of the Index has not been an isolated venture. Over many years and in many parts of the 
world, George Soros has promoted the idea of an open society through his philanthropic activities, in-
tellectually and financially. In Croatia, based on the same premises, a group of experts from the fields of 
philosophy, sociology, law, political sciences, economy and civil society, has designed the Open Society 
Index as a unique intellectual product, the basis for which is in the philosophical concepts of Karl Po-
pper. The initiative for the project was started by Slavica Singer, professor at the Faculty of Economy, J. 
J. Strossmayer University in Osijek, and a member of the Open Society Institute - Croatia board. 
Many individuals must be credited with identifying and creating the Index’s methodology, but the 
small methodological team was crucial: Ivan Burić, Dragan Bagić, and Žarko Bajić, who created the In-
dex, while Marina Škrabalo and Dražen Lalić developed the approach to the case studies. With great 
help and commitment from Aleksandar Štulhofer, Ksenija Turković, Zrinjka Peruško, Tomislav Reško-
vac, Davor Gjenero, Velimir Šonje, Nenad Zakošek and Gvozden Flego, a number of other experts con-
tributed to the creation of the Index.
In a pilot phase in 2005, still within the Open Society Institute – Croatia, the first investigation was 
performed, and the results were published in Croatian and English. They were disseminated widely, to 
organisations of civil society, the media, governmental institutions and agencies at local and national 
level, and international organizations. Several hundred experts from the whole Croatia participated in 
the research, while a public opinion poll was conducted, on a sample of 1000 citizens. A series of round 
tables was held, each one dedicated to one of the six dimensions investigated – the rule of law, the tran-
sparency of the political process, education, the media, minorities and marginalized groups, and econo-
mic rights and entrepreneurship, as well as to the topics elaborated in the case studies. A call for propo-
sals was announced, for policy and advocacy projects, through which the Open Society Institute Croa-
tia donated around 380 000 dollars to various organizations, which tried to bring their projects to bear 
on those areas in the society which were identified as the most closed. 
During June and July 2006, Otvorena televizija (OTV) broadcast 7 programs on the topic of the 
open society in Croatia. Numerous articles were published in the media, referring to the results of the 
Index. Several other research efforts in the field of social sciences and the humanities and civil society 
used the Index; the case studies were presented at conferences, and the publication has been made ava-
ilable online at www.idemo.hr.
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The Index was presented to the representatives of civil society in a series of countries, for example, to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Indonesia and Russia, to name but a few. The intention is 
to spread the use of the Index, as it has been designed as an instrument that enables vertical (chronolo-
gical) and horizontal (geographical) comparisons, taking into account all the differences of each respec-
tive society. This year the pilot phase was finished, and the Index was conducted in Croatia and Kosovo 
– and for the first time the general value of the Index has been published. In March 2006, we established 
iDEMO Institute for Democracy, which took over the implementation and further development of the 
Open Society Index. Its founders and members are exactly those people who designed it and created it, 
and who want to initiate changes, not only by promoting the results of the Index, but also with concre-
te projects. Within its activities iDEMO runs projects for the articulation of policies in the fields iden-
tified by the Index. iDEMO intends to endorse this type of project, based on the Index results, in coo-
peration with governmental and non-governmental organizations.
Accordingly we call upon the non-governmental sector, governmental institutions and the private 
sector, to investigate this year’s results, interpretations and recommendations, and to find a field in whi-
ch they want and are able to influence changes. We believe it is time for the private and public sectors to 
pay attention to public policies, and to participate in criticising, making, articulating and creating 
them.
Although Croatia as state and society has doubtlessly made progress, we cannot afford to be comple-
tely satisfied. In spite of the progress made, lots of issues remain to be solved within the purview of the 
open society, the development of governmental and nongovernmental institutions, and assistance to 
citizens.
The post-transitional challenges in front of us, as well as the obstacles Croatia must overcome in or-
der to become a credible EU member state, are big indeed. 
As engaged members of the society, we would like to contribute to the creation of an agenda for pro-
fessional and public discussion on key problems of our country’s development. That is not and cannot 
be a job solely for politicians.
Identifying the prevailing opinion, initiating discussions, finding solutions are tasks for all citizens 
and the real work of organisations of civil society.
Finally, we would like particularly to thank Slavica Singer, Aleksandar Štulhofer and Žarko Bajić for 
help in finalizing this publication, for without them it would have been very different. 
Andrea Feldman and Simona Goldstein
iDEMO Institute for Democracy, January 2007
9INTRODUCTION
Aleksandar Štulhofer, PHD, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences,            
University of Zagreb
What are we talking about when discussing an open society? If we leave aside the philosophical and 
political theory history, the concept of an open society is most simply explained through the idea how 
open and closed a given society may be. Let us imagine society X. We imagine it as a whole containing 
state administration (offices, clerks and regulations), institutions such as the legal system (courts, laws...), 
then educational, cultural and economic institutions. Let us imagine, of course, also the citizens of this 
hypothetical society, in which some of them work at the institutions mentioned, and almost all use 
them directly or indirectly. We can say that society X is more open than society Y if it meets two key 
conditions. The first is that within society X, discrimination of citizens by institutions is less present 
(from employment to access to the services that are offered by the institutions).  The second condition 
is that its citizens, in comparison with those of society Y, can control these institutions better. The less 
discrimination and the more independent control of institutions there is, the more open the society is. 
Efficient control of the functioning of social institutions enables faster and more precise recognition of 
the points where the society is closed, where it places obstacles to openness, and thus enables the elimi-
nation of these obstacles. 
Certainly, open societies are marked by other specificities, such as for example, a developed civil 
society sector or the rational elaboration of a rich public life.  The reason why the basic dimensions of 
an open society are here reduced to lack of discrimination and independent monitoring of social insti-
tutions is not just the wish for concision. If we take a closer look at other characteristics, we will note 
that they are, in one way or the other, the fruit of progress specifically in these two focal dimensions.  
A more open society is more just and in the long-run more successful than a less open or a closed 
society. Its members are not necessarily happier or healthier than those living in closed societies, but 
they certainly have better access to protection of health and greater freedom to seek what each and every 
one of them finds important for having a happy life. An open society is, simply said, a better place to be 
and to have a happy life. 
The project Open Society Index (OSI) was launched in 2003, within the Open Society Institute 
– Croatia. The Index was the brainchild of Slavica Singer. Further development of the Index was con-
tributed to by several members of the former Open Society Institute Board, and, methodologically, the 
Index was completed by three young researchers, authors of the chapter on methodology. From the very 
beginning, the Index had equally strong local and global ambitions. On the one hand, the Index is the 
result of the wish for systematic monitoring of the transformation of Croatia – measuring how open it 
is – in order to help to locate and identify obstacles to development, i.e. all the points that we can name 
as generators of a closed within the context of an open society.  On the other hand, bearing in mind the 
fact that not a single society is either completely open, or completely closed, the purpose of measure-
ment necessarily depends on the opportunity for comparison and on contextualization. 
Is Croatian society opening faster or slower than similar societies? Is it marked by obstacles that are 
common to post-communist transitional societies in the region? The local context, in other words, is 
likely to become clear only within a wider perspective. In that sense, the Index has been from the very 
beginning envisioned as a comparative task, a project that will have, along with the national, also a re-
gional, and with time a global application as well.1
1  The project is currently being applied in Kosovo and preparations for its application are taking place in Russia, as well 
as Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Furthermore, civil society organizations from Slovenia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Indonesia 
and some ASEAN countries are showing an interest in joining the process of measuring the openness of their societies
10
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A critical reader will notice that there have already been a series of similar international indices, all of 
them measuring the level of democratization, development of civil society, human development, percep-
tion of corruption, competitiveness and so on. The advantage, and the purpose, of this new instrument, 
according to our judgment rests upon its comprehensiveness and sense for details of the measurement 
that enables us not only to estimate the level to which a society is closed or open, but also allows us to 
identify the generator of trends that tend to produce a closed society.  In contrast to other existing indi-
ces, the Open Society Index brings together all the basic societal dimensions: the economy, legal system, 
education, basic political processes, media as well as the status of minorities, where the experts’ assessment 
of the overall openness of society relies on their detailed evaluations, taking into consideration the rela-
tive importance of every chosen dimension for the process of the further opening of society. The second 
important difference is in fact the practical potential of the Index. Stressing specific obstacles, i.e. segments 
of social life that are marked by the trend towards a closed society, the Index shows the way, and thereby 
strengthens advocacy. Compared to other international indices, the results of the Index are also a future 
action plan.  
This book presents experts’ estimations of the openness of Croatia between 2005 and 2006.2 The 
findings are based on two separate surveys that were conducted by applying the same methodology. Sim-
ply said, the results obtained point towards a small but significant improvement, presented in detail wi-
thin the following chapters. During the period from the year 2005 to 20063, the Croatian became a more 
open society. From the total of 100 index points marking a society that is totally open, the experts polled 
graded the current level of openness of society with 42.1 points.  Considering the result from the year 
2005 with 40.8 points, the indicated progress towards a more open society would be almost insignificant, 
if it did not reflect the fact that increased openness is noted in five out of the six measured dimensions. 
Although the overall openness of society remains modest, this positive change is indeed encouraging.  
As readers will most certainly notice, the differences in Index values in such a short period could re-
sult from the situational influences (for example, some major social affairs happening prior to the pro-
cess of surveying) or methodological particularities (such as difference in expert sample selection), prior 
to actual societal changes. In this sense, the importance and real value of the Index will be seen only thro-
ugh a continuous monitoring of the dynamics towards an open society, through channelling advocacy 
efforts in order to influence the mentioned dynamics and through comparison with the situation in ot-
her countries.    
Let us turn back to the latest findings. Just as a year earlier, the dimension of the media was assessed 
most positively. The importance of these findings lies in the fact that open media tend to produce other 
open dimensions; open media are capable of a critical analysis of reality and thereby, through mobiliza-
tion of the public, the media are capable of pressuring the decision-makers. Most certainly, this type of 
activity requires not only open media, but good, professional journalism. Without the latter, open media 
remain a missed opportunity, or even worse, a mechanism spreading cynicism and apathy. When spea-
king about the quality of the Croatian media, we should take into consideration that we have a deficit 
analytical journalism, which is to a great extent caused by an extremely short editorial attention span. In 
contrast to the dominant principle of muck-raking journalism that makes every news “old” within a co-
uple of days, the readiness to devote sustained coverage and investigation to very important topics is a 
fairly unusual situation within Croatian media.  
2 For preliminary findings on how open Croatian society is  in 2005 compare Goldstein, S. (2005) Otvorenost društva 
– Hrvatska 2005. Zagreb: Institut Otvoreno društvo.   
3 Taking into account that the experts assessed the state of a society in the previous year, the first assessment of 
openness of a sociaty relates to the period 2004-2005.  
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Figure 1 How open key social dimensions are 2005 – 2006 (experts’ estimation)
In contrast to the year 2005, when the dimensions of the rule of law and status of minorities were 
ranked second, in 2006 they took the fourth and fifth place on the ranking list. This is only ostensibly a 
poor result. For it is a fact that both dimensions were assessed as more open, and their fall in the ranking 
was caused by some other dimensions being even more open, not by their becoming more closed. This 
is exactly what happened with the education and economic rights and entrepreneurship dimension. The 
first one of them moved up from the fourth to the second place, suggesting that the degree of openness 
was pushed up at least partly by different educational reforms (Croatian National Education Standard 
and the Bologna Declaration). The economic dimension is the dimension that records the strongest 
opening within one year of monitoring (enlargement of the space of economic freedoms). Having in 
mind its role in the long-term stability and sustainability of societal openness, this is certainly one of the 
most important findings of this study. 
The recently announced reduction and rationalization of legislation within the economic field sho-
uld secure further development of the identified process of openness, which moved up from the fifth to 
the second place. 
Just as there has been no change at the top of the open society league table, so there has been no al-
teration at the bottom. In both years of measurement of the openness of society, the political was iden-
tified as the least open dimension. That is also the only dimension to have been recorded as more closed 
in the period 2005-2006. This finding points towards a lack of competence, professionalism and ethics 
among politicians and political institutions. The consequences are multiple, and anecdotally they are 
manifested through the everyday contempt and mistrust that the public shows toward political elites. 
Taking into consideration the fact that the engagement of politics in the fight against corruption recei-
ved the lowest grade among all criteria that were used to measure the political dimension, in the long 
run, the outcome of the governmental National Program for Combating Corruption 2006 – 2008, re-
cently introduced in the Parliament, could play a crucial role in how politics is perceived in Croatia. 
If an encouraging view of this kind of evaluation of the political sphere is possible at all, it should be 
sought within the fact that the decrease in the openness of political processes did not transfer to other 
dimensions, in particular to dimensions that we would expect, such as the economy. This discontinuity 
suggests that politics has to a large extent given up on control of other dimensions of social life, or that 
it is being increasingly successfully resisted.4
If we look at the ranking of the importance of individual dimensions for the absolute openness of 
Croatian society, we will see a major correlation. The importance of three dimensions (politics, minori-
ty rights and economy) was assessed identically in both measurements, and the importance of the other 
4  As shown by the detailed analysis of the political dimension (compare the paragraph on transparency of political 
processes), this seemingly does not apply to state owned companies, in particular on the local level. 
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three dimensions varies by a single percentage point. Lack of relevant differences within the assessment 
of importance suggests that the growth of openness in the period 2004-2005 is not a consequence of 
mere shifting of priorities, but really does rest on the perception of changes in the level of the openness 
of certain dimensions. As expected, the functioning of the rule of law was assessed as the most important 
dimension for the process of producing an open society. There seems to be consent about this not only 
among experts, but also in the public, among representatives of international organizations, as well as 
the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. The economy was identified as the least important 
dimension during both measurements. Thus the chapter on the economic dimension of openness of 
society discusses the reasons for this – could it be that the basic principles of economic openness, such 
as independence of the market economy and economic freedoms, seem to have been already achieved 
in Croatia, or is it something else? 
During 2005 and 2006, the project also included a public opinion poll in order to find out how much 
the citizens are familiar with the concept of an open society, to what extent they understand it, if they 
are inclined to it and how they grade the importance of certain social dimensions for the process of ma-
king a more open society in Croatia. Public opinion polls tended to suggest there was a gap between 
experts’ viewpoints and the perception of the Croatian public. In connection with the definition of an 
open society, the findings are encouraging. In comparison to the year 2005, the recent survey shows that 
an increased percentage of citizens (55 % in comparison to previous 44 %) define an open society as a 
society  “as one in which everything can be openly discussed and in which all citizens, regardless of the-
ir identity and nationality, have the same chances in life.” It should be mentioned that this increase did 
not influence the choice of the most important dimension for the process of openness of Croatian so-
ciety. During both measurements, citizens stressed the importance of education, which not only proves 
the understanding of social processes, but also the acceptance of values that are justly considered to be 
the basis for a sustainable future (Figure 2).5
Figure 2 Importance of certain dimensions for the openness of Croatian society 2005 – 2006, 
according to an opinion poll 
5 The graph shows the relative importance of each dimension, that is, its share within the total importance of openness 
of society (100%).
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Figure 3  Importance of certain dimensions for the open society in Croatia 2005 – 2006, a comparison 
of general public opinion and the opinions of experts
As shown in Figure 3, experts and the public part ways in their evaluations of the importance of cer-
tain dimensions.  If we compare the dimensions that are considered the most important, the legal system 
as identified by the experts, and education for the public, the resulting impression is that the experts are 
concentrated on immediate obstacles in the way of a more open society (weaknesses of legal state), whi-
le the public focuses on long-term guarantees of openness (education and civility).6 The fact that the 
public values protection of minorities with an extremely low grade would be worrying – as a possible 
expression of the usual insensitivity of the majority – if a similar expert assessment did not suggest that 
a lot has already been achieved in the field of the protection of minorities. 
The chapters that follow present and interpret detailed findings of the research, each chapter focusing 
on one of the six key social dimensions. Interpretations that authors offer rely on detailed insight into 
the elements of the assessment, that is, into the specific criteria that the experts used to identify the de-
gree of openness of society within each dimension. Each of the six chapters includes recommendations, 
guidelines to advocacy, focused on the overcoming of obstacles to an open society, in the shaping of whi-
ch the outlook for Croatian accession to the EU can be sensed.
After quantitatively based analyses, the book continues with two case studies. The first case study 
focuses on the attitude toward sexual minorities, which is assessed as a space of social praxis marked by 
more negative than positive changes.  The next chapter deals with war crimes trials in Croatia, which, 
according to the experts in the survey, was the most eminent example of the way in which Croatian so-
ciety became more open during the year 2005.  In both cases, we are dealing with qualitative analyses of 
the activities of governmental and nongovernmental institutions, legal context, the role of media and 
experts, and finally the reactions of the Croatian public. 
The last chapter acts as a certain methodological bonus; it describes the conceptualization and logic 
of measurement. When describing the conceptual framework, structure of sampling, procedure of data-
collecting and the ways of calculating the Index, the concluding chapter of the book gives the reader the 
opportunity for a critical assessment of the achievement and credibility of the presented conclusions.
Who is this book intended for? The answer is included within the very beginning of this introduc-
tory text. If we name our imagined society X Croatia today, the results and the interpretation of the va-
lues of the Open Society Index seem extremely important for all of those who are participating in social 
decision-making, regardless of the level of that decision-making and the level of its formality. The eva-
luative character of the study should equally interest researchers into social phenomena, including jour-
6  It is still possible that over the long term the orientation of public opinion is an outcome in doubt in the likelihood 
that current obstacles relating to the judiciary and politics can ever be successfully settled.
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nalists, as well as activists of civil society organizations who are active in the fields analyzed by the Index. 
Finally, but not less importantly, the book speaks to all citizens who feel the need to act publicly – in 
pressuring inactive and insufficiently effective governmental and nongovernmental bodies. For politici-
ans and activists, the Index pinpoints the areas where they have been successful, and where not, stressing 
the areas that are in deficit. For journalists and social researchers, it shows the “black spots“ and genera-
tors of a closed society  that deserve particular analytical attention. To all others, the results presented 
within this book show the areas where their engagement is most needed, confirming, hopefully, their 
everyday experience. 
Whether the Open Society Index will succeed in becoming a new Croatian export product remains 
to be seen, but its previous and present application, we believe, brought about new and important insi-
ghts into the direction and achievement of transitional processes in Croatia. Diagnosing the state of 
affairs, highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of achievements to date, the study that lies befo-
re you promotes a complete, critical, innovative and engaged view of the country that we are living in. 
Interpretation of results in the six dimensions 
investigated

17
THE RULE OF LAW
 Ksenija Turković, SJD, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb 
INTRODUCTION
This report deals with the part of the research focused on the relation between the rule of law and 
the extent to which a society is open.  Data gathered are represented in the report in three chapters. The 
second chapter discusses the conceptual framework for determining openness within the field of the rule 
of law: the significance of the rule of law for generating an open society, explanation of the six criteria 
and the related subcriteria and pieces used to measure openness within this field. The third chapter shows 
the situation in Croatia in terms of an open or closed society in the area of the rule of law, the changes 
that occurred in relation to previous year in the same area, and stresses the points where the experts have 
spotted the most difficult problems in meeting particular criteria. Monitoring of the dynamics of trends 
towards and open or closed society over time needs to be taken into account with some reservations, as 
the number of experts who participated in the previous year (8) and this year (17) differs significantly. 
Due to the short period in between the two studies, it is difficult to believe that any crucial changes in 
the society could have occurred. I would rather attribute certain deviations, particularly those noted in 
negative evaluation of particular subcriteria or pieces, to the change in awareness of the experts and to 
their greater sensibility to specific issues. In conclusion, an overview of the results is given, from the per-
spective of the EU accession process, as well as recommendations for improvement of the rule of law in 
the Republic of Croatia.
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Conceptual framework for assessment of an open society in the field of rule of law
The rule of law is often considered one of the key components of a democratic society, an instrument 
to ensure that the actions of those in power are in the public interest, that every individual and social 
group may have their freedoms and rights protected, and that they may accomplish their individual and 
group goals and interests. Various theoreticians have pointed out that the rule of law contributes to the 
improvement of stability,7 freedom,8 efficiency,9 utility,10 formal justice11 and substantive morality.12 
The rule of law is an extremely difficult concept to define. Its definition and meaning have been the 
subjects of innumerable scholarly discussions.13 Drawing upon a century-old tradition, many people cu-
rrently consider that the basic idea of the rule of law is that any exercise of power, either private or public, 
should be limited by the law. From this, two basic requirements of the rule of law are derived: a) the 
requirement to limit official power - that civil servants may act only in line with firm regulations clearly 
defined in advance, which limit their discretion and thereby prevent tyranny and arbitrariness, and b) 
the requirement for the laws to be accessible and clear to those to whom they refer, so they can adjust 
their behaviour accordingly. It is therefore considered that the rule of law relies on how and what laws 
are enacted, the separation of power into three branches, judicial independence, the apolitical nature of 
the judiciary, judicial control of executive authorities, and access of citizens to justice. 
This study started from this contemporary, wider concept of the rule of law, so the degree of so-
cietal openness in the area of the rule of law was measured by six criteria: a) quality of legislation; b) 
availability of legal protection to all citizens; c) the quality of the control of the work of the courts; d) 
the efficiency of justice; e) judicial independence; and f ) confidence of citizens in the judiciary. Each 
of these six criteria was divided into a certain number of subcriteria (25 of them) and each subcriterion 
into a certain number of items/indicators (totalling 86).14
7 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. I (1945) Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 273-80; 
Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1954) New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 5-7, 9, 
18-19, 26.
8 See, for example, Friedrich A. Hayeck, The Constitution of Liberty (1960) Univ. Of Chicago Press, pp. 153-54, 
227-28; Friedrich A. Hayeck, The Road to Serfdom (1944) Univ. Of Chicago Press, pp. 80-84, Michael Oakes-
hott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (1941) Liberty Press, pp. 387-89.
9 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (1979) Clarendon Press, pp. 225-26; Richard 
A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (1990) Harvard University Press, p. 20.
10 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government (1931) Oxford University Press, p. 236.
11 Randy Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law (1998) Clarendon Press, pp. 89-90; Lon 
Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964), Yale University Press, pp. 38-40.
12 George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought (1996) Oxford University Press, pp. 11-12; Judith N. Sh-
klar (1987), Political Theory and the Rule of Law in Allan Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan eds. (1987), The 
Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology, Carswell.
13  There are great differences among the British, American, French and German understandings of the concept 
of the rule of law. Traditionally, there has been a theoretical clash between two concepts of the rule of law: po-
sitivist and substantive. According to the so-called positivist conception, the rule of law implies the fulfilment 
of certain formal criteria related to the enactment and application of the law, irrespective of the ends that a spe-
cific law serves, whereas the so-called substantive conceptions largely equates the rule of law with the notion of 
justice. In Croatian legal circles, the positivist conception of the rule of law still prevails. However, nowadays, 
many understand the concept of the rule of law more widely than both the traditional positivist and substantive 
conceptions. For more details on the definition of the concept of the rule of law, see John V. Orth (1998) “Ex-
porting the Rule of Law,” Vol. 24 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg., pp. 71; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., (1997) “The Rule 
of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,” Colum. L. Rev., Vol 97, p. 1; David Kairys (2003) “Searching 
for the Rule of Law,” Suffolk U. L. Rev., Vol. 36 pp. 307; Ruti G. Teitel (2002) “Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law 
for the New Global Politics,” Cornell Int’l L.J., Vol 35, pp. 355.
14 Respondents rated each item for its importance for ideal openness of an society and assessed its state in Cro-
atia, on a scale 1 – 7. Items are grouped into subcriteria according to the content. For each subcriterion, an ave-
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The famous Fuller list of the necessary characteristics of the rule of law requires legislation to be 
general, accessible to all, non-retroactive, understandable, consistent, stable, enforceable, and within the 
power of the subjects.15 Here it is mostly a matter of requirements  related to the manner of enactment 
of laws and the quality of drafting laws. It is specifically those requirements, covered in the study by the 
criterion of quality of legislation, that comprise the fundamental essence of the rule of law, and as such, 
the main starting point for positivists. Therefore, this study has also started from the assumption that, 
in order to attain the rule of law, and thereby an open society via the rule of law, what is important is 
a) the actual manner of the enactment of laws (their timely enactment, the ability of all stakeholders to 
influence the enactment of laws, the access of the public to bills and the holding of public debates on 
these bills, leaving enough time from the passing of the law to its implementation so that citizens can 
become familiar with the content of the law, the preparation of detailed explanations of bills for the 
purpose of their easier interpretation later), b) the quality of laws (the provisions should be written in a 
language that is clear and understandable to all, they should be specific, should not limit the freedom of 
citizens unduly, should not leave legal vacuums16,  should be  mutually harmonized, adequate resources 
should be provided for the implementation of the law and control mechanisms for its implementation 
should be envisaged, as well as sanctions for lack of compliance, and c) stability of laws (requirement 
not to change the laws frequently).17 
In addition, the rule of law as understood by the substantive point of view requires justice to be atta-
ined through law, so that courts in judicial systems abiding by the rule of law need to be empowered to 
control the compliance of the laws with the Constitution and human rights.
Traditionally, the access to the protection of the law was not considered a component of the rule 
of law. However, in the last few years it has been specifically the access of all citizens to legal protection 
that has become an important element in the “export” of the rule of law to transition countries. It is im-
portant for an open society that all citizens may in practice enjoy legal protection and equality before 
the courts and the law, therefore this criterion is divided into two subcriteria: equality of legal protecti-
on and access to legal protection for all citizens.
The control of the performance of the judiciary (of courts, state attorneys, attorneys and public no-
taries) is also important for openness in the sphere of the rule of law. This study has concentrated on con-
trol through the evaluation of the work of judges and prosecutors, the system of their promotion, acco-
untability and sanctioning abuse and poor quality work, control of corruption, abiding by codes of ethics, 
transparency of the work of judicial bodies and prosecutors, and, finally, civil control of the judiciary. 
In the last twenty years or so, the practice of the European Court of Human Rights with regard to 
the right to a hearing within a reasonable time referred to in Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights has changed perspectives on the efficiency of the judiciary and raised awareness that 
the efficiency of  the judiciary is one of the prerequisites for the implementation of the rule of law and 
that the legal security of citizens, as well as the equality of citizens before the law and the courts, greatly 
depends on the efficiency of the judiciary.  
Nowadays, it is the autonomy of the judiciary that is considered one of the most important elements 
for the implementation of the rule of law - if the judiciary is not autonomous, it cannot control execu-
tive authority. The autonomy of the judiciary, on one hand, implies the independence of courts from the 
rage values is given, on basis of calculating the average of all items making a subcriterion. Average values of all 
criteria is calculated as average values of all subcriteria making a criterion. The scale for criteria is 0-100.
15 Fuller, supra note 10, pp. 33-94. 
16 These requirements arise from the principle of legality.
17 Of course, those requirements should be relativised to a certain extent. Laws are often written so that they are 
unclear to ordinary citizens without an attorney. Sometimes it is difficult for citizens to find provisions which 
relate to their case, etc. 
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influence of parties (primarily indicating that there is no corruption; therefore, the indicator of the low 
occurrence of corruption in courts, which in the questionnaire is part of the control of the performance 
of the judiciary, should really be in the part related to the criterion of the autonomy of judiciary), exe-
cutive authorities and “immunity” of courts to various kinds of pressures: political, public, and interest-
group. However, we have to be aware that it is impossible to isolate the judges completely from the in-
fluences of society and that this, in the long run, would not even be advisable, since their decisions sho-
uld be consistent with the prevailing social values - otherwise the majority in society would not see any 
sense in complying with these decisions.
On the other hand, the discussion about the autonomy of the judiciary implies the recruitment and 
promotion of judges, prosecutors and other judicial employees exclusively on the basis of their expertise 
and quality of work. Regardless of the importance attributed to expertise when judges are being appo-
inted, the political opinion about the candidate and his or her prior behaviour always has a certain bea-
ring. There are attempts to compensate for this by awarding judges tenure for life or by their election by 
citizens for a fixed term.18
While working on the design of the research,  trust of the citizens in the judiciary was considered 
to be extremely important in assessing the openness of the rule of law dimension. This was confirmed in 
the experts’ survey, as the experts evaluated almost all the indicators (except those referring to the avai-
lability of information on the work of the judiciary) as very important for the achievement of openness 
in the dimension of the rule of law. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CROATIA
The importance of the rule of law in comparison with other dimensions
This year, like last, of all six key dimensions of societal openness that were studied, the dimension of 
the rule of law was rated as the most important by the experts.19 Interestingly, both this year and last, 
each of the six sets of experts grouped according to their basic fields of expertise rated the rule of law as 
the most important dimension for achieving an open society (see Figure 3).20 
Last year, the rule of law received on average 24 index points and this year 23. These 23 points can 
also be interpreted as a 23% share in the total importance of all six dimensions for an open society.21 This 
is not surprising since the rule of law is to a great extent one of the prerequisites for the attainment of 
openness in the other key dimensions.
Comparison of the values of criteria within the rule of law
Legal experts were asked to assess each item within an individual criterion of the rule of law with res-
pect to the situation in Croatia on a scale from 1 = “is not present at all” to 7 = “is very much present.” 
According to the assessments of legal experts, the situation in the country in the area of the rule of law is 
18 See Mauro Cappelletti (1989), The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective, Clarendon Press, pp. 104-
113.
19 92 in all,  17 of them from the legal area, 13 experts for politics, 29 for minorities, 8 for education, 13 for eco-
nomy, 12 for the media. 
20 At the end of a questionnaire, each respondent had opportunity to assess the importance of all six dimensions 
– of the one she/he covers as an expert and other five. Experts assessed the importance by distributing 100 points 
to respective dimensions according to their opinion about the importance for the overall openness of a society.
21 On a scale of importance from 1-100, politics and media received 17 points, education 16, minorities 15 and 
economy 12 points.
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poorest regarding citizen trust in the judiciary (40% of theoretical maximum was scored)22 and the effi-
ciency of judiciary (41% of the maximum value was scored)23. The highest level of openness is noted in 
the autonomy of the judiciary (48% - an increase of 20% over last year’s figure), and the quality of legisla-
tion (46 % - an increase of 7% over 2005).24 The efficiency of the judiciary is assessed worse than it was 
last year (11% lower than in 2005) as is the availability of legal protection to all citizens (4% worse than 
in 2005).( See Figure 4. ) This does not necessarily mean that the situation is objectively worse, but it pro-
bably indicates that legal experts have become even more aware of the problems present in these areas.
Figure 4  Open Society Index according to the criteria25
22 Some surveys conducted in Croatia show that our citizens’ confidence in Croatian courts is weak or non-exi-
stent, most often due to the length of the proceedings. In a study conducted in 2002, the courts received the 
least public trust: it turned out that the citizens appreciate the church or private entrepreneurship more than 
three times as much as the judiciary, and in comparison with courts, confidence in the university, the President 
of the country, or the army is more than twice as high. See Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA) Regional Survey of Public Agenda, 2002, http://archive.idea.int/balkans. In another survey, responding 
to the question about which institutions they would eradicate corruption from first, citizens indicated to the 
largest extent the judiciary and health care. Transparency International Report. V. Kregar, Corruption in Judi-
ciary, in: Lalić ed. (2002), Croatian Judiciary: Lessons and Perspectives, Zagreb, pp. 323-350. According to Uze-
lac, id., str. 3.
23 Such an experts’ assessment of the situation in the efficiency of justice corresponds with a study recently con-
ducted by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ).See Alan Uzelac, Efikasnost pravo-
suđa u Europskom kontekstu: usporedba funkcioniranja europskih pravosudnih sustava, accepted for publica-
tion in the Zagreb Law School (2005). CEPEJ was established on 18 September 2002 as a permanent body of 
the Council of Europe, and consists of experts from 46 member states. Its basic tasks are: a comparative analysis 
of the results of various judicial systems; development of joint statistical criteria and other means of evaluation; 
analysis of problematic areas in which the situation should be improved. The area of work of CEPEJ includes 
civil, administrative and criminal justice.
24 At the end of a questionnaire, each respondent had opportunity to assess the importance of all six dimensions 
– of the one she/he covers as an expert and other five. Experts assessed the importance by distributing 100 points 
to respective dimensions according to their opinion about the importance for the overall openness of a society
25 Created as an average value of all items (questions in the questionnaire) grouped in each particular criterion.
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In the study, the experts provided examples from 2005 showing that some progress had been made 
towards a more open society in the area of the rule of law. These were, for example: the relatively successful 
beginning of negotiations with the EU, the transparency of the electoral process at local elections, positi-
ve developments in war crimes trials,26 (the arrest of Hrvoje Petrač, the surrender of Ante Gotovina to the 
Hague Tribunal, the retrial of the Lora case, which this time was better organized and conducted in a 
calmer ambiance, the ICTY’s transfer of the cases of Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac to Croatia),27 the 
establishment of the government’s anti-corruption program and the various anti-corruption measures ta-
ken, constraining politicians to make declarations of their personal wealth,  the revelation of some corrup-
tion scandals in spite of  attempts at cover-ups, the several criminal procedures against judges conducted, 
publication of judicial practice on the Internet, informing the citizens about reforming the judiciary (jum-
bo ads, brochures, Internet), professionalism in the work of the State Attorney General, the activities of 
the Children’s Ombudsman Office – strengthening the debate on violence against children and on do-
mestic violence, initiating a debate and introducing educational measures on bullying in the workplace, a 
relatively successful implementation of the law on the access to information. Together with these positive 
examples, the experts have also offered a whole lot of examples indicating that Croatian society is still very 
closed in the area of the rule of law: the screening for the chapter of the judiciary and human rights has 
been postponed in the negotiations with the EU, the Minister of Justice was suddenly replaced with no 
real reasons being given, the National Judicial Council exceeding its competence, the inefficiency of courts 
in conducting bankruptcy proceedings, an increase in the repressiveness of policy concerning crime, the 
Government decision to hold closed sessions, the discrimination and stigmatization of minority groups 
(national minorities, sexual minorities,28 HIV-positive persons, women, the disabled, people in political 
asylum), the failure of introducing registered partnership into Croatian legislature, conducting court trials 
on cases of violence against women and children (the Gospić case and the Brezovica case).
VALUE OF  SUBCRITERIA WITHIN PARTICULAR CRITERIA
Table 1 Rule of law: evaluation according to criteria and subcriteri
 2005. 2006.
 Change
(abs.) (%)
quality of legislation
precision and explicitness of laws 42 43 1 2%
transparency of the legislators’ intention and intelligibility 47 50 2 6%
constitutionality and basic human rights protection 42 53 11 26%
no unnecessary severity in the laws 52 64 12 23%
ensuring the implementation and control of enforcement of law 39 40 1 3%
democratic quality of the legislature 43 42 -1 -2%
durability and stability of laws 38 29 -9 -24%
26 However, the respondents’ perception is not unambiguous here, since the same subjects have been mentioned 
as many as six times as an example of the shift towards a closed society.
27 For more details about this issue, see the study of the case of an open society, Tihomir Ponoš, Advances in 
the prosecution of war crimes during 2005
28 For more details about this issue, see the study of the case of a closed society, Aida Bagić, Vesna Kesić,  A Clo-
sed Society Case Study: Sexual and Gender Group Marginalisation Dynamics during 2005 From Zrinjevac 
to the gallery of Parliament and back again onto the street
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access to legal protection for all citizens
equality in legal protection 42 45 2 7%
availability of legal protection to all citizens 48 43 -5 -10%
control of the performance of the judiciary
control, code of ethics, and expertise as the only criterion 34 44 10 29%
accountability, sanctions for poor performance, sanctioning of 
abuse 35 38 3 9%
no corruption in the state attorney’s office 43 42 0 -2%
no corruption in the courts 57 46 -11 -19%
transparency in appointment and promotion 34 43 9 26%
civil control of the judiciary 39 45 6 15%
efficient control of work of public notaries 43 34 -8 -21%
efficiency of judiciary
quality of work and impartiality of the state attorney 46 43 -3 -7%
efficiency and tempo of work of the courts 42 35 -7 -17%
speed of work of examining magistrates 50 47 -3 -6%
autonomy of judiciary
independence of the courts 40 49 9 23%
transparent and expert criteria for selection 38 46 8 21%
independence of the courts of  pressure from the public 43 50 7 16%
trust in the judiciary
trust of the citizens in courts 35 32 -2 -9%
trust of the citizens in the state attorney’s office 40 37 -3 -8%
access to information on the work of the judiciary 40 50 10 25%
Quality of legislation
Figure 5  Subcriteria – change 2006 – 2005
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Among all the items measuring the quality of the laws, the experts rated as the most important tho-
se about the enactment of laws in harmony with the Constitution (6.88 out of 7) and about the harmony 
of the laws with requirements for the protection of  basic human rights (6.88 out of 7). At the same time, 
both items were also rated as being those that are put most into effect in our society of all the items me-
asuring the quality of the laws. For both items we also note a significant progress (an improvement of 
25%) in the perception of their effectuation as compared to the last year’s study (see Figure 5). This is 
largely a consequence of the EU screening process, where our legislation is being closely monitored to 
check whether it is in accordance with the demands for the protection of human rights   and other con-
stitutional principles found in the foundations of European societies. From this point of view it seems a 
great effort is being undertaken.  Furthermore, the perception of the mildness of our laws increased (a 
relative increase of 23% in relation to the previous year – Figure 5) – which might be related to the cam-
paign focused on the needs for change in the criminal laws, some parts of which indeed did change – so 
the feeling that our legislative solutions are not too severe has gained strength. The value for the lastin-
gness and stability of laws significantly decreased (for 24 % - see Figure 5), which is probably a result of 
the harmonisation of our legislation with the acquis communitaire, which demands a whole series of very 
prompt legislative changes. Particular attention should be paid to the mitigation of this effect. In addi-
tion, according to the results, attention should be focused on the coherence and compatibility of soluti-
ons from various laws, ensuring sufficient resources for enforcement of the law,  the possibility of certain 
interest groups influencing the passage of  laws, availability of drafts of bills to the public, and opportu-
nity for the public to be involved in debate on proposed legislation. These items/indicators are assessed 
either as important or very important, but also as rather poorly put into practice in our society.
Access to legal protection for all citizens
Figure 6  Subcriteria – change 2006 – 2005
When looking at the subcriterion the equality of legal protection to all citizens, an increase of 6% is 
noted, in comparison with 2005, while the accessibility of the legal protection to all citizens is marked 
by a decrease of 11%. Within the criterion of the access of all citizens to legal protection, the item that 
was assessed as the most important was that concerning laws not discriminating against certain groups 
of citizens. At the same time, this item is considered by the experts to be put into effect to the greatest 
extent in our society, compared with all the other items that were used to measure this criterion. Equal 
treatment by judges of ordinary citizens and public figures was also considered  very important by the 
experts, but their assessment is that the situation here is not really satisfactory. With respect to ensuring 
the protection of the law to all citizens, the experts consider that efforts should be invested mostly into 
ensuring good quality legal aid for citizens, a decrease in attorneys’ fees, improving the work of the Sta-
te Attorney’s Office (to react more promptly ex officio when someone’s rights are violated), and into 
publishing intelligibly written brochures on various civil rights and the resources available to protect 
them.
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Quality of control of work of the judiciary
Figure 7  Subcriteria – change 2006 – 2005
Within the criterion of  control of the work of the judiciary, the items that were assessed by the experts 
as very important for the attainment of an open society in the area of the rule of law were the non-exi-
stence of corruption (6.94 out of a maximum of 7 points); the sanctioning of poor quality work and the 
transparency of appointment and promotion were assessed as slightly less important; while the least im-
portance was accorded to the items referring control of the work of judicial bodies (by the Ministry, co-
workers, the existence of  codes of ethics and civil control of the judiciary).
Least open of all is the control of work of public notaries and attorneys, but it seems justifiable to say 
that when looking at the control of work of the judiciary, according to the experts’ opinion, the most 
problems stem from the lack of accountability and of not sanctioning poor quality work of the judicial 
bodies (In spite of the fact that a slight increase took place here, the level of openness is rather low, only 
38% - Table 1). 
The experts also consider the transparency in the system of appointing and promoting judges, trai-
nees and counsellors inadequate (although a significant step forward took place in comparison with 
2005 – it was 28% more open - Figure 7). Corruption in courts and in the State Attorney’s Office was 
assessed as relatively a matter for concern a level higher than last year. The experts in last year’s study 
considered freedom from corruption to be 57% of the maximum value, while the assessment of this year’s 
study has brought this figure down to 46%, that is, a deterioration of practically 20 %. Yet this might be 
a reflection of several cases of the revelation of corruption in the judiciary and the indictments of several 
judges that took place in the previous period. The only item within this criterion that could be conside-
red satisfactory is that higher courts pass decisions irrespective of the reputation of the lower-instance 
court judge whose decision is being considered.
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Efficiency of the judiciary
Figure 8  Subcriteria – change 2006 – 2005
Items measuring the efficiency of justice that were rated as extremely important for assessing of how 
open society is within the area of the rule of law were regular and effective enforcement of judicial de-
cisions and low occurrence of invocation of the statute of limitations due to judicial inefficiency, or in 
other words, that the court proceedings do not last unreasonably long. Legal experts did not consider 
other items equally important for measuring societal openness in the area of the rule of law. According 
to the assessment of experts, the situation in Croatia is extremely poor with respect to the great number 
of cases  that last unreasonably long, regular and effective enforcement of judgements, a great number 
of invocations of the statute of limitations due to judicial inefficiency, manipulation of the length of 
proceedings and the non-existence of alternative dispute-resolution models. The negative perception of 
all three subcriteria, as well as all the items  within them, is even greater than it was last year. Assessing 
the work of courts, of the State Attorney’s Office and of investigating magistrates, the experts rated the 
work of courts as the worst, as they scored only 35% (Table 1).
It is in this field, the work of the courts, that the biggest expert disappointment can be noted– it was 
perceived as being 17% less open than it was in 2005 (Figure 8).
Citizens’ trust in the judiciary
Figure 9  Subcriteria – change 2006 – 2005
The confidence of citizens in the work of the State Attorney’s Office is slightly higher (37%- see Ta-
ble 1) than the confidence of citizens in the work of the courts (32% see Table 1), but the situation in 
terms of both sub-criteria is rated worse than last year (see Figure 9). 
The assessment of the experts is that all the items measuring openness in the area of the trust of citi-
zens in the judiciary are very poorly attained in our society. The confidence of citizens that a proceeding 
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will be conducted in a reasonable time (1.71 out of 7) and the confidence of citizens in the probity of 
the courts (1.94 out of 7) are rated lowest. 
Autonomy of the judiciary
Figure 10  Subcriteria – change 2006 – 2005
In all subcriteria measuring the autonomy of the judiciary a positive increase has been noted in the 
perception of their openness (Figure 10) . The experts have assessed almost all the items used to measu-
re the independence of the judicial bodies as very important for achieving an open society in the rule of 
law. The experts rated the susceptibility of the courts to behind the scenes political influence and the 
manner of recruiting trainees, counsellors and judges the issues in Croatia that gave the most cause for 
concern within the criterion of autonomy of the judiciary. Croatia should pay a greater deal of attention 
to further strengthening judicial independence, especially by strengthening its independence of political 
pressures and by recruiting and promoting judges and other judicial employees exclusively on the basis 
of their expertise and quality of work.
CONCLUSION
The Open Society Index of the rule of law has been established on the basis of the arithmetical mean 
of all six criteria for the rule of law. In the 2006 study, this index was 44%, while in the 2005 study it was 
42%. According to all the experts’ assessments,  the areas of the media, economy and education were 
somewhat more open, the treatment of minorities was ranked the same as the rule of law, while the realm 
of  politics has been ranked significantly less open (only 35%).
Therefore there has been a slight improvement over 2005  in the level of openness achieved in the 
dimension of the rule of law (autonomy of the judiciary, trust in the judiciary, control of the quality of 
the judiciary’s work, and quality of legislation were judged slightly better, while at the same time access 
to legal protection and the efficiency of the judiciary were assessed more harshly).
As a candidate country, Croatia is under the powerful magnifying glass of the EU. One of the areas 
being stringently monitored is the attainment of the rule of law in Croatia. Therefore, the rule of law in 
this research has been recognized as one of the important indicators and generators of an open or a closed 
society. The Opinion given by the European Commission on the Croatian application for EU member-
ship 25 includes the state of affairs in the overview of the rule of law, which indicates almost the same 
problems as the study conducted within the framework of the Open Society Index. The European Com-
mission assesses the efficiency and the functioning of judiciary as giving the most cause for concern. The 
Open Society Index also indicates that it is just in this segment within the rule of law that Croatia shows 
the strongest trend towards being a relatively closed society. The Opinion/Avis stressed the need to redu-
ce external influences on the judiciary  – especially in the area of war crimes trials, the need to improve 
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judge and trainee education, to strengthen the fight against corruption, to improve the efficiency of ju-
stice - and particularly to reduce the backlog of cases and the length of proceedings, to establish free legal 
aid to a greater extent, to reduce counsel’s fees and to tie them to the worth of the case, and not to its len-
gth. Such a high level of correspondence between the Open Society Index results and the European 
Commission’s Opinion indicates that the items measuring an open society in the area of the rule of law 
are well formed, and that there is a high level of agreement between domestic experts and external obser-
vers on the fundamental problems faced by Croatian society in the area of attaining the rule of law.
The second round of the research aimed at the formation of the open society index in the area of the 
rule of law allows us to make the following general conclusions:
1. The majority of items within the rule of law are well chosen 
2. A smaller number of items within different criteria overlap, so that they need to be rephrased 
and/or merged 
3. The sub-criteria are extremely useful for analysing societal openness, but some of the subcri-
teria within the rule of law dimension are either not well-chosen terminologically, or are not 
formed well and the items in them are not ordered well, so this needs to be corrected for the 
next round of research
4. The items should be set either as a measure of a closed or a measure of an open society, ot-
herwise the product of importance and evaluation does not make real sense.
The study of the situation in Croatia has indicated the need for further improvement of all the ele-
ments of the rule of law (according to the experts’ assessment, all the dimensions are attained lower than 
50% of the theoretical maximum). Especial attention has to be paid to the improvement of the efficien-
cy of the judiciary and to the strengthening of the citizens’ trust in the judiciary, where the indices are 
the smallest, 41% and 40 % respectively.
The second round of the study has once again confirmed that the Open Society Index is an original, 
interesting and very valuable idea. The comparison of the index results with the European Commission 
evaluation of the situation in Croatia as candidate country and the correspondence of the conclusions 
of these two analyses indicate the value of the index in finding out the most sensitive points and the best 
mechanisms of combating closed societies. Undoubtedly, its significance will be great in comparative 
analyses of different societies’ openness, in temporal tracking of the degree to which a given society is 
open or closed and in identifying why a society is closed.
Policy Recommendations
1. In order to increase the quality of the enactment of laws, it is necessary to:
 a. enable interest groups to influence their enactment,
 b.  before a law is passed, draw up an analysis of the entire area for which the law is to be enac-
ted,
 c. ensure timely availability of the bills to the public, before they are discussed in the  
Government
 d. enable involvement of the wider public in the discussion on offered legal solutions
2. In order to increase the quality of legislation, particular attention needs to be paid to:
 a. harmonization of solutions from different laws
 b. sufficient resources to provided for the enforcement of the law
 c. the drafting of laws is responsible and difficult work, and needs to be adequately remunerated 
(for writing more demanding legislative material, a public tender might be announced)
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3. In order to ensure that all citizens have access to legal protection, the most activities should be 
focused on:
 a. providing high quality and legal aid,
 b. decreasing attorney fees
 c. improvement of the work of the state attorney office (faster response when someone’s rights 
are being violated)
 d. making of simple brochures about the various rights of the citizens and procedures for their 
protection)
4. More stringent control of the quality of work of the judiciary needs to be introduced:
 a. control by the Ministry of Justice  
 b. peer review
 c. elaboration of codes of ethics and implement obligatory education on ethics, for judges, co-
unsel and state attorneys each year on a regular basis
 d. develop a system of corruption control within the judicial system
 e. increase the transparency in the appointment and promotion of the judicial employees
 f. judicial practice of all the courts, and not only that of the Supreme Court, should be available 
on the Internet
5. In order to increase the efficiency of the judiciary, particular attention needs to be paid to:
 a. regular and efficient enforcement of the judgements of the courts
 b. decrease  the number of cases that come under the statute of limitations,
 c. making it impossible to manipulate the length of the proceedings
 d. introduction of alternative modes of solving disputes
6. For increasing trust in the judiciary, the least important is the access to information about the 
work of the courts.  What is necessary is to raise their effectiveness and to decrease the corruption 
found in them.
7. In achieving the autonomy of the judiciary the most attention needs to be focused on :
 a. enhancing independence of political pressures
 b. recruiting and promotion of judges and other judicial employees exclusively on the basis of 
expertise and performance.
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TRANSPARENCY AND THE DEGREE OF DEMOCRACY                    
ATTAINED IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
Nenad Zakošek, PhD, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb
INTRODUCTION
Democracy as a form of political regime is open to change: both for improvement and solving pro-
blems that emerge from the political process, and for steps towards autocracy and populism. Therefore 
it would be naïve to think of the transformation of former socialist systems in East Europe as a one-way 
process: the transition from an autocratic to a democratic system, with gradual consolidation of different 
levels and aspects of democracy, with the positive outcome of the process guaranteed. Nor is the proce-
ss of joining the European Union in an effort to reach the high goals set by the so called “Copenhagen 
Criteria” for membership a guarantee of the irreversibility of democratization and the stability of the 
once attained standards of democratic life.
On the contrary, democracy itself (not the mere “transitional period” between the autocratic and the 
democratic system) is a dynamic system, in which the processes of open democracy and closed autocra-
cy, to use the terminology of this study, go on simultaneously. Democracy is a demanding system: the 
prerequisites are a certain level of civil engagement, the maturity of political elites, the absence of deep 
ideological divisions, and also the absence of broad socioeconomic differences in society, the tolerance 
of political majorities and minorities, institutional balance which prevents concentration of power and 
ensures control over elected officials and state bureaucracy, and last (but not least) the competency of 
elected elites and the ability to achieve the desired (economic, social, political) effects.
Democracy to a certain degree generates its own problems: political polarization, populism and irres-
ponsible elites. The latest experiences of the new democracies of the Central and East Europe, particu-
larly the countries that joined the European Union in 2004, tell of this. For instance, Poland is faced 
with  a rise of political instability which is the result of  the instability of political parties, the rise of ide-
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ological conflicts, volatility and voter abstention and the fragility of political coalitions. Slovakia, on the 
other, at the parliamentary elections in June 2006, experienced how social discontent can be a basis for 
populist mobilization. The elections were won by the left-wing populist party Smer, which formed a very 
dubious parliamentary majority by entering a coalition with extreme nationalists and the compromised 
autocratic party of Vladimir Mećiar. In autumn of  2006 Hungary suffered some deep political tremors 
and a political division of the electorate and the elites which resulted in violent protests and a crisis of 
government legitimacy less than six months after the parliamentary elections. And finally, in Slovenia 
the last parliamentary elections two years ago, after a long period of consensual politics led to a rise of 
ideological and political polarization which can also be a cause of political instability and tendencies that 
are a threat to democracy.
All of these experiences should be kept in mind while studying the transparency and degree of de-
mocracy of the political process in Croatia, both when developing the analytical instrument for evalua-
ting democracy, and when interpreting the results.
Conceptual framework of the research into the openness of Croatian politics
The original methodological concept that is the basis for open society research in the whole and in 
the six chosen dimensions have been retained in the second year of study. Each dimension is defined 
through an array of criteria, that have in this year’s study been additionally methodologically checked by 
fact-oriented analysis of data, which enabled us to define subcriteria and thus achieve a higher level of 
precision and clarity of analysis. In evaluating democracy the starting point was not the formal definiti-
on of democracy, but the implemented criteria and subcriteria, portraying a clear picture of what we 
would call the optimal model of a democratic system. 
The first criterion, named “the degree of participation and vertical openness”, evaluates one of the key 
elements of democracy, namely the realistic possibilities for citizens to take part in politics through po-
litical institutions and organisations. In the study this criterion is broken down to three subcriteria: the 
first is the vertical openness of political parties, which tries to evaluate to what extent political parties can 
be mediators for the initiatives and interests of citizens; the second one is the possibility for citizens to 
directly influence governmental institutions, which depends on the quality of procedures to ensure that 
influence (elections, public debates, openness towards civil society), and the political awareness of citi-
zens and political elites; the third is concerned with the degree of decentralization and the realisation of 
the principle of subsidiarity and it evaluates the functioning of  institutions of local government and the 
possibility for citizens to influence them. The second criterion, called “the degree of control and legality” 
encompasses the institutional division of government and the quality of democratic control over the 
elected state officials as well as the professional state apparatus. It breaks down to subcriteria of civil con-
trol over mechanisms of repression (military, police and secret services), efficiency of the control over 
public institutions (through internal control, state audits and the media), respecting the division of power 
(especially the independence of the judiciary) and the efficiency in fighting corruption at the national 
and local level. The third criterion deals with “transparency and access to information”, in other words it 
includes the political function of the public as an important condition for a high-quality democratic 
process. This criterion is evaluated through two subcriteria, the access to information about the work of 
governmental administration to all parties (ranging from opposing politicians to journalists and citizens), 
and the transparency of processes of political decision making and the work of political institutions. The 
fourth criterion is “the degree of responsibility”: this deals with the modality of the functioning of go-
vernment institutions, government administration and political parties, and it ensures integrity in the 
performance of their functions, closeness and openness towards citizens, responsiveness to the wishes 
and notions of citizens. The different aspects of the modality are expressed through three subcriteria: 
responsibility of the executive government, responsibility of the members of parliament and the leader-
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ship of political parties, and the efficiency of the institutions (meaning the central government admini-
stration and local government). The fifth criterion, “autonomy”, evaluates several different aspects of  the 
functioning of government and the quality of democratic processes: these aspects are, firstly, the protec-
tion of the government administration and state-owned companies from political party manipulations 
(that falls under the first criterion), secondly, political independence of civil society organisations (uni-
ons, the media), and thirdly, the independence of governmental institutions from the influence of power-
ful individual interest and pressure groups (both are included in the second subcriterion). And lastly, 
the sixth criterion, “the degree of professionalism and rationality”, is concerned, on one hand with com-
petence and the lack of ideological polarization in governmental institutions, and on the other hand 
with the characteristics of the political awareness of citizens, the willingness of citizens to discuss poli-
tical agendas without ideological divisions. Evaluating the Croatian political process with such a complex 
categorial apparatus should give us a reliable insight into the state of democracy in Croatia. 
It should be pointed out that the methodological concept for evaluating democracy applied is com-
parable with similar studies in other countries. In the last couple of years the increase of the number of 
democratic systems enhanced the interest to compare them. Today there are a number of projects that 
through the use of quantitative indices evaluate the quality of democracy and the level of the protection 
of freedom and human rights. Most of these projects, including ours, involve the interviewing of experts 
and to a lesser degree rely on public opinion polls. 
What is specific about our project is the research into the open society in a broader sense, and not 
just the political system and the quality of democracy. If we focus on the approach of evaluating demo-
cracy in a restricted sense we can notice parallels with similar international studies. One of the most 
prominent recent research projects since 2000 was done by the International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) from Stockholm under the name Democracy Assessment. The resear-
ch evaluates the state of democracy in eight countries from all continents using a unique methodology. 
Without going into the details of the project, which is focused on descriptive studies and is less concer-
ned with quantitative evaluation of the quality of democracy, in this very extensive international project 
the definitions of the term democracy and the criteria for evaluating it are very similar to our own. The 
basis of the research is a simple and clear definition of democracy: it is a political system that is based 
on two principles – citizen control over political decisions and political elites, and their equal rights in 
performing that function. Furthermore it is assumed that these principles are in practice realized thro-
ugh the following seven “mediating values”: participation (rights, resources and organizations that ena-
ble political participation and participating culture), authorization (organizing fair elections and control 
over the professional non-electoral personnel in the state administration), representation (correspon-
dence between the attitudes of the legislative body and the attitudes and opinions of the citizens), res-
ponsibility (the mechanisms of government division, the independence of the judiciary, parliamentary 
control over executive and governing power, fair civil services and the prevention of corruption), tran-
sparency (the level of publicity in the work of the executive government, the independence of media, 
the access to information), responsiveness (open procedures of public debates, reliable appeal procee-
dings against the procedures of the government, the closeness of local government and its citizens) and 
solidarity (the quality of civil culture: tolerance of diversity and the level of support for democracy).         
The evident closeness of our research methodology with the conceptual and methodological instru-
ments of the IDEA research increases international comparability and the quality and applicability of 
the accumulated data.
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The importance of each of the dimensions of an open society
The results of this year’s research, especially thanks to the comparison with the data from 2005, cle-
arly point out the state and the direction of the development of societal openness in the selected dimen-
sions of the research. First let us take a look at how the importance of the dimension of societal openne-
ss being studied was evaluated. As we are dealing with six dimensions, if their influence on societal ope-
nness were the same, each of these dimensions would make 17% of the synthetically expressed state. If 
we take a look at the data on evaluating the importance of each of the dimension of societal openness 
in both years we will notice that there has not been any substantial change: it is still considered that law 
is of the utmost importance for a society that is open (its influence is approximately one third higher in 
regard to the balanced state); politics, education and media, in spite of some marginal changes, are still 
of average importance, while the importance of the status of minorities is just under the average (15%) 
and the importance of the economy is well below the average (12%, a third less than the average). What 
does this mean? The structure of problems in Croatia obviously has not changed in the past year. The 
most urgent issues are still the problems of the legal order and the provision of legal safety. In a broader 
sense it means that the transitional issues of Croatian society – which are the result of institutional, eco-
nomic and social change – have not yet been resolved: development of institutions and especially their 
acceptance (legitimacy) in the eyes of the citizens have not reached the level at which the institutional 
and judicial order would became an unquestionable and self-explanatory basis for the development of 
other processes important for an open society.  On the other hand the economy is still considered as a 
dimension of less importance for societal openness, in other words, in Croatia the entrepreneurial-libe-
ral spirit that would see the activities in economy as the key means of social change, including a change 
such as to increase societal openness, has not prevailed. As to the status of the minorities it is indisputa-
ble that today in Croatia that issue is given great attention but its influence on the extent to which the 
society is open is still below average. With the stabilization of the institutions for the protection of eth-
nic minority rights and with the increasing frequency of debates about the status and rights of other 
(e.g. sexual) minorities in the future it should be expected that the importance of minority issues for 
societal openness will increase. The fact that the importance of politics for societal openness is only ave-
rage should not come as a surprise: politics is perceived as a dimension that has a high concentration of 
power that affects all the other dimensions, but at the same time, obviously, there exists an awareness on 
the limits of political act.   
Comparison of the general evaluation of societal openness in each dimension                 
in 2005 and 2006
While there are no major differences in evaluating the importance of particular dimensions, there is 
definitely a change in evaluations of the degree of openness of particular dimensions. There are two op-
posing trends at work here: only in the dimension of politics has there been a great decline in compari-
son to 2005 (a relative decline of 11%, from 35 it fell to 31), while in the other five dimensions there 
has been an improvement. The combined effect of these changes is a slight rise in the general value of 
open society index in 2006 in comparison to 2005, by approximately one and a half index points. In 
spite of the overall improvement, I believe that the negative trend in the dimension of politics should 
arouse concern, because that dimension has the greatest influence on all other dimensions. Therefore, 
the continuation of the negative trend in the dimension of politics could jeopardize the improvement 
in other dimensions. In other words, without the improvement in the quality of an open society in po-
litics there cannot be any lasting improvement in other dimensions either. 
Finally, we should look at the absolute degree of the open society index in each of the dimensions. 
Here politics clearly stands out from all other dimensions. Five of the dimensions have been assessed 
35
NENAD ZAKOŠEK: TRANSPARENCY AND THE DEGREE OF DEMOCRACY  ATTAINED IN.....
with a very similar index value that is just below the middle of the index: from the highest evaluated 
dimension of the media (46) to somewhat lower graded dimension of law (44) and minorities (43). In 
contrast to that the dimension of politics is graded far worse, with index value of 31, with about one 
third of the index points fewer than all the other dimensions. 
On basis of the assessment it can be concluded that in Croatia politics is the weakest link of societal 
reforms and we could also presume that it has a negative effect on the judiciary, the dimension which is 
assessed as the most important. Furthermore, it can be presumed that the blame for such a low assessment 
of politics and the negative development trend falls on the current balance of political power, so above 
all the practices of the ruling party, the HDZ, and of the central state institutions, the Government and 
the Parliament, which are run by that party or where that party is in a majority.
Evaluation of the main criteria of the politic dimension
Let us take a closer look at the structure of that poor assessment of the political dimension. Below the-
re is a graph showing the six criteria that were used to evaluate the dimension of politics (Picture 11). 
Figure 11 Open Society Index according to the criteria
In both years the lowest graded criterion in politics has been responsibility; it also had a significant 
drop of 5 percentage points and with an index value of 27 is just above quarter of the theoretical index 
maximum. The two highest graded criteria, participation and vertical openness, and transparency and 
access to information, have an index value 35, just above of one third of the theoretical index maximum, 
and they both dropped  (by 4 and 3 index points). At the same time, these are also the only two criteria 
that are graded above the average mark for the dimension of politics. The criterion of autonomy had the 
largest fall from 2005: it went down by 8 percentage points, more than one fifth of the index value it had 
in 2005. In order to understand the meaning of these scores and the reasons for such a negative trend in 
the index of open politics we need to analyze more closely the structure of the criteria and subcriteria 
that were used to form these scores, with an occasional look at the values of characteristic items that 
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comprise those criteria. In Table 2 an overview of all the criteria and subcriteria in the dimension of po-
litics is given, and the change in the index value in years 2005 and 2006 is pointed out. 
Table 2 Transparency and degree of democracy of political process: evaluation through criteria and 
subcriteria
2005. 2006.
CHANGE
(abs.) (%)
The degree of participation and vertical openness
Vertical openness of political parties 36 34 -2 -6%
Possibility for citizens to influence the government and public 
policies 41 35 -6 -15%
Decentralization and respecting the principle of subsidiarity 38 37 -1 -3%
The degree of control and legality
Efficiency of civil control of mechanisms of repression 35 39 4 11%
Efficiency of control of public institutions 37 31 -6 -16%
Respecting the division of power 44 35 -9 -20%
Efficient fight against corruption 25 23 -8%
Transparency / access to information
Accessibility of information on the work of public institutions 
and authorities 37 38 1 3%
Transparency of political decision-making 41 35 -6 -15%
The degree of responsibility
Responsibility of executive authorities towards citizens 33 25 -8 -24%
Responsibility of executive legislative authorities and political 
parties towards citizens 29 25 -4 -14%
Efficiency of institutions 34 37 3 9%
The degree of autonomy and efficiency
Independence of state-owned companies 
and the government administration of  politics 33 26 -7 -21%
Independence of civil society organizations of politics 46 37 -9 -20%
The degree of professionalism and rationality
Rationality of political acting 33 31 -2 -6%
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Degree of participation and vertical openness
Within the overall rather poorly assessed dimension of politics the criterion of participation and 
vertical openness is one of the two criteria assessed most highly. The subcriterion “decentralisation and 
adherence to the principal of subsidiarity”, with an index value of 37, is the criterion best evaluated. Such 
an evaluation is most of all the result of the estimation that the system of local government passes on 
enough of its authority to municipalities and townships (average 2.9),29 but at the same time the possi-
bility for citizens to achieve their specific interests is still evaluated as unsatisfactory (2.3).   
The subcriterion “possibility for citizens to influence the government and public policies” has recei-
ved a lower mark (index value 35) and has declined significantly in comparison with 2005 (when the 
index value was 41). The weakest components of the subcriterion are the unsatisfactory communication 
procedures between members of parliament and citizens and the lack of will in citizens to achieve that 
communication (the average item mark being only 1.9), and besides that also the quality of public deba-
tes (2.0). It is also obvious that the institutional and political and cultural prerequisites for factoring ci-
tizen initiatives into the political process have grown weaker since 2005. At the same time, which is so-
mewhat surprising, the highest evaluated component of the subcriterion is the degree of influence of 
civil institutions on the political process (3,2), which is the result of a view that the organised non-go-
vernmental sector has a certain political influence.
The subcriterion that has been given the lowest mark is the vertical openness of political parties (in-
dex value 34), and not only this year but also the year before. The subordinate position of party members 
to the party leadership and insufficient tolerance for difference of opinion within the party is considered 
particularly a matter for concern (the average mark of both items is 2.0).    
Transparency and access to information
This criterion has been evaluated approximately the same as the one before and therefore belongs to 
the areas of Croatian politics that cause relatively little concern. Within this criterion the subcriterion 
that received the highest mark is access to information on the work of the bodies of public government 
(index value 38). It is important to point out that this is also one of the rare subcriteria that was assessed 
better than the previous year. Such a high evaluation is mostly contributed by access to information by 
members of parliament (3.4) and by journalists (3.1), while at the same time it is considered that citizens 
have a more difficult time obtaining necessary information from relevant state bodies (2.1) and bodies 
of regional and local government (2.2). Transparency of the political decision-making process in the 
Parliament received was assessed adversely (index 35), where the lack of public accessibility to data rela-
ted to financing of electoral campaigns is especially worrying (1.9) as is the tendency of politicians to 
make their decisions away from the public eye (2.0). Two significant changes for the worse in the com-
ponents of this subcriterion should be pointed out: in comparison with the 2005 evaluation of the in-
dependence of public media and the transparency of the political decision making process in the Parli-
ament have decreased dramatically (in both items the average value went down by more than one point). 
And yet, despite this decrease, the public media were assessed relatively high (3.0).
The degree of control and legality 
This criterion is in third place according to the index value within the dimension of politics (index 
value 32 is slightly above the average of the whole dimension). The worst evaluated subcriterion, also the 
subcriterion with the lowest absolute evaluation within the dimension of politics, is “efficiency in the 
29 The scale ranges 1 – 7, where 7 is the highest grade. 
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fight against corruption” (index value of only 23, less than a quarter). The extremely low result in the 
year 2005 was worse by another 2 percentage points, and the evaluation of the probity of local gover-
nment (1.5) is one of the lowest within the dimension of politics.
The subcriterion “efficiency of mechanisms which control the work of the central government ad-
ministration” has also received a low mark (index value 31), which relates to different mechanisms of 
control (audits, internal evaluations, control through the media) of the civil service while the component 
of fighting corruption has the lowest score (1.5). Strict respect for the division of power as a form of 
control over state administration has been evaluated slightly better (index 35, which is above the avera-
ge of this societal dimension). It is significant that the subcriterion suffered a significant decrease, of as 
much as 9 percentage points in comparison with 2005. This subcriterion includes the independence of 
the judiciary, control of the executive branch by the legislative arm and the lack of informal immunity 
of ruling party officials. The last component was evaluated with the lowest mark (1.7), which is a signi-
ficant decline in comparison with 2005.
The best assessed criterion is the efficiency of civil control over the mechanisms of repression, the con-
trol over the military getting the highest mark (3.3) and control over the secret services the lowest ( 2.1).  
Autonomy
The autonomy criterion is a complex indicator that on one hand measures the degree of (party-) po-
litical interventions in the central government administration, management of state-owned companies 
and the organizations of civil society, and on the other hand the independence of government from cer-
tain groups’ interests. We have pointed out that this criterion suffered the most significant decrease in 
comparison with 2005: the index value dropped from 39 to 31. The main reasons for this decrease can 
be found in both subcriteria: in the first one, which evaluates the independence of state-owned compa-
nies and management of politics (in the sense of partisan party politics), and has been evaluated with a 
very low index of 26, the biggest drop being experienced by the component of independence of state-
owned corporation management of the ruling party (from 2.3 to 1.5).
The other components of this criterion, which measure political parties’ use of state administration 
and government institutions, suffered a lesser drop but their absolute indeed points are very low (ranging 
from 1.7 to 2.3). Within the criterion of the independence of institutions of civil society of politics,  the 
value of the independence of the most influential political media suffered the greatest drop (from 3.7 to 
2.7) and the independence of Government and the Parliament of certain groups’ interests has been gra-
ded significantly lower (in 2006 - 1,8).
Professionalism and rationality
This criterion reached the same index value as the previous one (31), and its value designates the de-
gree of ideological polarization at all levels of political action, from members of parliament and party le-
aders to citizens. The value for this criterion was also low in the previous year, and has slightly decreased 
this year, which shows that ideological conflicts still dominate over meaningful agenda-based debates.
Responsibility
This year, as well as the previous one, this is the criterion with the lowest value except that this year 
the index value is even significantly lower, 27. This synthetic value within itself hides conflicting trends. 
Indices of the two subcriteria, the responsibility of the executive branch towards the citizens and the 
responsibility of the legislative branch and political parties to the citizens, have decreased and reached 
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the value of 25. Both criteria include items that have been graded with the lowest mark (1.3 and 1.4) in 
the whole dimension of politics, and relate to the readiness of the members of the executive government 
to resign in the event of some ethical transgression, and the readiness of  members of parliament to resi-
gn if they leave the party on whose list they were elected. The morality of politicians earned itself the 
lower mark. But the third subcriterion, institutional efficiency, shows an opposite trend and achieved an 
increase in index value from 34 to 37. This relates to the functioning of the civil service and local gover-
nment and their ability to give the citizens certain services. The value is still not satisfactory because it is 
only slightly above a third of the theoretical maximum.
 The process of joining the EU and the quality of democratic politics
If we take a look at the findings of our research in the light of the process of joining the EU and the 
demands that this process makes on Croatian politics, we must note the large and disturbing deficits that 
can most definitely have a negative influence on the rate of attaining the conditions for membership. 
Here we will just point out those deficits that are the greatest obstacle for attaining the conditions for 
joining.
• not enough respect for the division of power, especially the unsatisfactory functioning of the      ju-
diciary and insufficient independence of the courts
• inefficiency in fighting corruption
• politicization of management and state companies
In such conditions the state of Croatian politics undoubtedly makes social, economic and judicial 
reform more difficult and presents a constant source of instability. Therefore we should expect that the 
main obstacles in the process of accession will be in the area of politics, and will be manifested through 
its negative influence and through inefficiency in the implementation of reforms which the European 
Commission demands from Croatia. 
Conclusion and recommendations
After two years of study on the how open Croatian society is and two cycles of research we can with 
great certainty claim that politics is the weakest dimension in Croatian society. Politics received far the 
worst evaluation and in 2006 it is the only  researched dimension that suffered a decline from the previ-
ous year. A significant amount of the blame for the poor results and the causes for this negative trend 
must be laid at the door of the ruling party, in particular the following issues:
• unsatisfactory mechanisms of control of the executive power,
• the weakening of the division of power,
• more political interference in the central government administration, the state-owned companies 
and the media,
• the weakening of judicial and media independence,
• inadequate mechanisms for fighting corruption,
• insufficient transparency of the political decision-making processes. 
Furthermore, some of the poor results are a consequence of the state of Croatian politics as a whole 
and the (lack of ) quality of Croatian political elites in general and not just the ruling party’s. The fo-
llowing deficits are especially in question:
• insufficient vertical openness of political parties,
• lack of adherence to ethical criteria of responsibility and general insufficient responsibility of po-
liticians at all levels of government,
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• excessive ideologisation and tendency towards populism instead of rationality and  capability to 
confront political programs,
• inefficiency and corruption of the local government.
Finally, it should be mentioned that, in contrast to the generally negative trend, there have been some 
steps forward in Croatian politics and they are:
• more efficient civil control over the mechanisms of repression, slightly better efficiency of the sta-
te administration,
• easier access to information on the work of state institutions for members of parliament and jour-
nalists.
• larger influence of civil institutions on politics.
In conclusion: politics in Croatia in the last two years has, according to this study, tended to close 
and not to open society. It is crucial to raise the awareness of all the deficiencies of Croatian politics no-
ted here, citizens and politicians both should become aware of them. It must also become clear that po-
litical deficits seriously threaten the reform capabilities of the Croatian society. The change of such po-
litics will be a necessity if we want to join the European Union or, in other words, if we want to live in 
an open society. 
iDEMO recommendations:
• reinforce the mechanisms for control of the executive government,
• reinforce the mechanisms for fighting corruption,
• work on a radical increase of the transparency of the political decision-making process, 
• create and develop mechanisms of internal party democracy,
• insist on the responsibility of politicians and political parties,
• increase the access to information on the work of the central government administration (not only 
for members of parliament and journalists but for the public in general). 
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Education and openness
Purpose of this part of the Open Society Index is two-sided: it should directly show in what measure 
an education system is – according to the experts’ opinion – open, and then, sequentially, to what extent 
and in which way its characteristics contribute to the level of openness of a society on the whole.
The extent to which an education system is open is expressed by means of six criteria, each one cove-
ring one aspect of an open system. The criteria used are:
- Possibility of participation in education,
- Pluralism in the education system,
- Possibility and efficiency of public debate,
- Transparency and access to information,
- Autonomy and efficiency of institutions and teachers,
- Legality and control of institutions’ work.
The education system contributes to the achievement of an open society to the extent it promotes 
values of pluralism and tolerance, enables equalization of possibilities, and trains for autonomous and 
responsible life choices/decisions, for adequate level of social inclusion and citizen participation.
The first criterion, possibility of participation in education, links openness of the education system 
with access to education: the system is open to the extent to which education as public good is equally 
accessible to all citizens. The best way to measure openness of the education system defined this way is 
to establish to what extent education is accessible, not to the mainstream part of population, but, quite 
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the opposite, to those who are not part of it: geographically (children from rural parts of the country, 
far from city centers), socio-economically (poor), ethnically (national minorities), psychologically and 
physically (children, young people and adults with special needs)... Although it might look obvious, and 
therefore even almost trivial, it is necessary to indicate that in this context “equal” does not mean “same”: 
the same conditions will not result in equal access to education to those who are not initially equal. For 
a physically healthy child, it is sufficient to have, allowing for a slight exaggeration, an average staircase 
at the school entrance and a textbook in the standard script. For a child in a wheelchair, however, a lift 
is necessary to go to the school in the first place, or at least a ramp, just as a blind child needs a textbook 
in Braille. Here, the same conditions obviously mean inequality. In contrast, equality demands the appli-
cation of the principle of differences, according to which undeserved inequalities, those that are not the 
results of intention but of birth, need to be compensated in some way30. In case education as public good 
is not to the same extent accessible to all, it results in unequal life chances, as, in spite everything, they 
drastically increase with the higher level of education .
The second criterion, pluralism, includes two matters. The first is pluralism within the education 
system itself, which is manifested as pluralism of educational goals, methods and textbooks. It is not, 
pragmatically speaking, a matter of a broad selection of educational of curricula that can satisfy various 
needs of users, but of the right to choose. This indicator refers also to other characteristics of the educa-
tion system – its possibility to promote – through formal and hidden curricula – various values of dif-
ferences (i.e. pluralism as its institutionalization) and to tolerance, and this influences the openness of 
society on the whole.
The possibility and the efficiency of public debate create the third criterion. Its purpose is to indica-
te not only whether the possibility exists of articulating interests and attitudes through a public debate 
on education, but also how efficient it is, and to what extent the education system is open to proposals 
and requests that are being shaped through and by the debate.
The fourth criterion is transparency of the education system and access to information, or, put dif-
ferently, the ability to see from “the outside” what is happening inside the system.
This is primarily of concern regarding the transparency of decision-making and implementation of 
decisions, as well as readiness of the system to enable access to all interested to all relevant information 
about activities, institutions and so on.
Autonomy and efficiency of institutions and teachers comprise the fifth criterion. It indicates the 
level of professional academic autonomy within the system (the autonomy is here implied primarily as 
institutionalized protection of illegitimate political and governing interventions). Furthermore, its pur-
pose is to show to what extent the system is capable of executing proclaimed goals. The latter is closely 
related to the control and legality, which constitute the last criterion.
The term control implies two issues: existence of a rational mechanism for evaluating (and subsequ-
ently improving) the quality of work of the educational institutions, as well as the accountability of the 
educational institutions not only to their direct financier, i.e. the state, but also to those who are being 
educated (in public administration jargon: service users). When it comes to legality, the purpose is to 
identify whether an adequate legal framework exists and whether the mechanisms for its implementa-
tion are institutionalized.
30  J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971, § 17, pp. 100-108
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Table 3  Education: evaluation according to criteria and sub-criteria
2005. 2006.
Change 
(abs.) (%)
Possibility of participation in education
Potential of the education system to enable participation in 
education 39 37 -2 -5%
Adjustment of educational programs and processes to the needs 
of specific populations 39 45 6 15%
Basic access to education 56 53 -3 -5%
Pluralism in education
Tolerance towards pluralism of educational content and 
programs  
39 45 6 15%
Pluralism of educational curricula, methods, and goals 44 46 2 5%
Possibility and efficiency of public debate
Openness of the education system towards suggestions and 
proposals of the stakeholders
31 35 4 13%
 Openness of dialogue on education 40 42 2 5%
Transparency and access to information 38 42 4 11%
Autonomy and efficiency
Efficiency of education 37 40 3 8%
Autonomy of educational institution 43 60 17 40%
Control and legality
Possibility of control of work of education system 32 33 1 3%
Quality of normative regulation of educational institutions’ 
work 52 62 10 19%
Efficiency of fighting corruption in education 35 38 3 9%
The given criteria, i.e. the characteristics they are referring to, do not have equal relevance for an edu-
cational system that is open (Figure 12) 
According to the experts’ opinion, relatively the most relevant are autonomy and efficiency and con-
trol and legality ( 6.32 on the scale 1-7), while relatively the least relevant are  transparency and access 
to information (5.94) and the possibility and the efficiency of public debate(5.91).
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Figure 12 Assessment of importance of criteria of openness of education (on the scale 1-7)
The European context
According to Article 149 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community31  “[t]he Community 
shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member 
States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the respon-
sibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and 
their cultural and linguistic diversity.”.
In spite of a rather explicit definition, according to which the content and organization of educati-
onal institutions remain fully under the jurisdiction of the member states32, there is an evident intention 
in the EU to define a common framework for the development of national education systems, which 
gained considerable impetus with the Bologna Declaration (1999) and the Lisbon Strategy (2000).
When taking into account the goals from the Bologna Declaration33, from the perspective of ope-
nness, it is of particular importance to mention the introduction of a control system and improvement 
of quality of higher education. The Lisbon Strategy34 is significantly more comprehensive and ambitious, 
setting before the Union a strategic goal for this decade – “to become the most competitive and dynamic 
world economy based on knowledge, capable of sustainable development with higher employment and 
higher social cohesion”. Achieving this goal implies modernization of education systems, and demands 
“a greater role of the European Council in leading and coordination [of the process], in order to ensure 
more coherent strategic focus and efficient supervision of the progress.” The following year, the ministers 
of education agreed on the common goals that should be reached by 2010 and in 2002 a detailed pro-
31 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Official Journal of the European Com-
munities 2002/C 325/33
32 To which is added, in Paragraph 4 of the same Article that the Council of the EU, for the purpose of realising this 
objective “shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States”.
33 http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/educ/bologna/bologna.pdf
34  Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council, 2000, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm
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gramme was adopted35, which lists 13 goals, grouped in three categories: improvement of quality and 
efficiency of education, increase of access to education for all and opening of education systems to the 
world. For achieving these goals “Open Method of Coordination” will be used, that includes “unique 
comprehensive strategy”36.6
For openness of education, insistence on equality of access to education has a particularly important 
role: “All citizens must have equal access to education and training. Member states must take care of the 
needs of vulnerable groups, particularly those with disabilities and difficulties in learning, as well as of 
those who live in rural/isolated areas. “37
The Programme furthermore requests member states to integrate, within their education systems, a 
principle of equal opportunity, in order to ensure equitable access to education for the deprived and 
marginalized, and to ensure efficient promotion of learning of democratic values and democratic parti-
cipation in the schools38.
Openness of education in Croatia
In 2006 education obtained 45 index points: the result is the same as that of the dimension of the 
economy, and somewhat lower than the index of the media (46). The index results for all other areas are 
lower (rule of law 44, minorities and marginalized groups 43, transparency of political processes 31). 
This year the result is somewhat higher than it was the previous year, in which education scored 41 index 
points. According to the experts’ assessment, out of six aspects of education (which correspond to the 
basic six criteria) the best result was scored by autonomy and efficiency (48) and the worst by the possi-
bility of and the efficiency of public debate (38).
Figure 13 Open Society Index to the criteria
35 Detailed Work Programme on the Follow-up of the Objectives of Education and Training Systems in Europe, Of-
ficial Journal of the European Communities, 2002, 2002/C 142/01
36  Ibid., pp 5-6
37  Ibid., p 12
38  Ibid., p 13
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Autonomy and efficiency
The criterion of autonomy and efficiency is the criterion with the highest Open Society Index (48), 
and it was also, along with control and legality, assessed as the most important for the openness of edu-
cation as a whole. The span between the indicators with the highest and the lowest value is very signifi-
cant (1:2.08). 
Table 4 Items/Indicators grouped in the sub-criterion Autonomy and efficiency and evaluation of 
openness on the scale from 1 (lowest value- least open) to 7 (highest value- most open)
Indicators Evaluation
Autonomy of university 4,8 
Possibility of autonomous actions of faculty and educational institutions 
in the delivery of curricula
4,1 
Low incidence of principals with inadequate expertise being appointed
 to educational institutions
4,1 
Low incidence of principals being appointed to educational institutions 
mainly on political grounds 3,9 
De-ideologisation of educational program 3,4 
Efficiency of educational institutions in the implementation of the basic 
educational goals 
3,3 
The high effect of education on development of freedom of expression, 
self-realization and creativity
2,9 
Elementary school program unburdened with “formal” content 2,8 
Compatibility of educational programs with developmental needs 2,4 
Possibility of educational processes resulting in the recognition 
and highlighting of the special talents of pupils and students
2,3 
It is interesting that the indicators referring to autonomy are assessed with a significantly higher index 
(60) than the indicators referring to the efficiency of the system (40) (Figure 14). The indicator with the 
highest value is the autonomy of university (4.8) 39, and immediately after the low incidence of principals 
with inadequate expertise being appointed to educational institutions and possibility of autonomous actions 
of faculty and educational institutions in the delivery of curricula (both 4.1). At the same time, the auto-
nomy of educational institutions is the sub-criterion with the highest increase over the previous year, 
which leads to the conclusion that in the field of autonomy significant progress has been achieved. As 
there were no significant changes within the regulatory framework in this field in this year, it can be 
concluded that awareness of the importance of autonomy had risen considerably, not only within the 
field but in general. The whole field of autonomy got fewer index points (40), and progress since 2005 
is almost negligible (Figure 14). All three items with the lowest value, strong influence of education on the 
development of freedom of expression, self-realization and creativity of pupils/students (2.9), compatibility 
of educational programs with developmental needs (2.4), and possibility of educational processes resulting in 
39 Evaluation of items/indicators is expressed on a scale from 1 to 7, where the value 7 means that respective character-
istic is fully present/implemented in the education system. 
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the recognition and highlighting of the  special talents of pupils and students (2.3) speak of the distinct ine-
ffectiveness of the system.
Figure 14 Sub-criteria – evaluation of openness in 2006 in relation to 2005
The primary reason for the low efficiency of the education system is the lack of any significant chan-
ges in the curricula. All previously announced or even initiated changes, such as the so-called CNES(Croatian 
National Education Standard), come down to the mere rearrangement and re-naming of existing curri-
cula. 40
How crucial thorough curricular changes are for raising the effectiveness of the system will be clear 
if the current situation is compared with the demands for EU education systems from the perspectives 
of the Lisbon Declaration and the program “Education and Training 2010”. 41
Pluralism
Open Society Index of this criterion is the second on the list and it makes 45 index points (Figure 
14). Having in mind that the index is a percentage of the realization of certain characteristics, it is obvi-
ous that pluralism in education is realized only 45% in relation to the possible optimum, that is, not even 
half-way. The span between the highest and lowest ranked items is relatively large (1:1,84).
Table 5 Items/indicators grouped in the sub-criterion Autonomy and efficiency and evaluation of the 
openness on a scale from 1 (lowest value- least open) to 7 (highest value- most open) 
Indicators Evaluation
Pluralism of textbooks (possibility of choosing textbooks) 4,6 
40  In passing it may be said that the actual process of the origination of the CNES tells of mystification abetted by ag-
gressive PR activities that present methodical trivialities such as group work, making posters and learning in nature as 
educational novelties and as an important curricular change. The whole of this story started off with the making of the 
catalogue of knowledge which, as its creators explicitly stated, and as entailed by the logic of things, was created on the 
basis of the curriculum as it existed.  These catalogues of knowledge, almost literally, from Monday to Friday, by the 
copy and past method of transubstantiation were converted into the NCES, on the basis of which completely new 
curricula are apparently being created.
41 For us particularly instructive are activities the aim of which is curriculum reform thanks to which educational sys-
tems will enable the young to acquire the key competences essential for self-actualisation, social cohesions and a soci-
ety of knowledge. For more on this see Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Key
Competences for Lifelong Learning, 2005
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Possibility for children to learn about their own culture as much as about 
the culture of the majority 3,8 
Pluralism of educational programs and methods 3,5 
Satisfactory representation of topics in educational programmes that 
cover cultural and ethnic diversity 3,4 
Satisfactory number of courses at universities that emphasize various forms 
of cultural diversity
3,1 
Tolerance of all forms of diversity is promoted in educational programs 
and institutions 3,0 
Pluralism of educational goals 3,0 
Satisfactory representation of topics which deal with sexual and 
physical differences 2,9 
Existence of various different programs which affirm cultural diversity 
in primary and secondary education 2,8 
A great number of alternative educational programs 2,6 
Possibility for pupils/students to choose educational contents to a 
satisfactory degree 2,5 
The openness of this education system criterion has been assessed on a basis of two sub-criteria: de-
velopment of tolerance of diversity (tolerance of pluralism of educational contents and programs) and 
the pluralism of the education system itself (pluralism of educational programs, methods and goals).
Figure 15  Sub-criteria – evaluation of openness in 2006 in relation to 2005
The highest level of openness, when one is talking about the pluralism of education system, is shown 
in the pluralism of textbooks, where the possibility of choice of textbooks was assessed (atypically) hig-
hly (4.6) (Table 5). Two indicators within this sub-criterion that are assessed the lowest are possibility for 
pupils/students to choose educational contents to a satisfactory degree (2.5) and a great number of alternati-
ve educational programs (2.6).
This assessment very realistically expresses the utterly undifferentiated and monolithic nature of the 
education system. Aiming to be more efficient, modern education systems have increased their differen-
tiation most often in two ways. The first is the inclusion of as many various educational programs and 
models deriving from different educational philosophies as possible. The second is the reduction of the 
compulsory part of the curriculum (the so-called curricular nucleus) and an increase in electives. The 
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Croatian education system, on the contrary, still offers the same to all, in spite of the fact that educati-
onal needs are undoubtedly very different. This is one of the key reasons for its poor efficiency. 
What is worrying regarding pluralism is the second sub-criterion index value, i.e. the value of indi-
cators that directly speak not only about the openness of the system itself, but also about education as a 
generator of an open or closed society (Figure 14). Three indicators assessed rather poorly are the exi-
stence of various different programs which affirm cultural diversity in primary and secondary education 
(2.8), the promotion of tolerance of all forms of diversity in educational programs and institutions (3.0) and 
satisfactory representation of topics which deal with sexual and physical differences (2.9) (Table 5). The only 
indicator that has a somewhat higher value in this group is possibility for children to learn about their own 
culture as much as about the culture of majority (3.8). 
This assessment of the ability provided for children to learn about their own culture is in accordan-
ce with a generally high assessment of the possibilities for the education of national minorities (with 
exception of the Roma who need to be addressed, for a number of reasons, as a “non-traditional” i.e. 
atypical national minority42).
At first sight, it might seem that these assessments are in explicit contradiction. However, one should 
not forget that this ostensible contradiction is a consequence of the modes of education of national mi-
norities; it is primarily a consequence of the organization of education for national minorities through 
separate or additional subjects or curricula, in separate classes, and somewhere even in separate schools. 
If you look at the school mainstream, it is clear at first sight that it does not reflect even the fact that di-
fferences exist, let alone the idea that they are acceptable.
An education system that does not accept differences, and promotes them even less, creates an actu-
al danger of two kinds. At a pragmatic level, non-familiarity with the differences in ever more heteroge-
neous societies has produced consequences such as lack of resourcefulness and incapacity for rational 
social interaction. At a level of principle, such an education system is incapable of promoting consensus 
on the basic values underpinning a democratic community: tolerance and respect for difference.
Control and Legality
Control and legality is a criterion that is, together with autonomy and efficiency, according to the 
experts’ assessment, the most important for an open education system and for an open society as a who-
le. Therefore, the fact that the number of index points (44) puts this criterion below the index figure for 
education in general is disturbing (Figure 13). Equally important is that the span between the lowest 
and the highest evaluated indicators is rather large (1:1.3) (Table 6).
Indicators that stand out in this group according to their index points are those that refer to the legal 
framework (quality of normative regulation of educational institutions’ work): quality of the Law on Pri-
mary Education (3.4), the Law on Scientific Work and Higher Education (4.6), and the regulations that 
deal with the primary education of national minorities even reach as high as 5.0, which is the indicator 
with the highest level in the whole educational dimension researched. The index value for the whole 
sub-criterion makes 62, which leads to the conclusion that, according to the experts’ assessment, the 
legal regulatory framework of the education system is, with respect to openness, outstandingly good.
42 One such atypical factor is that the Roma, as ethnic group, are not characterised so much, as is the way of  tradi-
tional ethnic minorities, by traditional cultural bonds such as language, religion and customs, rather by a common 
socio-economic status.
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Table 6  Indicators grouped in the sub-criterion Control and legality and evaluation of  openness on a 
scale from 1 (lowest value- least open) to 7 (highest value- most open) 
Indicators Evaluation
Satisfactory legislative regulating issues related to the primary education 
of  national minorities 5,0 
Good law on scientific work and higher education 4,6 
Good law on primary education 3,4 
Possibility for change of poor and inadequate regulations in the field of education 2,6 
Efficiency in fighting corruption in education 2,6 
Possibility for students to evaluate professors and quality of study 2,5 
In procedures of official evaluation of the quality of work of the teaching staff, 
the authorized institutions fully adhere to the prescribed criteria of assessment 2,5 
Parents and pupils have are able to evaluate the work of the teaching staff in 
primary and secondary schools 2,1 
Development of rational parameters for assessment of the performance 
of educational institutions 1,9 
Figure 16 Sub-criteria – evaluation of openness in 2006 in relation to 2005
At the same time, the indicators that deal with the possibility performance assessment within the 
education system are assessed as rather low, the development of rational parameters for assessment of the 
performance of educational institutions being one of the two with the lowest value in the whole field of 
education (1.9). These results were expected to an increased degree, and are a consequence of the fact 
that in the Croatian education system a mechanism of systemic performance evaluation has not yet been 
established, that is, some of its elements are in their infancy phase. Education systems that do not have 
performance assessment mechanisms usually face two acutely serious problems.
Principally, without such mechanisms a systemic improvement in performance is not possible, so 
these systems are either distinctively static, or changes are only sporadic and led by more or less intuitive 
assessments of what is not good and what should be done about it. Along with this, the systems witho-
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ut incorporated performance indicators and mechanisms cannot be transparent, as one of the precon-
ditions of their transparency is exactly a possibility of insight into the performance of the institutions.
A hardly noticeable improvement in relation to the previous year could be explained by the intro-
duction of some elements of performance assessment in institutions of higher education, and in some 
secondary education institutions. In the first case, it is referred to the activities related to the application 
of the Bologna Declaration, in which the establishment of quality control mechanisms is one of the ba-
sic six goals. In the field of secondary education, certain improvement is a result of establishing and first 
activities of the State Centre for External Evaluation of Education.43
The fact that is particularly worrying is that the efficiency in fighting corruption is assessed rather 
low (Figure 16), and it seems that the problem is more serious in higher education than in pre-tertiary 
education. 44
Possibility of Participation
Participation in education, i.e. access to education, scored 43 index points (Figure 13), and at the 
same time has been assessed by the experts as the third most important criteria for a society that is open 
overall. Furthermore, again, the span between the highest and lowest evaluated indicators is very large 
(1-2.8) (Table 7).
Table 7 Indicators grouped in the sub-criterion Possibility of participation and evaluation of openness 
on a scale from 1 (lowest value- least open) to 7 (highest value- most open) 
Indicators Evaluation
Satisfactory access to primary education for all citizens regardless 
of the place of residence 4,5 
Adjustment of curricula to the needs of national minorities 4,4 
Equal conditions for education for the whole pupil/student population 3,6 
Capacity of the education system to ensure means and educational 
equipment for children with special needs – difficulties in development 3,4 
Access to primary education for the Roma children 3,0 
Possibility of the education system to obviate backwardness in education 
of  children with unhelpful social status 2,9 
Adjustment of educational processes to the capacities of  disabled children 2,9 
Possibility of the education system to provide relevant knowledge and experience 
for the disabled persons leading to their successful integration 2,8 
Capability of the education system to ensure satisfactory number of scholarships 
to the socially deprived 2,3 
43  The cohort that enrolled in high school in 2005 has already had national exams in three subjects, and these children 
are the first cohort that will have the state administered leaving exam.  The national tests and the leaving exam as ex-
ternal forms of assessment not only of pupil achievements but of school performance are potential mechanisms for the 
control and improvement of the performance of educational institutions.
44 Istraživanje javnog mnijenja o korupciji, javnosti informacija i interesa, Transparency International Hrvatska, 2005. 
http://www.transparency.hr/dokumenti/istrazivanja/omnibus_04_2005_korupcija.pdf
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Adjustment of school buildings for disabled children 2,1 
Adjustment of special programs in primary education to the specific needs 
of the Roma children 1,6 
The second highest value is scored by the indicator adjustment of educational programs to the needs 
of national minorities (Table 7), which is at the same time the indicator that has a very significant incre-
ase over the previous year. This is in accordance with the relatively high index of the education of natio-
nal minorities in general, as assessed by the experts. This leads to the conclusion that belonging to a spe-
cific ethnic minority does not have any significant influence on access to education. The exception is the 
access to education for Roma, who are, because of their utter socio-economic deprivation and margina-
lization, and often even segregation, in a completely different position. 
According to the data from the Croatian Government, “very few Roma children attend elementary 
school which is obligatory, and 40% of the enrolled Roma children never finish primary education”45 
As for secondary education, only 7% of Roma children upon finishing primary education enrol in 
secondary school (the national average is 78.5%), and only 3.5% of these finish some sort of the secon-
dary education.46 
Therefore, it is a bit surprising that the experts assessed access to primary education for Roma chil-
dren as high as 3.0, while at the same time adjustment of the special programs in primary education to 
the specific needs of Roma children was assessed with 1.6 index points (which is the indicator with the 
lowest value in the whole area of education). The first indicator shows an increase in relation to the pre-
vious year, which might be explained with the activities connected with the Roma Decade and the last 
year’s Decade Action Plan for Roma Inclusion, 2005-2015. 
What is of concern is that both indicators which speak about access to education for children with 
poor social status are assessed low (possibility of the education system to remove or reduce backwardness in 
the education of the children with unfavourable social status 2.9, and capability of the education system to 
ensure satisfactory number of scholarships to the socially deprived 2.3). Furthermore, the whole of the sub-
criterion basic access to education has recorded a decrease in comparison with the previous year’s figure. 
(Figure 17)
Figure 17 Sub-criteria – evaluation of openness in 2006 in relation to 2005
45  Akcijski plan desetljeća za uključivanje Roma, 2005-2015., Vlada RH, Zagreb, 2005; also Draft Roma
Decade Action Plan 2005-2015, Government Of the Republic of Croatia, Office for National Minorities, Zagreb, 2004, 
p. 21 http://www.romadecade.org/en/index.php?search=&action=20&id=0&jump=0
46 Ibid., p. 22
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However, it seems that the education system is relatively most sensitive in connection with (apart 
from the Roma children) children with special needs, and that the access to education in this case is alar-
mingly low. Possibility of the education system to provide relevant knowledge and experience for disabled 
persons  for their successful integration in professional and social life is assessed at 2.8 (Table 7), adjustment 
of educational processes to the capacities of  disabled children at 2.9, and adjustment of school buildings for 
disabled children at only 2.1 (this indicator having the third lowest index from the total of 56 indicators 
relating to the openness of education).
Transparency and Access to Information
Transparency of the education system and access to information are assessed with the index value of 
42 index points (Figure 13). In comparison with last year’s result, it can be concluded that in this area 
certain progress took place, as last year’s index value was 38. 
Figure 18 Sub-criterion – evaluation of openness in 2006 in relation to 2005
At the same time, this area ranks as the next to the last on the scale of importance for openness of a 
society, according to the opinion of the experts (Figure 3).
The indicators with the highest value are those referring to the transparency of financial decisions: 
transparency of financing public institutions’ programs (3.8) and financing of non-governmental educa-
tional institutions (3.6). (Table 8) Transparency of the decision making process for the authorisation 
given to non-governmental educational institutions (3.9) has also been assessed relatively highly. In all 
three cases a significant increase is noted in comparison with the previous year. Two indicators are asse-
ssed poorly, even though a certain increase is noted there as well:  transparency of the process of autho-
risation and approval of textbooks (2.5) and transparent performance assessment system for educational 
institutions (2.1). The increase of transparency of the authorisation and approval of textbooks might be 
connected with a new law, the rather controversial Law on Textbooks.
Table 8 Indicators grouped in the sub-criterion Transparency and access to information and evaluation 
of openness on a scale from 1 (lowest value- least open) to 7 (highest value- most open) 
Indicators Evaluation
Transparency of the decision making process for the authorisation of non-governmental 
educational institutions 3,9 
Transparency of the decision making process of the Ministry of Education, Science 
and Sport in financial support to and co-financing of the programs delivered by the 
public educational institution
3,8 
Transparency of the decision making process of the Ministry of Education, Science 
and Sport in financial support to and co-financing of the programs delivered by the 
non-governmental educational institution
3,6 
38
42
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
        Transparency 
               and access 
      to information
        
        
Open Society Index
2005
2006
54
OPEN SOCIETY INDEX CROATIA 2006
Openness of the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport in providing information 
to stakeholders 3,3 
Transparency of process of authorisation and approval of textbooks 2,5 
Transparency of work of non-governmental educational institutions 2,5 
High level of awareness of the public about results of education of pupils/student 
population 2,3 
High level of awareness of the public about results of education of pupils/student 
population 2,1 
Possibility and effectiveness of public debate
Possibility and effectiveness of public debate is in the last place both in the assessment of importan-
ce for openness of education and in the index value (38) (Figure 13). While the combination of these 
two facts can be somewhat consoling, the latter by itself warns that the education system is still not ready 
to accept that the interests and attitudes articulated through the public debate on education as a public 
good are not only legitimate, but should be taken into account seriously in the decision making. In that 
sense, the Croatian education system definitely suffers from being chronically closed: all attempts to 
initiate changes in the education system that have not been initiated by the officials of the system are 
regarded as the movements of the enemy’s troops, or, at least, as meddling of the uninvited into other 
people’s business. Therefore, it is not surprising that a dialogue among the authorized state institutions 
and interested professional non-governmental organizations and other organizations is a rare appearan-
ce (2.5), while consultations with them in the decision making process are even more infrequent (2.3) 
(Table 9).
Figure 19 Sub-criteria – evaluation of openness in 2006 in relation to 2005
What is interesting here is that the possibility of participation of the representatives of national mi-
norities has been assessed significantly higher than the acceptance of their critiques and suggestions. This 
apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that members of national minorities formally par-
ticipate in the decision-making process, but their real influence on these decisions is in fact rather weak. 
What is in this area encouraging to a certain degree is that literally all indicators note an improvement 
in comparison with last year’s results.
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Table 9 Indicators grouped in the sub-criterion Possibility and effectiveness of public debate
and evaluation of openness on a scale from 1 (lowest value- least open) to 7 (highest value- most 
open) 
Indicators Evaluation
Participation of representatives of national minorities’ organizations in creation 
of the concept for the curricula for national minorities 3,9 
Participation of teachers and professors in the preparation of bills regulating 
the area of education 2,8 
High level of acceptance of criticisms and suggestions given by representatives 
of national minorities 2,8 
Possibility of critical debate on educational programs designed for national 
minorities 2,8 
Large number of open and high quality public debates on education 2,8 
Possibility for teachers to initiate concrete changes intended for the improvement 
of primary education 2,5 
Possibility for students to initiate concrete changes intended for the improvement        
of higher education   
2,5 
High level of consultation of pupils and students, and acceptance of their 
suggestions referring to the improvement of the educational process 2,5 
Open dialogue of authorized state institutions and interested professional 
non-governmental organizations about educational issues 2,5 
High level of consultations of parents, and acceptance of their suggestions             re-
ferring  to the improvement of the educational processa
2,4 
High level of consultations of professional non-governmental organizations           
and other institutions interested in educational issues during the process 
of introduction of bills on education
2,3 
Conclusion and Recommendations
The research indicates a literally “less than half ” openness in education (45 index points out of 100 
possible), which fits predictably  into the picture of Croatian society that we anyway tend to form on 
the basis of less methodologically scrupulous resources such as the media or everyday experience. The 
degree of openness of the education system, in fact, does not contrast significantly with the low level of 
openness of other areas researched and of society in general. 
Based on the data the research provided, three basic problems can be pointed to, which tend to ge-
nerate a closed society in the area of education. 
The first is the nature of the existing curriculum which is the reason for the low effectiveness of the 
education system.
Within the context of this research, by the effectiveness of the education system is primarily meant 
its ability to contribute to the democratic character i.e., openness of society. This means the education 
system will be efficient if it is able to establish a motivating environment for development of freedom of 
expression, creativity and self-actualisation of children and youth, and foster pluralism and tolerance.
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The type of curriculum that is in the center of the Croatian education system (including its hidden 
curriculum47) is of an essentially different nature, and therefore the efficiency of the education system 
cannot be increased by mere changes, but only by introduction of significantly different curricular para-
digm, i.e. a serious curricular reform.
The second problem lies in the fact that the education system (its institutions as well) are responsible, 
that is, accountable only to their own managers. There is almost no trace of an idea that the Croatian 
education system as a public good should be accountable to the public, or users of its services. The con-
sequences are two-sided. On the one hand, the Croatian education system is in a large measure non-
transparent and inaccessible to ideas and interests that are not articulated within the governing structu-
res of the system itself or the centres of political power. On the other side, the level of quality control is 
very low, and the mechanisms for its realization are to the certain degree established only where they are 
necessary for centralized management of the system.
Finally, it is obvious that the education system has serious problems with possibility for participation 
under equal conditions. The Roma children and children with special needs are in a situation that speaks 
clearest about it, starting from the fact that the schools are literally physically inaccessible, and that they 
cannot participate in classes – for them - in a meaningful and productive way, or else the curriculum is 
completely not adjusted to their needs and specific qualities. 
Regular excuses such as  this being exclusively a matter of budget, or, only of very small number of 
children (percentage-wise) are the mode of arrogance that has no qualms about confusing one person’s 
rights with the good will (or wilfulness) of those who have the power to decide. 
On the other hand, such a situation has been caused by the distinct rigidity and low level of plurali-
sm within the system itself: in a system that offers the same to all, all those who need something different 
will inevitably be deprived. 
Possible changes of the education system that would lead not only to more openness, but to the ope-
ning of the society, can be drafted through several points:
   Change of curricular paradigm that would result in a curriculum that does not standardise the 
educational process, rather its outcomes. A curriculum so devised enables the flexibility that is 
necessary in order to respond to different demands and satisfy different educational needs, as well 
as rational establishment of control system and improvement of quality;
 Content-related changes in the curriculum capable not only of reflecting pluralism in society, but 
of promoting the basic values of the civic culture;
 Introduction of specific positive discrimination of children from marginalized social groups and 
children with special needs, in order to enhance equal opportunities;
 Introduction of mechanisms that would enable stakeholders to articulate their interests and have 
a certain influence on public policy in the field of education. One of the possible mechanisms 
would be the establishment of a National Council for Education whose members are not appo-
inted by the Minister, but by Parliament. The selection of the members should be organized by 
the relevant parliamentary committee calling upon institutions, non-governmental organizations 
and citizens to send proposals for candidates with statements of reasons. The Ministry should be 
obliged to consult with the Council in important decision making processes, and the Council 
could initiate different kinds of debates and proposals itself.       
47 “Hidden curriculum” is a term that denotes institutional culture of educational institutions, which mediates non 
explicated values on which the system is based, thus defining not only acceptable models of behaviour and academic 
activities but also points of reference for the interpretation of “open” curriculum.
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Figure 19. Open Society Index according to given criteria for the field of economy – change in  2006 
in relation to 2005
Economic Openness: Between Destiny and Freedom
In 2006,  as it could in 2005, Croatia can be evaluated as a closed society when viewed through the 
experts’ perception of main economic criteria for openness. Although experts still consider the area of 
the economy the least important for achieving an open society and do not give a systematic pattern of 
answers indicating what an economically open society would be, in some important components of ope-
nness we do see some hints of positive improvement. Transparency in the privatisation process and go-
vernment involvement in the economy have reached the top of the ranking list of the components of an 
economically open society, replacing the competence of the judiciary to try offences in the area of eco-
nomic crime. This can be interpreted as a positive change. A demand for higher transparency of state 
interventions shows that Croatia is moving on from the great destiny-creating subjects that fill the news-
paper columns from fear that the rule of law is not functioning, to subjects of less interest to the media 
but of no less importance related to the need to improve the quality of government involvement. Furt-
hermore, in the areas of control and legality, the possibility of participating in market competition and 
the capacity for and efficiency of public debate, this year’s research shows an increase in openness.
How to determine an economically open society
If we look at data such as the number of state border crossings, the value of goods and services exc-
hanged with other countries and the total amount of international capital flows, we come to the conclu-
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sion that Croatia really is an economically open country. However, the crucial question is whether it is 
so due to the geopolitical and global economical circumstances being such that it cannot be anything 
else or whether Croatia is open because its citizens have with their attitudes and actions through their 
representative bodies and executive government chose an open Croatia and acted so as to achieve that 
vision. In other words, is our state of openness a result of circumstances or a result of a conscious and 
independent choice of politics? Interviewing the experts whose views reflect the attitude of the intellec-
tual elite and influence public opinion and the opinion of politicians can give us a partial answer to that 
question.
The question is definitely wrong if we interpret it strictly ‘black or white” (either freedom of choice 
or historical destiny), but if we start from the fact that circumstances and choice always mix in certain 
proportions to create the reality, our search can illuminate many components of the subjective percep-
tions recorded in this research.
Perception of the open society from an economic point of view is defined through six criteria and 
thirteen sub-criteria. Subcriteria are the elements of the criteria, so the evaluating instrument can be 
described with the following list of criteria (bold print) and subcriteria (normal print): 
Possibility of participating in market competition
Possibility of starting undertakings  
Suitability of conditions for starting undertakings
Equality in market competition
Equality in market competition 
Normative and institutional equality 
Possibility and efficiency of public debate
Existence, frequency and efficiency of public debate 
Readiness of government institutions for public debate
Transparency and access to information
Access to information 
Transparency of activities of government institutions  
Autonomy and efficiency
Efficiency of starting undertakings
Independence of the economy of political influence 
Control and legality
Legality of the functioning of enterprises
Quality of the legislative instruments for freedom of market
 competition 
Competence and efficiency of regulatory institutions
The criteria are set in such a way that each reader can interpret them according to his own preferen-
ces, in other words, according to his belief of what an open society in the economic sense is. Depending 
on the ideological starting point, the interpreter can give higher or lower values to different criteria and 
subcriteria. For instance, a radical liberal point of view that leans toward anarchism would negate the 
criterion of control and legality, moreover, it would see it as a threat to the openness of society. It would 
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sion that Croatia really is an economically open country. However, the crucial question is whether it is 
so due to the geopolitical and global economical circumstances being such that it cannot be anything 
else or whether Croatia is open because its citizens have with their attitudes and actions through their 
representative bodies and executive government chose an open Croatia and acted so as to achieve that 
vision. In other words, is our state of openness a result of circumstances or a result of a conscious and 
independent choice of politics? Interviewing the experts whose views reflect the attitude of the intellec-
tual elite and influence public opinion and the opinion of politicians can give us a partial answer to that 
question.
The question is definitely wrong if we interpret it strictly ‘black or white” (either freedom of choice 
or historical destiny), but if we start from the fact that circumstances and choice always mix in certain 
proportions to create the reality, our search can illuminate many components of the subjective percep-
tions recorded in this research.
Perception of the open society from an economic point of view is defined through six criteria and 
thirteen sub-criteria. Subcriteria are the elements of the criteria, so the evaluating instrument can be 
described with the following list of criteria (bold print) and subcriteria (normal print): 
Possibility of participating in market competition
Possibility of starting undertakings  
Suitability of conditions for starting undertakings
Equality in market competition
Equality in market competition 
Normative and institutional equality 
Possibility and efficiency of public debate
Existence, frequency and efficiency of public debate 
Readiness of government institutions for public debate
Transparency and access to information
Access to information 
Transparency of activities of government institutions  
Autonomy and efficiency
Efficiency of starting undertakings
Independence of the economy of political influence 
Control and legality
Legality of the functioning of enterprises
Quality of the legislative instruments for freedom of market
 competition 
Competence and efficiency of regulatory institutions
The criteria are set in such a way that each reader can interpret them according to his own preferen-
ces, in other words, according to his belief of what an open society in the economic sense is. Depending 
on the ideological starting point, the interpreter can give higher or lower values to different criteria and 
subcriteria. For instance, a radical liberal point of view that leans toward anarchism would negate the 
criterion of control and legality, moreover, it would see it as a threat to the openness of society. It would 
view the criterion of autonomy and efficiency with great doubt (due to criterion (a) which hints at eco-
nomic activities by a foreign country), and would stress the importance of the criterion of participation 
in the market competition and the criterion of transparency and availability of information. The so called 
social liberalism, typical of the political reality of our region, would interpret the criteria the other way 
round, pointing out the importance of the normative framework and the functioning of the rule of law 
(with whose power, according to this belief, we should make great compromises).
The ideological glasses through which the results will be viewed in this text are colored with a grea-
ter scepticism concerning state intervention and the criteria of control and legality than customary in 
domestic literature and practice. 
By comparing the results of the Open Society Index and certain criteria in 2006 and 2005 (Picture 
1) we see that four out of six criteria evaluated by the experts have achieved a significant increase in ope-
nness. The possibility and efficiency of public debate and the participation in market competition have 
increased by as much as eight percentage points. Control and legality increased by six percentage points, 
while transparency and availability of information mark an increase of four percentage points. If we keep 
in mind that the index of economic openness and the freedom of entrepreneurship on the whole incre-
ased in 2006 in comparison with 2005, we are tempted to accept the conclusion that this year’s research 
showed an increase in the economic openness of Croatian society, although the equality in the market 
race (the ‘most open’ segment) marks a slight drop in openness, while autonomy and efficiency are sta-
gnate at a low level.
Positive shifts of most of the indicators are indisputable, but in an attempt to reach a conclusion it 
is necessary more precisely to define their real content and the framework that defines them. Because of 
this, we will proceed to analyse the changes in the ten most important ‘items’ ( items are components of 
different subcriteria), and then we will comment on why experts classified the whole area of economy 
as the least important in the generation of an open society. Without this framework it is impossible to 
interpret the results in more detail.
Figure 20  Open Society Index according to criteria 
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The ten most important ‘items’ of openness: do changes in the ‘top-ten’ list say 
anything about openness?
Before we start to comment on the changes in the ranking list it should be said that changes in an-
swers from year to year cannot show changes in attitudes over time if the samples are not representative 
and stable, which is not the case here. However, these changes should be noted, because at least they 
show agreement or disagreement of the two samples of interviewed experts, which gives us more details 
on how the elite perceives Croatia as an economically closed or open society.
Table 1 Ten of the highest ranked items/indicators of economic openness of society
Rank 
2006. Item/Indicator Rank 2005.
1 Transparency of the process of the privatisation of state-owned companies 
new in the top 
ten
2 Transparency of government involvement in economy new in the top ten
3 Highly developed protection of property rights 4
4 Competence of judiciary to try criminal offences in the area of economic crime 2
5 A tax system that does not discriminate against certain market participants
new in the top 
ten
6 Independence of the work of private entrepreneurs of political influences 6
7 Independence of public enterprises of political influences 7
8 Efficient anti-corruption fight in the economy 8
9 A customs system that does not discriminate certain market participants 
new in the top 
ten
10 Neutrality of state and inspection services in law enforcement and other forms of market regulation 9
Table 10 shows the experts’ opinion on ten of the most important items/indicators of economic 
openness, displaying this year’s and last year’s ranking.48 
The ‘good’ news is (what makes it look good are the glasses through which we define an open society) 
that our top-ten list is quite dynamic, so this year there are four new entries: transparency of the proce-
ss of privatisation of state-owned companies and transparency of government involvement in the eco-
nomy (making their entries in the number one and two slots), and customs and tax systems that do not 
discriminate against some market players. We lost some of the items from last year’s top-ten list: highly 
developed core institutions which regulate the freedom of market competition (dropped from 1st place 
to 13th), efficiency of the judiciary in processing trying offences in the area of economic crime (dropped 
from 3rd to 12th place), good regulation and practice of public procurement (dropped from 5th to 11th 
place), efficient legal protection of creditors (went from 10th place to 18th place). Six of the items more 
or less kept their rank from last year, and drops of six, eight, nine and thirteen places cannot be charac-
48 Item (or indicator) is used to determine different aspects of the problem
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terised as significant considering the chosen research methodology (except, to a degree, the drop in the 
importance of market competition from 1st to 13th place). We can conclude that the attitudes are ba-
sically stable, considering the chosen method and sample.
The noted changes do not necessarily reflect the reality (experts are not privileged in the sense that 
they have some mystical view into ‘reality’), but mostly reflect the political and media-projected priori-
ties. For instance, the sudden growth in the importance of government involvement in the economy, 
which happened parallel to the process of joining the EU, probably facilitated the jump of that compo-
nent to 2nd place of our ranking list. 
In that context it seems strange that the importance of the functioning of the Agency for the Protec-
tion of Market Competition dropped from 1st place to 13th place, especially if we have in mind that the 
Agency was statutorily granted a key role in evaluating the justifications of state involvement in the eco-
nomy (keeping it from jeopardizing the equality of market participants). We can assume that some of 
the experts are not aware of that role of the Agency, so that they do not connect the problem of gover-
nment involvement with the functioning of the protection of market competition. Otherwise it would 
be very difficult to explain why the importance of the Agency’s work is growing, while the importance 
of the Agency itself and its functioning is declining. This can be interpreted as a sign that this institution 
should have a stronger position in the world of politics and media as an independent body protecting 
an important public good.
 Is the economy the least important generator of an open society?
The views of the expert sample bore out the view that ranks economic criteria as the least important 
for an open society of all the institutional areas considered in any way significant in this issue.
Repeated this year, the importance of this result is enhanced. Accordingly, we shall again comment 
on it in more detail this year. The result can be interpreted in three ways. One way would be to comment 
on the low ranking of economic openness as opposed to the area of politics or law as positive, if such a 
ranking reflected the case in which economic problems are much better handled in Croatian society 
than political or legal problems. It is hard to imagine such an explanation being true.    
According to the second interpretation most of the people interviewed really think that economic 
openness is neither particularly desirable nor important for an open society. In that sense, the low level 
of importance that is assigned to economic openness can be an obstacle to policies aimed at strengthe-
ning it. The relevance of this interpretation should not be underestimated. In the expert sample there are 
only 14% of economy experts, but they also rank the areas of politics and law as more important for an 
open society. It is not surprising that the rest of the experts then rank the economy as the least important. 
The question remains whether such ranking of the importance of the economy for openness is a result of 
a completely wrong perception and, perhaps, of an ideological heritage49 or if it is a rational ranking con-
sidering the relations between individual institutional areas, as the third interpretation suggests.
According to the third interpretation, the people interviewed still perceive the area of economy as 
occupied by politics. After all, in Croatia, state ownership is still more widespread and state expenditure 
is higher than in other transitional countries and most of the EU countries. If this interpretation is correct, 
49 What the ideological heritages of socialism and the economics of prosperity have in common is the starting point 
that market error (the inability of the market to solve all social problems of allocation and coordination of resources) 
exists. However, these points of view (wrongly) assume that the state can successfully solve these problems. Neither 
socialism nor welfare economics are very interested in analysing how the state apparatus really works during interven-
tions, in other words, they neglect possible ‘hierarchy errors’ that happen, the influence of which should be compared 
to market errors. Both socialism and welfare economics, which represent the dominating quality of the intellectual 
heritage not only in Croatia but in the whole of continental Europe, assume that the state is benevolent although his-
torically speaking we can say that the nature of state involvement is very different and even dangerous.
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emphasizing political over economic reforms as important for making a more open society will have an 
effect on the economy and in this sense such a ranking of the economy should not be worrying. On the 
contrary, if we live in an era when some (potentially free) society on this or on the other side of the one-
time iron curtain is trying to rid itself of chains of government interference inherited from the past, this 
interpretation could have a positive connotation. Although it can speak in favour of the negative thesis 
that in the economic sphere of the society no groups are being formed that could act to open the eco-
nomy segment and the society as a whole.
 It is still expected that changes will come from above, primarily from the spheres of politics and law, 
because – as we concluded last year “the experts rightly perceive that the real influence of the state in the 
economy is still much more important for the openness of society than the relations in private markets”. 
We are still prisoners of the past.
The reader will judge for her/himself which of the interpretations is most probably correct. In my 
opinion it is best to stick to the third, because the second is too fatalistic and disappointing. The second 
interpretation makes this text superfluous, because if the basic role of economy and entrepreneurship is 
not understood, then it cannot be changed by preaching.
Why are the state and the economy conceptually separated?
The axiomatic material used to make the theoretical glasses we are using to interpret these results is 
based on the fact that the government, and involvement or interference by it, and an open economy are 
two separate concepts, where the first too strongly inhibits the second. Of course, such a starting point 
can be criticized with arguments, especially from a theoretical perspective, and from a perspective of not 
such a distant past (18th and 19th century) where we see that an uncontrolled market is not necessarily 
a ‘pretty’ or ‘desirable’ state institution. However, here we will stick to our assumption about the con-
ceptual separation of state intervention and (a potentially open) society, as well as to the assumption of 
their tense relationship of the controlling (the state) and the controlled (economy). This assumption 
makes sense because both the scope of government involvement in Croatia and the ‘recent’ past (almost 
the entire 20th century) back up the starting assumptions about inherited inefficiency and excessive go-
vernment involvement and spending.
From that perspective another result can be evaluated as ‘positive’: the rise of the importance of tran-
sparency of government involvement in the economy to the second place of our ranking list in table 1 
should be viewed as a part of the ‘package’ in which transparency in the process of privatization of state-
owned companies rose to  first place, while the other areas of fiscal and political transparency kept a high 
ranking: good regulation and practice of public procurement in the 11th place, and the transparency of 
public expenditure in the 19th place (out of 74 items of economic openness). While in 2005 at the very 
top of the list were the problems of the efficiency and competency of the judiciary to deal with economic 
crime, this year issues of government involvement in the economy take the lead. It is obvious that the 
experts are starting to perceive government involvement as inefficient, inequitable and insufficiently 
transparent. The most important thing is that it seems that the experts are starting to see this as the bi-
ggest current problem in opening up society from an economic perspective. Support for such an attitu-
de can be found in Table 11, where the subcriteria and indices of openness are shown for the year 2006 
in comparison with year 2005.
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Table 11 Subcriteria – changes in 2006 in comparison to 2005 
2005. 2006.
Change
(abs.) (%)
Possibility of participating in market competition   
Possibility of starting undertakings 40 51 11 28%
Suitability of conditions for starting undertakings 39 42 3 8%
   
Equality in market competition   
Equality in the market 56 52 -4 -7%
Regulatory and institutional equality 48 50 2 4%
   
Possibility and efficiency of public debate   
Existence, frequency and efficiency of public debate 35 44 9 26%
Readiness of the state institutions for public debate 36 46 10 28%
   
Transparency and access to information   
Access to information 48 56 8 17%
Transparency of state institution activities 34 36 2 6%
   
Autonomy and efficiency   
Efficiency of starting undertakings 40 41 1 3%
Independence of the economy of political influence 35 37 2 6%
   
Control and legality   
Legality of the functioning of enterprises 34 40 6 18%
Quality of the legislative regulation of freedom 
in market competition 43 49 6 14%
Competency and efficiency of regulatory institutions 31 35 4 13%
 
Access to information and the possibility of starting up enterprises marked a big rise of the Open So-
ciety Index and joined a small group with an index value over 50%, which includes the subcriterion of 
equality in market competition. They, however, do not mark such a positive change. Moreover, with equ-
ality in the market a worrying decrease of openness has been noted that we already commented on.
A similar rise and entry in the group of criteria between 40% and 50% can be registered with public 
debate, lawfulness of the work of entrepreneurs and the quality of the statutory regulation of freedom 
in market competition. Somewhat lesser positive changes and the level of index of 40% or more can be 
seen in the suitability of conditions for starting undertakings and regulatory and institutional equality. 
Slight changes and the lowest levels of index value can be seen in three subcriteria: competency and ef-
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ficiency of regulatory institutions, independence of the economy of political influence and transparen-
cy of the activities of government institutions.
Some of the results can be interpreted by government policies, which have in the last couple of years 
been largely focused on the possibility of participating in the market. It is exactly this segment in which 
our research registered the biggest change. If the perception accurately reflects the reality, we can con-
clude that those policies (for instance, that reflected in the launching of ‘hitro.hr’) were successful be-
cause they influenced the perception of experts. However, an objective system of measuring other insti-
tutions confirms the conclusion that there is some real positive change happening in Croatia when we 
speak of entrepreneurial activities.50 
Recommendations
The data reveal two ‘critical’ areas with a low level of openness and slight positive change in 2006 in 
respect to 2005. Those are: independence of the economy of political influence and the transparency of 
state institution activities. Weaknesses in these areas are also revealed at a deeper level, at the level of 
items, where this year’s research also registered a weakness in the governance of public companies. Howe-
ver, instead of a more thorough study of the cause, it is enough to notice that this is a perfect detection 
of the fact that in Croatia the state, and not the market, still controls most of the domestic product, and 
from there comes the logical conclusion of the people interviewed that the economy itself is of less im-
portance for openness than politics. The state still has all the cards in its hands. Let us recall that the 
government, through the budget, redistributes about half of the domestic product, and that amount 
additionally grows when we take into consideration the role of state, public and municipal economy 
companies in the economic life of Croatia.
For now there are no political preconditions for a change of such a condition. On one hand a big 
part of the electorate is made of economically dependent groups of citizens, while on the other hand 
there are the opportunism and the objective weakness of the business sector which is happy as long as 
taxes do not rise,  not even dreaming of any major decrease of taxes, or a larger and significant decrease 
of state expenditure in the current political situation. In such conditions, unfortunately, the only thing 
left to do is insist on a higher level of transparency of state expenditure and of state managing of public 
companies, as this research has already shown.
There is a lot of room for improvement in these areas by implementing the OECD guidelines for 
better corporate governance of state and public companies, the continuation of privatisation and, 
perhaps the most important, implementing a higher level of fiscal transparency in the processes of 
preparing, control and the transparency of spending budget funds.
This year’s research also indicates that selecting priorities guided by research like this would pay poli-
ticians dividends. The political focus on the possibility of starting undertakings has yielded positive results, 
which were registered in our study.  We can assume that the positive change in attitude which was regi-
stered in our sample of experts also represents a positive public perception in this area. If so, then the 
actions taken and the results achieved increase the likelihood of attracting votes in the next election. 
This year’s research results primarily call for a higher level of fiscal transparency and a higher level 
50 CEPOR’s TEA index that measures the vigour with which new companies can be started marks a significant in-
crease. Final conclusions should always be made in the light of objective measuring. We can assume that the experts 
do not notice the variables of openness directly, but that they use objective (e.g. statistical) markers, or that they are 
under the influence of media interpretations. Since the media picture and the perception of it can deviate from the 
reality, and indeed are subject to great fluctuations, we can only make conclusions while taking into consideration 
additional high quality markers which should be carefully selected and analysed.  
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of quality in the governance of public corporations. If the politicians, both in power and in the op-
position, read this text they should see it as an opportunity because increasing fiscal transparency and 
the quality of governance of public companies does not require rocket science. It is well known what 
should be done to achieve these goals; there are experiences of dozens of countries that worked on simi-
lar projects, and it is realistic to assume that with well-run projects things can be changed for the better 
in a year or two. The results will be monitored in future researches.
 
The study also showed that there is a need for stronger positioning of the Agency for Protection of 
Market Competition in the area of media and politics, as a more independent institution protec-
ting an important public good. That becomes even more obvious after the Agency, because of the 
adoption of EU standards, has taken on the responsibility of approving government involvement in the 
economy.
Instead of a Conclusion: Freedom or Destiny?
This year’s research has brightened up a bit the gloomy picture from the previous year’s research. Our 
methodological limitations restrict us from determining if there has been a real change in attitude thro-
ugh time or if we have just got our first (positive) variation of the results due to the change of the expert 
sample, but that is of lesser importance. It is much more important that after a long investigation we are 
starting to see some continuity in evaluating the issue of openness, and that continuity is concerned with 
our starting question: is the (real) Croatian economic openness a result of circumstances (destiny) or 
have the citizens of Croatia through their representative bodies and executive government chosen an 
economically open Croatia and acted to realise that vision? Right now the answer leans more towards 
circumstances; we have found ourselves in the era of globalisation and have tried to make the best of it 
according to the rules of the game.
At the level of expert perception and through monitoring our scientific, expert and media reality, we 
register confused attitudes about the role of the economy in forming an open society or even attitudes 
that deny any role to the economy in this matter. The aversion towards government involvement in the 
economy is more likely the result of a feeling of unfairness than of concern for loss of economic resour-
ces due to ‘friction’ in the system in which the public sector directly or indirectly controls the majority 
of economic flows.  
However, the registered change is maybe a new beginning. The liberal view will not establish itself by 
someone reading a liberal manual or one of the books by Hayek or Friedman which grab your attention 
through their logic and simplicity. The simplicity is questionable. The perception of the importance of 
the economy and entrepreneurship for the openness of society will be established only after the gover-
nment involvement and indirect management of economic resources become so inefficient that the pe-
ople will want something else. After all, that is why socialism failed. After the business sector becomes 
strong enough to be the key reviser of bad policies and the active participant of good ones (and in order 
to achieve that the sector itself must change for the better), the process will speed up, and the public sec-
tor will learn to differentiate the suggestions of the private sector which coincide with the public interest 
from those that are opposed to it. Once that happens – and it will take years, openness as a result of una-
voidable circumstances can become an openness as a result of conscious choice and politics.
Such an optimistic and for now unjustified view of the world rests on the hope that the pendulum 
will swing from openness as destiny towards openness as a free choice on the part of Croatia’s citizens. 
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MINORITIES AND MARGINALIZED GROUPS
Davor Gjenero, analyst and journalist
INTRODUCTION
The protection of minority rights in Croatia remains one of the controversial issues of consolidation 
of the democratic order and building of an open society in the country. According to the surveyed experts, 
in 2006, the Open Society Index has not substantially changed in this societal dimension in comparison 
with 2005. In 2005, the Open Society Index for this dimension amounted to 42, and in 2006 the situ-
ation has slightly changed by 1 index point. 
The state of openness in this societal dimension has been measured according to the following four 
criteria: the formal protection of the rights of minorities and marginalized society groups, the existence 
of control mechanisms for the protection of their rights, the attitude of the majority towards the mino-
rity and the correctness in public communication, and the existence or absence of discrimination against 
minorities and marginalized groups. We have already asserted in the Open Society Index 2005 that the 
formal protection of minority rights is no longer the core issue of minority protection in Croatia, since 
the experts evaluated that the society had reached 39, and this year the Index is even better – 52, thanks 
to, first of all, a better value for efforts invested into securing the equality of people with disabilities and 
the involvement of minorities in decision making processes. 
The position and rights of sexual minorities has dramatically deteriorated (34 in 2006 in comparison 
to 44 in 2005 – in other words, a relative deterioration of 29%). When talking about the criterion of the 
absence or existence of discrimination against minorities and marginalized groups, the situation has not 
significantly changed in comparison with 2005 (38 in both years), and the experts evaluate that the issue 
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of non-discriminatory practice in employment and advancement of minority and marginalized groups 
members marks a slight deterioration of an already bad situation, by as much as 2 index points (2006 
– 36). 
In 2005, the experts evaluated the criterion of existence of control mechanisms for the protection of 
minority and marginalized groups rights as critical, and in 2006, this criterion has experienced a slight 
improvement (49 in comparison with 44 in the previous year), but however, the improvement does not 
reflect the change of practice of public authorities but the evaluation of the strengthening of civil society 
control mechanisms. The experts evaluate the development of civil society in the area of protection of 
minority and marginalized group rights in 2006 as 11 index points better than the previous year’s, and 
the situation in this subcriterion is better than in any other – as much as 70. 
The criteria of the correctness of public communication and the attitude of majority towards mino-
rity was in 2005 also evaluated as the dimension in need of a breakthrough (39, and there were most 
incidents reported in this dimension). In 2006, the situation has slightly improved (41), where the big-
gest shift (of 6 index points) has been achieved in the subcriterion of public awareness-raising, first of 
all thanks to activities of the nongovernmental sector in raising awareness of the problems of people with 
disabilities. 
Figure 21:  Open Society Index according to criteria
Protection of minorities and marginalized groups and civil society 
The fulfilment of political criteria for the opening of an institutional dialogue has at least for some 
time lowered the monitoring level of human rights protection in Croatia, and the first stage of the ne-
gotiating process has remained marked by a marginalization of civil society institutions. Unlike other 
countries that entered the negotiation with the EU based on the Nice Agreement, countries with which 
the EU Economic and Social Committee formed consultative councils dealing with civil society stren-
gthening and its involvement in decision-making processes, there was no council planned for Croatia. 
Protection of minority rights and primarily the protection of marginalized social groups’ rights, where 
non-governmental institutions proved to be the most efficient, were directly hit by this EU approach to 
the institutional dialogue with Croatia.
This can be particularly harmful for consolidation of the achieved level of protection of rights of 
minorities and marginalized groups, especially because the research proved  that Croatian experts for 
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minority protection regard the item of development of civil society in the area of protection of mino-
rities and marginalized groups as one of those that best present the openness of Croatian society, since 
it records the best percentage of achieved openness in comparison with the theoretical  maximum. Si-
milarly, with regard to the development of civil society institutions, the experts mark a significant pro-
gress in comparison with the previous year. When talking about protection from discrimination of 
people with disabilities, the average index point for 2005 was 3.5, but in 2006 it has grown to 4.751. 
The experts estimate that also the two other areas – the development of civil society organizations 
active in gender equality control (4.6 in 2005; 5.0 in 2006) and those active in the protection of rights 
of national and religious minorities (4.3 in 2005; 4.8 in 2006) – mark a significant progress compared 
to the relatively good situation in the beginning of the research. Since on the basis of the previous year’s 
research results the Open Society Institute-Croatia called for policy projects and since some of the fi-
nanced projects implemented by non-governmental organizations were aiming at the termination of 
discriminatory provisions concerning people with disabilities in byelaws and in the regulations of local 
self-government, it is possible to presume that this new vitality of anti-discriminatory activities in civil 
society for the protection of rights of people with disabilities has significantly influenced this year’s 
better estimation of the situation in Croatian civil society dealing with the prevention of discrimination 
against people with disabilities. 
Control mechanisms for the protection of minority and marginalized groups rights
If civil society development marks a significant progress in comparison with the last year’s research, 
the same cannot be said of the other two control mechanisms for the protection of minority and mar-
ginalized groups’ rights. 
The efficiency of protection of minority rights and gender equality and quality public debates on 
position and rights of minorities were not only assessed worse than the status of development of civil 
society institutions dealing with protection of rights of minorities and marginalized groups in the abso-
lute sense, but these two areas also show a visibly slower progress. The aspect that was assessed as critical 
in the 2005 research, the readiness of local authorities to react promptly and efficiently to violation of 
ethnic minority rights, the experts in 2006 grade as poor as in 2005. Both times the grade was 2.1, but 
it is interesting that this year the experts emphasize the importance of political reaction to violation of 
minority rights, and it turns out that the achieved level of openness in this area is lower than the year 
before. The promptness of reactions on the part of the government  administration and of the public to 
violations of minority rights were assessed as only slightly better (2.5 in 2006 in comparison to 2.3 in 
2005) and the experts estimate that the public was more responsive to the issues of gender equality pro-
tection.
Minority rights are respected primarily on the local level, and the experts estimate that with respect 
to control mechanisms the reactions of local authorities remain the worst element. According to the 
public opinion poll, the general public still shows a high level of aloofness from problems of members 
of national minorities and of marginalized groups, although the experts see the situation as slightly 
better when talking about the public reaction to violation of ethnic minority rights than the reaction 
of the state. A special problem that remains is the unbalanced regional relationship towards the issue of 
minority protection. 
When talking about the rights of the largest national minority in Croatia, the Serbian, its parlia-
mentary representatives are also to blame, since, by entering coalitions, they agreed to the different sta-
tus of minority populations living in different parts of Croatia: a segregated society in the area covered 
by the “peaceful reintegration”,  social exclusion, tolerance of return in the area liberated by the Storm 
51 Grade scale goes from 1 to 7, where 7 is the highest grade.
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campaign, but only in those parts where the Serbian national community was in the majority before the 
war, and on the other hand, the obstruction of the return in the areas where the Serbian national com-
munity lived together with the Croatian population. That is why the governmental concern that all mi-
norities are granted their rights in all parts of the country is graded relatively poor (a slight increase of 
the grade: 2.9 in 2006 in comparison with 2.7 in 2005, but again the experts estimate the relevance of 
this issue in 2006 higher than the year before, so that the openness of society is actually deteriorating). 
It is visible that the status of civil society institutions, at least when it comes to the protection of mi-
norities and marginalized groups, is much better than the other control mechanisms and that it contri-
butes to the openness of the Croatian society. This is a paradoxical situation, since that at the time when 
Croatia is entering negotiations with the EU and when, in order to achieve the European principle of 
good governance, civil society should be gaining in importance, the Croatian non-governmental orga-
nizations are in crisis, which could be reflected in an even worse evaluation of the openness of the Cro-
atian society in the coming year. 
Attitude of the majority towards the minority and correctness of public 
communication 
The research conducted in 2005 has shown that the experts believe that the most important area in 
this phase of consolidation of the democratic order is the relationship of the majority towards the mi-
nority and correctness of public communication. The correctness of public communication was evalu-
ated as one of the areas where there was most progress made. In the early days, hate speech towards na-
tional minorities and marginalized groups was tolerated, and the research in 2005 has shown that altho-
ugh in the area of correctness of public communication and especially in the absence/presence of hate 
speech and discrimination in public discourse there had been the most separate incidents, this area has 
also achieved the biggest progress in direction of the establishment of an open and tolerant society. The 
research conducted in 2006 does not record so many incidents, which the experts recognized in the pu-
blic discourse and in the media, but the experts notice less response from media professionals, and public 
in general, concerning the issues of discrimination of minorities and marginalized groups and less tole-
rance towards ethnic and sexual minorities. 
The biggest deterioration occurred in the attitude of the media towards ethnic minorities.  In 2005, 
the experts evaluated that Croatia, with respect to the concern for editors and subeditors in the media 
that articles about ethnic minorities should promote tolerance had scored 2.9, and in 2006 only 2.8 (the 
relative deterioration of the openness in this area, due to the perception of its importance, is even bigger, 
almost dramatic). The image of the media is worse also when talking about non-expression of hostility 
towards representatives of sexual minorities, although the deterioration is not so dramatic here (3.1 in 
2006, in comparison to 3.0 in 2005). These changes in the attitudes of the media towards minorities and 
marginalized groups are clearly the reflection of trends that also otherwise happen in the media arena in 
Croatia. 
When talking about the acceptance of the minorities by the majority, a significant progress has been 
achieved in the issue of a benevolent attitude towards minorities setting up links with their mother co-
untries. In 2006, the grade was 2.9, which is a significant progress in comparison with the previous year 
(last year the grade was 2.5, but this year the experts believe that the importance of this issue for the 
openness of the society is less than the previous year, and this also is a contribution to the openness of 
the society). This change is not so much a consequence of ethnic minority politics as it is a consequence 
of the consolidation of Croatian international position and the affirmation of the value of regional co-
operation in general. This is, therefore, one of the positive effects of the process of the the European 
Union accession process.
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A significant breakthrough has been achieved in the public sensitivity towards discrimination of mi-
norities and marginalized groups. Most progress has been made in relation to the sensitivity towards dis-
crimination of people with disabilities. This year the grade is 4.2, and in 2005 it was 3.1. A better sensiti-
vity has also been established towards discrimination of women (3.7 in comparison with 3.4 in 2005). 
Less progress has been made in the issue of not encouraging discrimination against women in public spee-
ch (3.8 in 2006, in comparison with 3.7 the year before), and in the sensitization of the public to the dis-
crimination against sexual minorities there has been no progress and the grade remains the same – 2.1. 
Sensitization of the public to the needs of minorities and marginalized social groups  is an area in 
which there was significant progress in the previous year, especially when it comes to the existence of 
actions for the sensitization of a broader public to the problems of minorities and marginalized groups 
(3.1 in 2006 in comparison with 2.7 in the previous year) and the involvement of the state in such acti-
ons (progress is even bigger: 2.7 in 2006 in comparison to 2.3 in 2005). The experts also estimate that 
Croatia has also made progress with the programs of informing all minorities of the possibilities of obta-
ining their rights (3.2 in 2006 in comparison with 2.9 in the previous year). 
A significant deterioration has, on the other hand, been estimated with respect to the issue of social 
distancing of the majority towards the representatives of Serbian ethnic minority (2.2 in 2006 in com-
parison to 2.6 in the previous year). The social distancing has remained the same towards other ethnic 
minorities (3.0). In the area of (non)existence of discrimination by the majority of representatives of 
ethnic minorities, a significant backlash has happened also in the area of sensitivity of the majority towar-
ds discrimination of the minority (2.6 in comparison to 2.8 in the previous year). 
It is interesting that the experts believe that the great social distance decreased towards the Roma, 
who the Croatian society regards more as a marginalized social group than an ethnical minority, which 
has additionally increased the social distance. Despite the still troublesome result (the grade is only 1.8), 
a positive trend is noticed (in 2005 it was even worse – 1.6). Reducing the social distancing towards the 
Roma should be ascribed to the actions of sensitizing public for minority issues, but also to the involve-
ment of the state administration, and especially local authorities, in those actions, and the growth of 
social distance towards the Serbian minority should be connected with the negative trends in the media 
(editors tolerating hate speech, omnipresent sensationalism), as well as with the opening of a public de-
bate, even trials for war crimes that were committed in 1991-1995 by members of the Croatian armed 
forces against  civilians of Serbian ethnicity. 
Table 12  Minorities and marginalized groups -  evaluation according to criteria and subcriteria
2005 2006
change
(abs.) (%)
Formal protection of the rights and freedoms of minorities 
and marginalized groups
Inclusion of minorities in decision-making processes 45 51 6 13%
Position and rights of sexual minorities 44 34 -10 -23%
Effort in achieving equality for people with disabilities 41 47 6 15%
Respect of cultural and religious rights of ethnic minorities 59 60 1 2%
Discrimination of minorities and marginalized groups
Non-discrimination of ethnic minorities 37 38 1 3%
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Non-discrimination of minorities and marginalized groups 
in employment and professional advancement 38 36 -2 -5%
Non-discrimination of women 41 42 1 2%
Existence of control mechanisms for the protection  of minority 
and marginalized groups’ rights
Efficiency of institutions in protection of minority rights 
and gender equality 38 41 3 8%
Quality of public debates on position and rights of minorities 42 45 3 7%
Development of civil society in the area of protecting 
minorities and marginalized social groups 59 70 11 19%
Relationship between the majority and the minority and 
correctness of public communication 
Non-existence of hate speech and discrimination in the media 
and public speech 43 41 -2 -5%
Majority accepting a minority 37 39 2 5%
Public sensitivity for discrimination of minorities and marginalized
 groups 44 49 5 11%
Activities for public sensitisation to the needs of minorities and
 marginalized social groups 37 43 6 16%
Non-existence of majority discrimination  against minorities 36 34 -2 -6%
Discrimination of minorities and marginalized groups
The research conducted in 2005 showed that the real state of affairs in discrimination against mem-
bers of ethnic minorities and marginalized groups was significantly worse than the state of affairs in the 
institutionalized protection of minority rights. Implementation of laws and the exercise of rights accor-
ding to the results of the 2006 research, remain, on the other hand, just as big problems as in the previ-
ous year. Moreover, in two important aspects – nondiscriminatory relationship towards members of 
ethnic minorities and marginalized groups and towards gender equality – the experts evaluate the situ-
ation slightly worse than in 2005. Lack of discrimination against ethnic minorities is assessed slightly 
better than the year before, but the change has occurred primarily due to significant progress in the im-
partiality of courts in cases involving ethnic minorities. This issue was assessed at 3.1 in 2006, while in 
the previous year at 2.8. According to the experts’ evaluation, the trust of members of ethnic minorities 
in the impartiality of the judiciary has also increased (2.6 in 2006 in comparison with 2.5 in the previ-
ous year). Nevertheless, governmental concern for the equal development of the country has deteriora-
ted, especially when it comes to the areas where minorities predominantly live (2.4 in 2006 in compari-
son with 2.6 in 2005). 
It is interesting that both areas in which a significant breakthrough is noted and the areas where we 
can note a deterioration could be connected to the process of Croatian EU accession. On the one hand, 
the positive processes connected to the equal approach of the minority to the judiciary are a consequ-
ence of gradual implementation of the principles of the rule of law, as a necessary political criterion for 
EU membership, but also one of the Copenhagen criteria for full membership. On the other hand, an 
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even and sustainable social development is one of the pillars on which this integration is based. The fact 
that despite the negotiations about full EU membership Croatia is still performing worse in implemen-
ting one of its basic principles is an expression of deficit in its negotiating process, but also a reflection of 
the fact that the institutionalized dialogue and pre-accession harmonisation of Croatia with the acquis 
is limited to legislative adjustment and reforms in the drafting of laws and does not extend to the acqu-
isition of values (of the importance of civil society and all the way down to principle of even and sustai-
nable development) that represent the economic and political aspects of the integration of European 
democratic countries and open societies. 
Freedoms and rights of minorities and marginalized social groups
When talking about the institutional protection of minority rights, the 2005 research showed that 
it had been relatively qualitative, in any case much better than state mechanisms of minority protection. 
Nevertheless, the non-functioning of control mechanisms has deeply compromised the quality of insti-
tutional protection of minority rights. All these problems occurred in the 2006 research as well. This 
year’s research emphasizes the deterioration in (the experts’ perception of ) the legal protection of rights 
of members of ethnic minorities in relation to their participation in local government. Although the 
change in value is not significant – 4.3 in 2006 in comparison to 4.4 in the previous year – this year the 
experts estimate this issue by far more relevant for the evaluation of the openness of the society, which is 
an implicit proof of a negative trend in establishing an open society in this segment. 
A problem from the previous period still remains unsolved – the issue of stating the rights of mino-
rities to representation/proportional representation in local and regional government. For although the 
Constitutional Law obliges local government to implement the right to representation/proportional re-
presentation of members of a minority, the national census in 2001 was set up as a criterion for realizati-
on of this right, and during the census most members of minorities in the war-affected areas were still 
refugees. An even bigger problem occurred after the local elections in 2005, when during the formation 
of local government the principle of proportional representation in local administration bodies, prescri-
bed by the Constitutional Law, was completely neglected, and all the executive bodies were formed by 
the majority. Majority democracy cannot function as a principle that will ensure the development of local 
government and citizen equality in areas where two or three communities (“domiciliary” Croats, Serbian 
returnees and Croatian immigrants, mostly from Bosnia and Herzegovina) live as closed groups, one next 
to the other. Cases like the coalition in the city of Knin (all the ethnic Croatian groups and parties set 
against the political representatives of the Serbian national community), show an inadequate legal pro-
tection of the principle of proportional representation, but also the unwillingness of the central gover-
nment to react promptly where minority rights protection is needed. Particular importance  was given 
to this problem by the fact that minority rights are those rights that are realized primarily at the level of 
local and regional administration, and that the Constitutional Law on ethnic minority rights has achie-
ved a significant progress in comparison with the  previous legislative infrastructure  of minority protec-
tion. This is exactly because of the emphasis put on two pillars of minority rights protection at local and 
regional levels: the right to proportional representation in representative and executive bodies of local 
and regional administration, and the right to minority administration (ethnic minority councils).  
Nevertheless, we also note progress in this segment when talking about the involvement of ethnic 
minority representatives in decision-making processes dealing with the position and rights of ethnic mi-
norities (4.1 in 2006 in comparison with 3.8 in the previous year). The experts estimate that progress has 
been achieved in the creation of the infrastructural support for minority networking and activities. 
The greatest progress in comparison with the situation as estimated in 2005 was achieved in creating 
institutional preconditions for establishing equality of people with disabilities, especially with regard to 
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the elimination of physical barriers (3.1 in 2006 in comparison to 28 in 2005). As previously mentioned, 
what contributed to this is the targeted funding of that part of the nongovernmental sector engaged in 
raising awareness of this problem, but also in overcoming legal obstacles for its solution, on both local 
and national levels. 
Unlike the attitude of the public towards people with disabilities that it has been sensitized for, and 
better legislative preconditions secured in order to eliminate discrimination against them, the attitude 
of the public towards sexual minorities is ever more intolerant. The experts evaluate that both the legi-
slative infrastructure for the prevention of discrimination against sexual minorities (2.7 in 2006 in com-
parison with 3.3 in the previous year), and the state support for their networking and activities (2.1 in 
2006 in comparison with 2.9) are worse than in 2005. 
European integration and the protection of rights of minorities and marginalized 
groups 
The experts polled in 2006 regard the area of the protection of the freedoms and rights of minoriti-
es and marginalized social groups as important as the experts did in 2005. In the previous phase of con-
solidation of the democratic order the issue of protection of minority rights was one of the most crucial, 
and it was set as one of the three political criteria for the opening of the institutionalized dialogue with 
the European Union (in “package” with the issue of securing the return of Croatian citizens of Serbian 
nationality that had left Croatia in 1995). The other two criteria included regional cooperation and full 
cooperation with the ICTY. 
The adoption of the Constitutional Law on the rights of ethnic minorities in 2002, which was a Cro-
atian obligation according to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the preconditions were made 
for creating an entire system of legal protection of ethnic minorities’ rights. The Constitutional Law ba-
ses minority protection on three pillars: the right to representation/proportional representation of eth-
nic minorities in the bodies of local and regional administration; the right to protection of the passive 
electoral right of members of ethnic minorities, which grants eight parliamentary seats for representati-
ves of ethnic minorities in the parliament, elected in special “minority” constituencies; and the right to 
minority administration at the local and regional, but not at the national, level. 
Passing the Constitutional Law on rights of ethnic minorities was not enough, however, for the in-
stitutions of the European Union to evaluate the political criterion of protection of ethnic minorities in 
Croatia as completely fulfilled. Only after the change in power at the end of 2003, when the new admi-
nistration was able to form parliamentary majority thanks to the representatives elected in special con-
stituencies for members of ethnic minorities, was this coalition estimated as a proof of a strong political 
will for protection of minority rights. 
The issue of protection of rights of ethnic minorities changed from international to national, so that 
by the autumn of 2005   full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal remained the only political criterion 
for establishing the institutionalized dialogue of the EU with Croatia. Nevertheless, this coalition was 
not completely used for building the legislative infrastructure for minority protection in Croatia. 
For the rights granted to ethnic minorities by the Constitutional Law, first of all, the principle of 
positive discrimination in employment in public administration, public services, local administration 
and the judiciary, should only be defined by special laws, because the rights regulated by the Constitu-
tion and even the Constitutional Law cannot be achieved directly. The regulations of these rights and 
legal changes that must be introduced have not become part of the coalition agreement between the 
parliamentary majority and minority representatives.
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Conclusion and recommendations
The example of public change towards people with disability and the improvement of legislative in-
frastructure for prevention of discrimination against them show that the focused efforts of civil society 
and activities in cooperation with local and regional  government can achieve  progress in one of 
the areas of the open society, and that the same tactics should be used in relation to sexual and gen-
der minorities, whose social role had initially been poor, and got worse in this year. 
Civil society values can also influence the general public here, which is still highly homophobic, 
but also the civil service, local and regional government and central government administration, 
which could ensure preconditions for the prevention of discrimination against and the social iso-
lation of this marginalized group. 
A fact that is worrying is that the civil society institutions that were recognized as the most powerful 
and most functional mechanism of social control of prevention of discrimination of all minorities and 
marginalized groups are undergoing ever deeper organizational crises, and in the process of the harmo-
nisation of Croatian society with the norms of the European Union their potential remains unharnessed. 
The procedures implemented in the pre-accession reforms in the countries that became EU members in 
May 2005, first of all involvement in the Economic and Social Council of the EU, and formation of 
consultative councils with the nongovernmental sector in Croatia, would contribute to overcoming 
this crisis and strengthening the institutions of civil society  and would also prevent  this efficient 
social mechanism being weakened further. 
The example of the improvement that has taken place in the position of people with disabilities shows 
us the importance of action at the level of local and regional government when the issue of prevention 
of discrimination against minorities and marginalized groups is at issue.  The opinion of the experts 
shows that the functioning of the local authority level is the weakest link of minority protection with 
respect to the exercise and protection of   minority rights.   
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MEDIA
Zrinjka Peruško, PhD, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb
INTRODUCTION
The total Open Society Index of media system for 2006 generates 46 points (out 100 possible), whi-
ch is way above the total value of the index for all  areas (42.2). The positive shift toward an open society 
in the media sector in comparison with 2005 is relatively small (only 1 point). But then, in 2006, experts 
identified the media sector as the most open of all the dimensions of society that were analyzed. 
The total expert sample rated the importance of freedom of the media somewhat higher than in the 
previous research (17 instead of 16 %), thus in 2006, freedom of media has been identified as equally as 
important for an open society as transparency and the democratic quality of political processes. Toget-
her, these two areas share second ranking. 
Nevertheless, in the second year of the open society index in Croatia, results for the media show 
some alarmingly negative trends in certain areas that defined how the media system was open, and not 
all of these results are easily explainable.
Methodological corner
The analysis of media openness within this year’s Index is again based on three types of empirical 
data: 
The first group of data is based on experts’ opinions collected by means of a questionnaire, and 
they present answers to so called closed questions, where the experts had to rank the importance 
of a certain area for media openness, but also to rank the extent of its presence in Croatia. Based 
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on this part of the experts’ assessment (12), we can construct an ideal model of an open society in 
the area of the media, as well as an evaluation of the particular media in Croatia. 
The second part of the experts’ data that generates information belongs to a qualitative type of 
answer and it pertains to answers to open questions on examples of trends towards a more open 
or a more closed society: in this segment, all the experts (95) could provide examples from all do-
mains of social life and areas included in the research.
The third group of data comes from a public opinion poll, where, within the media dimension, the 
main goal was to record the understanding and readiness of citizens for openness of the media. 
Based on these three groups of empirical data, together with comparison with data from the previ-
ous year, we can get an insight into the media contribution to an open society and also the willingness 
and readiness of citizens to accept open media. 
The media are free, but are they responsible? 
An important part of the process of evaluation of open media in Croatia 2006, and participation of 
media in the process of creating a more open society, relies on citizens’ assessments that were gathered 
through opinion polls. It is clear that the development of any society cannot entirely rely on the polici-
es and activity of the elites (politics, governments, media), but must always be partially based (in a de-
mocratic society) on values and goals held by citizens.  The results of the survey show that 54.5 % of the 
population believe that an open society is a society where they can freely discuss all issues, and where all 
citizens, regardless of their identity and affiliation enjoy equal rights and opportunities. This result shows 
a positive move, if compared to 2005, when this definition of an open society was chosen by 47% of the 
respondents. We can expect this positive trend to continue in the future as well, for respondents who 
were under 29 years of age chose this definition in 66% of the cases; this percentage is higher than the 
average in respondents who completed secondary school education (58.3%) or those with a university 
degree (56.4%). 
Croatian citizens evaluated the importance of the freedom of the media for the overall openness of 
the society with an average value 3.5 ( on a scale where 1 is identified as the least and 5 as the most im-
portant).  20 % of the citizens find freedom of media to be critically important for openness of society 
(5), and further 31% find it to be extremely important (4). Respondents with higher education rated 
this area as even more important (3.7), although the relevant ranking of importance remained the 
same:
the media are considered as more important than minority rights only, while areas that are consi-
dered  to have a greater role for the openness of society are transparency and democratic quality of 
political processes, economic freedoms and entrepreneurship, democratization, the rule of law,  as 
well as quality and an equally accessible and open educational system (with an average value 4). 
Education is identified as the key area for openness of society, as in the previous year’s research; this 
once again proves that citizens have very good understanding of the basic directions of social deve-
lopment. 
The public opinion poll provided data on citizens’ attitudes toward accepting freedom of the media 
– in this part of the research this has been made operational as acceptance of the possibility of expressing 
different interests and viewpoints in the media, even those that are critical and those that oppose majo-
rity viewpoints. From the results it is obvious that there are still a significant number of citizens who 
think that some Croatian media should be banned (although the number of those in favour of this prac-
tice is only 1% higher than in 2005, and the number of people that oppose it decreased by 15 % in 2006 
- the number of those who are indifferent increased). When referring to the second question on the fo-
unding of a censorship body, there are a smaller number of complete, or partial opponents of such an 
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idea (the previous year there were 50.2 %), while the number of supporters of that idea has slightly in-
creased. In 2006, an increased number of citizens claim that the public television should report critically 
on basic societal values (46.4 % in 2006 compared with 40.6 in the year 2005).52
Table 13  Citizens on freedom of media
 
I do not 
agree at 
all
Generally, 
I do not 
agree
I neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree
I mostly 
agree
I 
completely 
agree
Don’t 
know
Some media in Croatia should 
be banned
24,4% 16,0% 17,6% 20,5% 13,6% 7,9%
A state commission-body  
should be established to make 
sure that media do not publish 
information that might run 
counter to nation interests  
23,8% 19,3% 17,3% 21,6% 9,8% 8,2%
Public, national television 
should not take a critical 
view of our basic societal 
values
23,9% 22,5% 21,6% 18,1% 7,6% 6,3%
Certain social groups should 
be forbidden to speak out their 
viewpoints if they are opposite 
from the majority viewpoints 
21,4% 22,5% 22,7% 17,6% 7,8% 8,0%
Freedom of the Croatian media 
is too great
15,7% 20,2% 27,3% 19,5% 12,7% 4,6%
Speaking about certain 
important issues, it is better 
to limit the opportunities 
for all people to express their 
viewpoints in the media
15,2% 17,8% 21,3% 26,3% 13,7% 5,7%
Within interpretation of obtained results, it must be noted that there are 30% of respondents who 
do not accept the idea of the free media in an open society; who believe there should be a governmen-
tal censorship body to make sure that media do not publish information that might run counter to 
state interests, that free speech should be disabled if it opposes the viewpoints of the majority, and if 
important issues are concerned, only certain social groups should be able to speak in the media. 
Although the radical part of these opinions quite minor (from 7.6 to 13.7 % of all answers), it still 
indicates that a democratic concept of public debate, without having the state interfering in it and the 
state’s complete separation from the public sphere and the editorial policies of the media, has not yet 
been accepted within the Croatian society. If we turn to interpretation of the answer regarding the free-
dom of the media, 32.2% of respondents find the media too free,  27.3 % neither agree, nor disagree, 
and one should ask oneself to what extent the quality and professionalism of the existing media has 
contributed to such an assessment. This category, together with some other categories that gained ra-
52 It is possible that this result is connected to a slight variation of question. Namely, last year’s question was “Public, 
state television should not report critically on the ultimate values within our society, such as the homeland war”.
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tings that do not support openness of the media, inevitably raises the question of whether the media 
have done all they could to make citizens experience the media as trustworthy, non-partisan participants 
and mediators of public debate. Or, perhaps, have the media through their disrespect for professional 
standards on fact-based and objective reporting, and in their chase for sensational themes, ensured more 
public attention, but at the same time lost their credibility? Support for  this  conclusion could also be 
provided by the survey of experts who rated the criterion that speaks on professionalism and rationality 
of the media worse than in 2005: objectivity and professionalism are now lower than last year by 2 index 
points (55 in 2006), rational and fact-based critical perspectives of the media dropped by 9 points (down 
to 36), development of engaged, investigative journalism and reporting decreased by 6 points (to 36) 
and equal treatment of all involved sides by 3 points (to 40). 
The index thus created of Croatian popular acceptance of open media comes to  54.7 % (on a scale 
from 0 to 100, where 100 stands for full acceptance). In comparison with other areas of openness of so-
ciety measured by this opinion poll survey, the overall result for the media sector seems fairly decent. 
Also, within the media sector, the index is much higher in highly educated citizens (63.3 %) and those 
younger than 29 (59.5 %); there were no important differences in regard to the respondents’ sex. Here 
again, it is shown that education together with age make up a good predictor of post-traditional values. 
Figure 22  Citizens: Comparison of index of acceptance of openness according to the dimensions  
Expert panel: Total openness of the media sector slightly improved 
The open media index for the year 2006 came to 46 (again, on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 stan-
ds for the maximum); while for 2005 it was 45.53 In relative relations, the index of acceptance of ope-
nness of the media in public debate by citizens (54.5) and experts’ index on accomplishment of an open 
media system (46) show a common positive trend which tells about improvement and acceptance of 
values of democratic political culture, as well as improvement in the development of elements that make 
up an open, democratic media system. 
53 The Index was calculated for the first time after the research conducted in 2006, based on data from 2005. 
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The analysis of the results gathered from questionnaires filled out by the experts went one step further 
in 2006. In defining media openness, the questionnaire kept the first year’s model of openness that is de-
fined through six main criteria: autonomy and independence of media, professionalism and rationality, 
absence of monopolies and equality of media market competition, openness of the media program con-
cepts toward different political options as well as ethnic and minority groups,   transparency, and effici-
ency of civil society institutions in the media sector.  The total number of indicators/items (i.e. special 
questions within upper categories) in the media segment was 66. In data processing, the analytical team 
conducted a componential analysis within each chapter, to receive factorial solutions correlated with data 
from 2005. Those items/indicators that proved to be active through equal content and component anal-
ysis for the year 2005 and year 2006 were formed into criteria that our evaluation is based upon. 
Each item/indicator required two types of answers: 
Assessment of each indicator according to its importance for the media (1 – as not at all impor-
tant for the ideal level of openness of society, up to 7 - extremely important for the ideal level of 
openness of society) indicate the opening or the openness of Croatian society.
Assessment of the level of achievement or presence within the Croatian society (1 – not at all 
present, 7 – very much present). 
The index was calculated by expressing the actual achievement of media openness as a percentage of 
the maximum possible degree of openness.
During interpretation of results in the media segment, it should be kept in mind that the interpre-
tation is based on a smaller number of experts than in the first research (12 experts in 2006 compared 
to 21 in 2005). Furthermore, there is a significant aberration from a joint average, which shows that 
experts’ opinions are not always consistent.54 These facts do not minimize the value of total estimation 
that is based on the arithmetical mean of all values, but it suggests a larger dispersion of experts’ grading 
within certain questions, which leads us to the conclusion that many of experts’ opinions on regarding 
what open media are differ.
54 Standard deviation of average values according to items moves from low 0.30 (estimate of the overall state of the 
freedom of media for openness of society), what speaks of a high understanding among experts, up to 1.9 (in evalua-
tion of the influence of civil society representatives and citizens in the Supervising Board of public television), show-
ing that the experts gave a wider range of answers to this question. 
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Results of evaluation according to the criteria 
Figure  23  Open Society Index according to the criteria 
When looking into the indices of openness according to certain criteria, it can be seen that the overall 
improvement in media openness in 2006 is actually based on improvement within two criteria: openne-
ss of the market (with a slight improvement of 1 point) and openness of media programs toward various 
viewpoints and relation toward minorities (improvement of 4 points).  All other areas have been given 
a lower, worse grade than last year (except for media legislation, which kept the same grade). 
The experts’ evaluation could be summed up within the following statement: 
 Regardless of the increased governmental pressuring of the media, less efficiency in media mo-
nitoring and controlling by civil society organizations, a significant fall of the standard of pro-
fessionalism and rationality of media (that represents one of the main characteristics of a quali-
ty media system), the variety of viewpoints expressed through the media and their sensitivity 
toward different minority groups is much bigger.   
In this way, openness of editorial policies toward minority topics and social groups is directly respon-
sible for the increase of media openness in the year 2006. 
With some caution, we could think of this as a indicator of an important trend in the democratic 
development of Croatian society (if not of its politics), for tolerance and openness to diverse opinions 
and views and the openness of public debate is a key component of a democratic culture (without which 
no kind of institutional progress can make long-lasting results).
Let us look in more detail at the results in the individual categories.
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Autonomy and independence of media 
Figure  24  Evaluation through subcriteria 
It is the experts’ estimation that last year’s largest negative shift (and that in relation to all media cri-
teria) happened in the attitude of the state/politics toward media (question: executive government is 
not likely to impose pressures on the media). A negative change of as much as 33 % compared to the 
previous year warns us of an alarming trend (that we believed behind us) of expectations of and search 
for control of the media. Along with the examples mentioned within the qualitative party policies of 
public television, with examples given of the show Latinica and Mr. Andrija Hebrang, recent examples 
of attempts to control public media can also include the attitude toward HINA and Vjesnik. 
Logically related to the increased governmental pressure on media  are the estimations of political 
independence of media, which has also registered a decline.  
Professionalism and rationality of media 
Figure 25  Evaluation through subcriteria
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The quality of media has been graded as worse than the previous year too. This again can be viewed 
as a consequence of increased governmental pressure upon media, and also as a consequence of compe-
tition in the media market that in Croatia does not account for better, but for worsened quality.   This 
criterion tells us a lot about the truthfulness of the media, on the trustworthiness of a given story or ar-
ticle, that it is presented without bias, and that it has been confirmed by several sources, and that all 
those involved have had the opportunity to give their sides. For the media system of a democratic coun-
try, a bad result within this criterion rings even more serious than the previous one. 
Absence of media monopolies 
Figure 26  Evaluation trough subcriteria 
The slightly improved value in the openness of the Croatian media market tells us that the expert pa-
nel missed identifying the takeover of the daily Slobodna Dalmacija by  EPH as an increase of the level of 
concentration of the media market. Sub-categories that make up this criterion included grading of qua-
lity of legislation on media monopolies, on openness of the electronic media market, absence of media 
monopolies and equality of competition in the  media market, as well as independence of distribution 
chains, efficiency of institutions for combating media monopolies and their independence, and the rea-
diness of executive government to engage in combating media monopolies and maintaining balanced 
competition in the media market competition. The expert panel concluded that development of the me-
dia market in Croatia seems to be on the right track in relation to economic criteria. Nevertheless, the 
expert panel did warn us about a fall in the quality of the media. 
Quality of media legislation
Figure 27  Evaluation through subcriteria
Although the overall quality of media legislation criteria won the same Open Society Index as the 
year before, a look inside this criterion gives us an interesting insight, and some hardly explicable ratings. 
For this criterion also includes rating the transparency and non-arbitrariness of obtaining concessions 
46
50
49
46
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
           Transparency of 
 the criteria necessary 
for gaining a national 
  broadcasting license
    
               
         Quality of media 
                    legislation       
Open Society Index
2005
2006
40
41
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Absence of media 
              monopoly   
Open Society Index 
2005
2006
85
ZRINJKA PERUŠKO: THE MEdIA 
for electronic media, which was graded better by the experts, while the quality of media legislation itself 
was graded poorly. Since the media legislation has not changed in the past period, we can conclude that 
the panel was grading the implementation of laws and their appropriateness for the Croatian media sy-
stem. A positive grade of the process of obtaining concessions could be connected with lower presence 
of these events in the past year.  Recent objections of some radio stations against the Council for the Elec-
tronic Media, which were published after this research had been conducted, (and we cannot judge their 
foundations) say that in the end not all the participants in this process are equally satisfied with it.
Efficiency of civil society institutions 
Figure 28  Evaluation through subcriteria
Both of the subcriteria referring to the efficiency of civil society organizations in the media sector 
have been graded lower than during the previous year. On one hand, the panel took into consideration 
the negative trend of worker’s rights and other social rights that affect journalists and other media wor-
kers. In Croatia, the collective work contract has still not been accepted (and there is no indication when 
it will be accepted). Only a small number of media houses have collective contracts signed.  The market 
economy in the media sector proves to be inefficiently regulated in relation to welfare and workers’ ri-
ghts, and this remains a sector that needs more state and private owners’ efforts and inputs. The trade 
union of journalists has been working on that issue for some time now.  
The evaluation of weaker efficiency of civil society refers to the CRT Council, and it is logical in 
conjunction with the evaluation that the media are more politically biased and lower in quality – for it 
is the role of the Council to ensure impartiality and a distance from politics.   In this segment too further 
work is clearly needed. 
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Openness of media programs
Figure 29  Evaluation through subcriteria
According to these results, most progress has been made in the concern of the print media to relate 
to ethnic minorities equally and without discrimination (17 percent increase from the year 2005). This 
is followed by the attention the print media pay to the issue of disabled persons (14 %), and finally by an 
increase in the variety of viewpoints and political options in the media and attention given to civil society 
(10). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that these results were relatively low for the year 2005, and that 
the present index for these categories still is still lower than the overall indeed for media openness. 
Conclusion and recommendations  
Lastly, regardless of the increase in the total index of media openness, the identified fall in the qua-
lity of media in Croatia gives great cause for concern, as does the decrease in media independence. The 
positive shift toward openness of editorial policies points toward increase in pluralistic values and tole-
rance within the public sphere. This deserves further empirical questioning, but if the estimation is ma-
intained after further empirical verification, it would tell us about a very positive shift that could further 
be interpreted within the positive development of political criteria for EU accession. Namely, openness 
and tolerance in the public sphere is one of the prerequisites of every functional democracy and it re-
presents the substance of the needed political culture. 
On the other hand, this year’s results of the experts’ grading pinpoint a high increase of executive 
government pressure upon media in comparison to the previous year, and a rapid fall in the political 
independence of the media. These results show us that more time is needed to strengthen positive steps 
toward political independence of media, for the political class still easily forgets and goes back to old 
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behavioural patterns. Civil society, including journalist’ associations and media as well, should continue 
monitoring and passing on warnings regarding concrete situations of pressure upon the media; they 
should jointly continue resisting such pressures.
 In the long-term sense of the general good, the evaluation that there has been a decline in the qua-
lity of media contents, their rationality and professionalism, gives much more ground for concern. Sin-
ce we are expecting politicians to start behaving within the European framework (last year’s pressures 
were also isolated cases, and not standard practice, as in the 90s) the reduced quality of media could 
become a part of a long-term trend, as feared by some European analysts. Further research into the open 
society should thus focus on the area of quality of media.  Open media are a necessary prerequisite for 
fulfilment of the social role of the media, and within the next period, the focus should be on the deve-
lopment of better quality media with more diverse contents.
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A CLOSED SOCIETY CASE STUDY:                                                 
SEXUAL AND GENDER GROUP MARGINALISATION DYNAMICS 
DURING 2005 
Aida Bagić and Vesna Kesić
From Zrinjevac to the gallery of Parliament and back again onto the street
In his review of recent gay and lesbian history in Croatia, at present the only substantial work on this 
topic, Australian historian Dean Vuletić notes the symbolic value of the fact that homosexual gatherin-
gs of the nineties and even earlier were located in the very heart of the capital, in Zrinjevac and Stros-
smayerov trg, cheek by jowl with cultural and political institutions such as the Croatian Academy, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Supreme Court.  In 1999 Zrinjevac was the scene of the murder of 
Jean-Paul Poulain, whose death is still unexplained. It is certain that he was homosexual, but there is 
nothing more than suspicion that those responsible for his death belonged to the skinhead subculture 
and that the attack was actually motivated by Poulain’s sexual orientation.55  In the last few years there 
has been an advance in Croatia, that has essentially changed the metaphor of the invisible presence in 
public urban spaces of part of the sexual minority, primarily gay males.
It was from Zrinjevac in summer 2002 that the first Gay Pride Parade set off,  and during the Queer 
Zagreb Festival 2004 a nearby pedestrian passage was emblazoned with the colours of the rainbow flag, 
generally accepted symbol of the gay and lesbian movements worldwide.  Almost simultaneously, in July 
2003, the concept of the same-sex union was introduced into Croatian legislation, and in spring 2006 
the Croatian Parliament debated the possibilities for registering partnerships. Not only were represen-
tatives of associations for the protection of sexual and gender minorities, lesbians and gays, involved in 
the preparation of both bills but, from the gallery of Parliament, they were able directly to observer the 
debate of the members concerning their rights.  In short, in the previous few years, Croatian society had 
been increasingly open to issues of sexual and gender minorities, and having to lurk in the shadows of 
the Art Nouveau buildings in which the principal national institutions of Croatia are ensconced gradu-
ally gave ground to growing visibility and presentation in institutions, in the literal sense and in the sen-
se of having greater influence on the institutional and legal framework and in the general public. And 
yet, some of the examples in which the society is still not open to sexual and gender minorities are to be 
found equally at the institutional level – in which the most frequent is the homophobia evinced in the 
parliamentary debate on the registration of partnership bill and the actual fact that the bill was not pa-
ssed – and at the level of society – in examples of various forms of violence based on sexual orientation, 
or discriminatory reporting in the media.  Accordingly, this is a case study illustrating the extent to whi-
ch Croatian society is still closed, as well as of its gradual becoming more open in the case of sexual and 
gender minorities.
Selection of topics and methods
The topic of this case study was selected according to the frequency with which examples indicating 
a closed society were collected during March 2006 during questions posed to experts from the area of 
the economy, media, politics, law and education as well as minority issues.   In their responses as a who-
le, discrimination against minority and marginalised groups and xenophobia were put forward as espe-
55 Cf. Vuletić, Dean, “Devedesete godine – između autoritarnosti i liberalizma. Gay i lezbijska povijest Hrvatske od 
1990. do 2000.”, in: Gordogan, winter-spring 2004. nos. 2-3, p. 138-156, tr. Luka Bekavac.
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cially marked examples of Croatian society as still incompletely open, among them sexual minorities 
being individually the most frequently adduced.  From a total of 223 examples suggestive of a closed so-
ciety, 26% referred to minority and marginalised groups and xenophobia, while among these, the pro-
portion that expressly referred to sexual minorities was 53%. At the same time, sexual minorities were 
mentioned relatively frequently as an example of social openness: of a total of 204 examples of openness, 
22% referred to openness to minority groups,  the share of examples in which sexual minorities were qu-
oted coming to 32%.
The case study was addressed primarily at the key events of 2005 and of the beginning of 2006, but 
in order to bring out their importance as indicators of trends in the openness of Croatian society, or the 
opposite, using examples of the treatment of sexual and gender minorities, it was essential also to refer to 
the preceding period.   In the introductory part, along with certain terminological remarks, we draw 
attention to the general social context and legislative background. The bulk of the article describes the 
dynamics and interference processes in the marginalisation and the social and political integration of 
sexual minorities. The first part is concerned with the initiative for the introduction of the institute of 
registered partnership into Croatian legislation, the lack of success of which is a witness to the still con-
siderable institutional stumbling blocks that exist where sexual and gender minorities are concerned and 
accordingly indicate the extent to which the Croatian is still a closed society.   In the collection of our 
information, we drew on reports about the state of human rights of sexual  and gender minorities of the 
legal team of Iskorak and Kontra56, documentation of the Croatian Parliament and the standing commi-
ttees and on other appropriate sources as cited in the text.   We would like to point out that as feminists 
and activists, as well as members of numerous minorities and majorities, we ourselves took part in many 
of the events described.
Remarks on terminology, statistics and public opinion surveys
Throughout this paper we use the expression “sexual and gender minorities” as an umbrella concept, 
while terms with more particular referents such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans-gender, trans-sexual, inter-
sexual and queer persons as well as the corresponding acronym LGBTTIQ are used depending on context 
and the source to which we are referring57.  Context and source are also determining in our use of the 
synonyms same-sex and homosexual58 orientation or option.
The multiplication of terms that refer equally to identities founded on affective and sexual orientati-
on towards persons of the same sex and to all other identities and practices that resist the dominant stan-
dard heterosexual paradigm is in itself something of an indication of the essential difference of sexual and 
gender minorities as compared with other minority groups.  These issues were addressed by the confe-
rence Gender Transgression: sexual/gender equality means more than binariness, held in Zagreb in No-
vember 2005.  The conference, in conjunction with the contributions made by activists and theorists 
dealing with work in the frameworks of trans-activism, feminism and trans-feminism from all over the 
56 Reports of the legal team of Iskorak and Kontra for the period 2002 to 2005 can be found at www.iskorak.org/hr/
preuzimanje/ (4.5.2006.)
57 A review of basic terms can be found on the Internet pages of some of the associations, such as Lezbijska grupa Kon-
tra www.kontra.hr or Lezbijska organizacija Rijeka – LORI www.lori.hr/terminologija.php.    Some of the terms are 
explained in the Croatian Wikipedia http://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homoseksualnost,  some more specific terms in 
Hrvatskom gej rječniku at www.gay.hr/slike/opsirno/rjecnik.pdf (22.5.2006).   For a more detailed definitions of 
given terms and their use in public communications it is helpful to consult: Mediji i LGBT zajednica. Priručnik LORI 
za novinarke i novinare o LGBT zajednici. LORI, November 2004, www.lori.hr/za_skinuti/Mediji_i_LGBT.pdf 
(22.5.2006.)
58 For the relatively late appearance of terms homosexuality and heterosexuality and the stigmatisation of homosexual-
ity in Western European culture see Francis Mark Mondimore, Prirodna povijest homoseksualnosti, Izdanja Antibarba-
rus, Zagreb, 2003.
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world, made an important contribution to the explication of concepts, to the endowment of academic 
dignity on and the import of order into the terminology and the existing linguistic and discursive 
muddle that rules in public and official speech in Croatia as well as in the other countries of SEE, when 
it is gender and queer topics that are at issue59.  In any case, it is apparent that minorities of sexual and/
or gender identities do not constitute any cohesive factor in the same that that, for example, national 
and religious affiliations do, nor can the indicators that refer to discrimination always be compared 
with those that exist for other minorities. 
While reports on the condition of human rights of ethnic minorities, of women as a political mino-
rity or other minority and marginalised groups such as veterans, the young and the disabled, practically 
always contain figures concerning the percentages of the total population that these groups form, from 
which quantitative data indicators concerning the level of their marginalisation can be derived and pro-
posals for their social and political integration subsequently proposed, corresponding figures for sexual 
minorities are meagre or non-existent.  Estimates of the proportion of persons with homosexual orien-
tations, that is, just one part of the sexual and gender minorities, range from 4 to 17% of the total popu-
lation, and are founded primarily on investigations carried out in other countries.60  But the issue of the 
accuracy of statistical indicators and the fact of minority status in the sense of numerical indicators that 
are currently bandied around are not crucial when it is sexuality that is the basis for a status on the mar-
gins of society.   Such indicators can be relevant only when the conditions are created in which a homo-
sexual orientation can be made public without fear of the possible consequences from society’s ingrained 
prejudices.61
Public opinion surveys, dealing with the views of the majority of course, unambiguously show a 
high level of prejudice.   For most members of the Croatian public, homosexual persons are not desi-
rable friends, although they might be neighbours and co-workers, while a great many do not wish to 
see them even inhabiting Croatia.62  Every tenth male would reject a homosexual son, more than a half 
of them would not want their child to grow up in a society that tolerates male homosexuality, and just 
a little fewer than a half would be willing to bring a child up in a society that tolerates lesbianism.63 
According to a comparative study of values in Croatia and other European countries, a mere 8% of our 
fellow citizens think that homosexuality can be justified.64  There are very few public opinion surveys 
dedicated primarily to sexual minorities, and still fewer of them in which the members of the sexual 
59 Proceedings with conference texts available at www.tgenderzagreb.com
60 Apart from it being essential, for the determination of someone’s sexual orientation, for the given person to go on 
record about it, the quantification of the population is made difficult by the dynamics of sexual orientation and the 
fluidness of sexual identities that are not necessarily harmonised. Cf.  Tea Škokić, “Znanstveno discipliniranje ljuba-
vi”, in: Etnološka tribina. Godišnjak Hrvatskog etnološkog društva 27-28, Vol. 34/35, pp. 23-37, Zagreb 2004/2005, 
p. 25.
61 Official statistics in Croatia for the moment include only data about sexual orientation as basis for discrimination 
in the complaints addressed to the Equality Between Men and Women Commission (Ombudsman) and the data of 
the Croatian Institute for Public Health, where in a review of the incidence of HIV or AIDS according to likely 
transmission route the category homo/bisex is given.  Cf. the report concerning the work of the Commissioner for 
2004 and 2005 at www.prs.hr (20.5.2006.) and www.hzjz.hr/epidemiologija/hiv.htm (24.5.2006.)
62 A homosexual person would be accepted as a friend by 47% of citizens, as a neighbour by 55% and as a co-worker 
by 58%, while 22% would not accept a homosexual as an inhabitant of the country. Cf. Ljudska prava i stavovi o 
homoseksualnim osobama”, Puls poll for CARANA Corporation, October 2002
63 A homosexual son would be renounced by 14% of men and 3% of women; 60% of men and 27% of women would 
not want their child to grow up in a society that tolerates homosexuality, 40% males and 40% females would not want 
their child to grow up in a society that tolerates female homosexuality. Cf. Maja Parmač, “Stavovi studenata prema 
osobama homoseksualne orijentacije”, dissertation,  Psychology Dept, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences,  Zagreb, 
2005.
64 Cf. Josip Baloban (ed.) U potrazi za identitetom. Komparativna studija vrednota: Hrvatska i Europa.
Golden marketing/Tehnička knjiga, Zagreb, 2005, p. 172.
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minorities themselves speak of their experiences. In their quantity and in their dominant methodology 
such investigations are in themselves an indirect indicator of the social status of sexual and gender mi-
norities.  It was only at the end of 2005 that the first such investigation was carried out in Croatia, with 
the objective of investigating the extent and structure of violence against LGB persons.  Its findings 
showed that in Croatia in the last four years, every other lesbian, gay or bisexual person suffered violen-
ce as a result of their sexual orientation.65  
The sensitivity of society to the discrimination against sexual minorities was assessed as the worst of 
all in last year’s Open Society Index.   Scoring equally poor results were the areas of protection of formal 
rights, government support to the activities of associations and the involvement of sexual minorities in 
decision making about their own rights.   As compared with the protection of the rights of ethnic mi-
norities and the formal equality of women, which are assessed as being relatively good, the laws concer-
ning the position of sexual minorities were evaluated as below average.
In fact, discrimination against sexual minorities is identified as more pronounced than with other 
minority groups, which is also the case when it is media attitudes to minorities is concerned; here, 
sexual minorities are perceived as the least protected from the various forms of hate speech.66  
Sexual and gender minorities in the legislation of the Republic of Croatia 
Non-standard sexual practices among consenting adults in Croatia have not for several decades been 
subject to criminal prosecutions67, but only in the last few years, largely thanks the need to harmonise 
the Croatian legal system with the acquis and European integration, as well as under pressure from ac-
tivism, were the first anti-discrimination laws passed. The Equality of Men and Women Law68 was the 
first expressly to define both direct and indirect discrimination and introduced a ban on discrimination 
on the basis of sexual preference in addition to the articles relating to sex, marital and family status. At 
the same time, Parliament passed the Same-Sex Unions Law69, important most of all because for the first 
time a same-sex union was legally defined and hence admitted as a social fact that resulted in legal effects. 
The law also defines and prohibits direct and indirect discrimination pursuant to a same-sex union and 
homosexual orientation:
Article 2
A same-sex union in the sense of this Law is a life-long union of two persons of the same sex (here-
inafter: partners) who are not in a matrimonial, common-law marriage or other heterosexual union, 
and that has lasted at least three years, and that is based on the principles of the equality of the par-
tners, mutual respect and assistance as well as emotional commitment. 
65 Cf.  Aleksandra Pikić and Ivana Jugović: Nasilje nad lezbijkama, gejevima i biseksualnim osobama u Hrvatskoj. Lez-
bijska grupa Kontra, Zagreb, 2006, p.7.
66 Cf. Gjenero Davor “Minorities” in Openness of Society in Croatia 2005, pp. 48-64.  According to this year’s research 
of the general population as part of the Index, it seems that most of those polled show a similar level of openness, or 
the opposite, to national or religious and sexual minorities. Openness to sexual minorities is claimed by about 40%, to 
national and religious minorities about 45%, while about 28% and 30% respectively express their lack of openness. 
But it should be noted that the share of “don’t know” answers is much higher when sexual minorities are concerned: 
13.3% of the sample chose the answer “don’t know” to the question of whether they agree with the statement: “I would 
have the same attitude to my best friend even if I found out that he or she was homosexual”, and only 5.6 gave a “don’t 
know” to the statement “I would never marry anyone who was not of my ethnic group or confession”. Cf. Indeks ot-
vorenosti društva, Izvještaj: Rezultati istraživanja na općoj populaciji”, working version, 15.5.2006.
67 Croatia decriminalised consenting homosexual relations between adult males in the criminal code of 1977, the age 
of consent being set at 18, unlike the 14 given for heterosexual relations. Female homosexuality has never been defined 
as a crime, but it was mentioned in a separate instrument as a lewd act.
68 Official Gazette 116/03
69 Official Gazette 116/03
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Article 21
(1) All discrimination, direct and indirect, on the basis of a same-sex union and the fact of a homo-
sexual orientation is prohibited.
(2) To encourage another person to discriminate shall be considered discrimination in the sense of 
Paragraph 1 of this Article.
(3) Direct discrimination means every kind of behaviour in which a person who is a member of a 
same-sex union is put or might be put in a less favourable position than a person in a comparable 
position on the grounds of the fact that the person is a member of a same-sex union.
(4) Indirect discrimination exists when a certain ostensibly neutral provision, criterion or practice 
puts or might put a person who is a member of a same-sex union in a less favourable position as 
compared with other persons.
Separate provisions have been introduced into other laws as well.  The Croatian Radio Television Law70 
and the Electronic Media Law71 prohibit programming contents  that incite discrimination against or ho-
stility to individuals and groups because of their sexual preferences or characteristics, while the Media Law 
prohibits, among other things, “inequality pursuant to sexual orientation” being encouraged or increased 
by the transmission of programming contents or arousing “hostility or intolerance” on the same basis.72 
The Labour Law73 mentions “sexual preference” and the Scientific Activities and Higher Education Law74 
refers to “sexual orientation”. There is in addition the Textbook Standards75, which ban intolerant speech 
and the negative depiction of individuals and social groups because of their sexual orientation. The Crimi-
nal Code76, Article 174 about racial and other forms of discrimination, was expanded in 2004 to include 
sexual preference77.  Then in 2005 in the Civil Servants Law78 “sexual orientation” was introduced as one 
of the criteria according to which government servants may not discriminate against or favour citizens, and 
the Government of the Republic of Croatia included this same provision into the Civil Service Code of 
Conduct adopted in the beginning of 2006.79  As well as laws in which it is explicitly referred to, sexual 
orientation – as well as gender expression and gender identity which are not at present mentioned in Cro-
atian laws80 - may be interpreted as a cause for discrimination with the use of the concept “other characte-
ristics” or perhaps, as in the Asylum Law81, of that of “belonging to a certain social group”.
Still, however, quite a large number of laws do not pay attention to the anti-discrimination provisi-
ons of the Equality Between Men and Women Law and the Same-Sex Union Law, the enforcement of 
these laws is not entirely clear, and members of the public who are discriminated against or exposed to 
violence because of their sexual orientation or gender expression find it difficult to pluck up the coura-
ge to make use of the existing mechanisms of legal redress.
70 Official Gazette, 25/03
71 Official Gazette 122/03
72 Official Gazette 59/04, Article 3
73 Official Gazette 137/04
74 Official Gazette 123/03
75 Official Gazette 63/03
76 Official Gazette 110/97
77 Law amending the Criminal Code, Official Gazette 59/04
78 Official Gazette 92/05
79 Official Gazette 49/06
80At the time of the debate on the Equality Between Men and Women Bill this problem was highlighted by Inga Tomić 
Koludrović proposing that the law should speak of equality of gender identities or more precisely of the equality of 
gender identities and sexual orientations. Cf. “Okrugli stol. Ravnopravnost spolova kao pravnai društvena norma. U 
Zagrebu 7. ožujka 2001.”, in: Kruh i ruže, no. 18, 2003, at www.zinfo.hr/hrvatski/stranice/izdavastvo/kruhiruze/
kir18/18okruglistol.htm (10.5.2006.)
81 Official Gazette 103/03
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In its Report concerning the state of human rights of sexual and gender minorities in the Republic of 
Croatia for 200582 the legal team of Iskorak and Kontra draw attention to instances in which the very 
institutions of government and the Government of the Republic of Croatia violate the prohibition of 
discrimination as defined in Article 21 of the Same-Sex Unions Law to the extent that when they make 
new laws or amend existing laws they do not acknowledge the rights and obligations of same-sex couples 
within other laws.  Thus, for instance, the Patient’s Rights Protection Law83 does not state partners in 
same-sex unions as persons that have the right to see medical documentation and does not allow the 
right to make a complaint on the grounds of a violation of the rights laid down in this law.   The already 
mentioned Civil Servants Law, in a similar manner, avoids discussing same-sex partners as persons beca-
use of whom civil servants might find themselves in positions of conflicting interests. 
In order to acquaint members of sexual minorities with the ways in which it is possible to seek redre-
ss from the courts and obtain protection against discrimination and violence in the Croatian legal system, 
as well as with the objection of  encouraging people to use the existing provisions, the legal team of Isko-
rak and Kontra has already published two editions of the LGBT Manual for the Use of the Anti-Discri-
minatory Provisions and Laws of the Republic of Croatia84, which in an extremely reader-friendly way puts 
forward the relevant laws and possibilities for obtaining the protection of the law against discrimination 
and violence, Nevertheless, very few people decide to report discrimination or violence because of their 
sexual orientation or gender identity.85 
At a roundtable on violence against the LGBT population held on the occasion of International 
Anti-Homophobia Day (May 17), several participants expressed the fear that institutions might react 
with more accountability only after “bloodshed”.86  In other words, it would seem that the level of latent 
violence is not enough to set off the institutional protection mechanisms, to a large extent only recently 
created, and thus to prevent its manifestation in still more drastic forms.
The Partnership Registration Bill
It was in this statutory and social context that a draft partnership registration bill was tabled. The 
lesbian group Kontra and Iskorak, the Rights of Sexual and Gender Minorities Centre, had for several 
years urged that same-sex unions be given the same rights as matrimonial relationships, and then in sum-
mer 2005 sent two proposals to government institutions and parliamentary parties.   In one they sought 
amendments to the existing family law, which would provide same-sex unions with all the same rights 
that conjugal partners have, while the bill for partnership registration excluded the right to adopt chil-
dren and was considered as a separate law.
The preamble to the bill pointed out that the legal consequences of the Same-Sex Unions Law were 
minimal, above all because many other laws, pursuant to which persons in a conjugal union or a common 
law marriage relationship exercised rights not covered in the provisions of the Family Law, did not pro-
vide for the same rights for persons in a same-sex union.  The analysis showed that common law marri-
82 Reports of the legal team of Iskorak and Kontra for the period from 2002 to 2005 are available at www.iskorak/
org/hr/preuzimanje/ (May 4, 2006).
83 Official Gazette 169/04
84 Zagreb 2004 and 2005, with support of the Human Rights Office of the Government of the Republic of Croatia. 
E-version at www.iskorak.org/download/lgbtprirucnik.pdf (May 10, 2006)
85 In cases of the Office of the Commissioner for Equality Between Men and Women there were two cases of com-
plaints about discrimination based on sexual orientation in 2004 and seven in 2005. See Report on Work for 2004 
and 2005 at www.prs.hr (May 20, 2006).
86 The round table “Nasilje nad LGBT populacijom: izazovi LGBT zajednici i hrvatskom društvu s osvrtomna iskust-
va u regiji” was held on May 20, 2006, organised by the lesbian group Kontra, as part of the feminist festival called 
FemFest.
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age partners were also discriminated against: a man and a woman in a formally concluded matrimonial 
union had 62 rights, while people in common-law marriages had only 29.  Persons in same-sex unions 
did not have even one of the rights that belonged to conjugal partners, and just the two rights provided 
for in the Same-Sex Unions Law: the right to maintenance and to property in common.87
Considering the expected resistance from primarily the HDZ and the Catholic Church, registered 
partnership was accepted by the representatives of the associations as a compromise solution, concerning 
which in the autumn of 2005 Dorino Manzin, chairperson of Iskorak, spoke with a fair amount of op-
timism: “We have chosen the “lite” version, because when public debates are being held we always hear 
statements like ‘we’ve nothing against it, just as long as it isn’t part of the family law, it isn’t a marriage 
and there is no adoption of children. If there is none of that, we have always said OK, and now we want 
to see if they’ll stick to their word…’ We expect the HDZ to support this kind of a statute. If it doesn’t, 
it’ll show that they are all hypocrites and manipulators.”88
The bill was sponsored for parliamentary consideration by Šime Lučin, SDP member, and Ivo Banac, 
independent member, former president of the Liberals. Šime Lučin had personally, as minister of inter-
nal affairs at that time, taken part in the first Gay Pride in 200289, while  Ivo Banac accepted the initia-
tive as part of his endeavours to bring the views of the NGOs and alternative groups into the legislative 
process.
The partnership registration bill was supplied to the president of the Parliament on September 20, 
2005, was put on the agenda for the 18th session, but a plenary debate was held only during the next se-
ssion, in March 2006.   During the several months at the turn of 2005 and 2006 it continued to excite 
the attention of the media.
The Government’s opinion was negative.   The existing legal framework was pronounced adequate: 
“The Government of the Republic of Croatia is of the opinion that the Family Law and the Same-Sex 
Unions Law, in line with international civilised standards, have completely regulated the matter of the 
right of people to contract marriage, to live in a heterogeneous extra-marital union or to live in a same-
sex union”.90  This view of the Government was additionally explained by Zdenka Ninić, assistant mini-
ster for the family, veterans and inter-generation solidarity at the roundtable about partnership registra-
tion that the Equality between Men and Women and the Human Rights and Ethnic Minority Rights 
committees had organised in early November 2005.   Apart from one of the key objections of the Go-
vernment being that the bill quite simply took over wholesale the provisions of the Family Law relating 
to matrimony, the assistant minister put forward the response of the chair of family law in the Law Fa-
culty of Zagreb University according to which there was no need for the regulation of partnership regi-
stration since “the European Union did not prescribe any such obligation for its member states but in 
Article 22 of the Charter of Human Rights it says that there are cultural and religious diversities that 
the European Union would respect”.91
87 Cf. Iskorak and Kontra legal team Prijedlog Zakona o registriranom partnerstvu, Zagreb, May 2005 (working ver-
sion)
88 Anita Belak-Krile. “Da, ja Ante uzimam tebe Jure za životnog partnera”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 18.10.2005, Medijska 
arhiva Pravnog tima Iskoraka i Kontre.
89 The fact that he was subjected to sharp criticism by civil society as minister of jurisdiction, because he did not man-
aged to halt violence at the Pride itself (teargas release) and after it (assumed or real participants being ambushed and 
beaten up) did not stop him continuing to advocate gay and lesbian rights.
90 “Mišljenje Vlade o Prijedlogu zakona o registriranom partnerstvu, predlagatelji Šime Lučin i prof. dr. sc.
Ivo Banac, zastupnici u Hrvatskome saboru”, at www.sabor.hr/default.asp?mode=1&gl=20060201000
0003&jezik=1&sid= (25.5.2006.)
91 Zdenka Ninić, according to the Minutes from the session of the Roundtable on the topic “Registered Partnership” 
of the Equality Between Men and Women Committee and the Human and Ethnic Minorities Rights Committee of 
the Croatian Parliament, held on November 8, 2005 in the Ivan Mažuranić Room, Trg sv. Marka 6 (7/1/DN)
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At the beginning of February 2006 the parliamentary committees went on record about the bill. The 
Legislation Committee decided not to support the bill “for reasons stated in the opinion of the Gover-
nment of the Republic of Croatia of November 3, 2005”.92  The Equality between Men and Women 
Committee supported the bill by a majority of votes (7 for and 4 against).93 The Human Rights and Eth-
nic Minority Rights Committee refused to support the bill (6 against, 4 for and 1 abstention).94  The 
result of the voting in the committees went along party lines; the HDZ members voted against, and in 
the Human Rights Committee they were joined by Šemso Tanković (SDA Croatia) while in the equa-
lity committee the proposal was supported by Vojislav Stanimirović of the SDSS.
Because of the Government’s opinion and the outcome of the debates in the standing committees, it 
was not to be expected that the bill would pass. But by a majority vote (76 against, 22 for and 5 absten-
tions) it was not even permitted a second reading.   Only the SDP supported the bill in its entirety; the 
HNS and the regional parties supported an enlargement of the rights of same-sex unions but not the 
right to adopt children, while HDZ and IDS, as well as HSS and HSP, were against.  On that particular 
day the three HSLS members happened not to be in the house.
At the moment the Government adopted its own opinion, an opinion we believe to have essentially 
shaped the outcome of the voting, the European Parliament Resolution on homophobia in Europe had 
not yet been passed.   Representatives of the associations perceived this document as the “start of a new 
era for sexual and gender minorities, for member countries and accession and candidate countries of the 
EU are required to adopt legislation forbidding discrimination and hate-speech addressed at minority 
sexual groups”.95 But although this was adopted on January 19, 2006, it would seem that the members of 
parliament found out about it only after the associations had presented it to the Croatian public at the 
end of February.    The parliamentary Web page in the rubric News from the EU mentioned only that the 
year’s session of the European Parliament would begin “with debates on a number of topics among whi-
ch are: a report of the EC on homophobia in Europe, European citizenship, trafficking in women and 
children, and the statement of the Commission on the conclusions of the recent WTO ministerial 
conference”.96   In connection with the link, the news mentions only the resolution of the rejection of 
any agreement concerning the long-term budget of the EU, and also mentions the resolution of the Co-
uncil of Europe parliamentary assembly condemning the crimes of the communist totalitarian regimes. 
That the European Parliament had a very lively discussion on homophobia and adopted the Resolution 
with a large majority (468 for, 149 against and 41 abstentions), there is no mention.
The Resolution states that homophobia is an “aversion to and irrational fear of homosexuality and 
lesbian, gay, bi and transgender (LGBT) persons based on prejudice and… [is] similar to racism, xenop-
hobia, anti-Semitism and sexism”97 and is “manifested in public and private spheres in various ways, such 
as hate speech and incitement to discrimination, mockery and verbal, psychological and physical violen-
ce, persecution and murder, discrimination in violation of the principle of equality and unjustified and 
92 Izvješće Odbora za zakonodavstvo o Prijedlogu zakona o registriranom partnerstvu, P. Z. no. 358, 63rd session, Feb-
ruary 9, 2006.
93 Izvješće Odbora za ravnopravnost spolova o Prijedlogu zakona o registriranom partnerstvu, P. Z. no. 358  33rd ses-
sion, February 15, 2006.
94 Izvješće Odbora za ljudska prava i prava nacionalnih manjina o Prijedlogu zakona o registriranom partnerstvu, P.Z. 
no. 358, continuation of 35th session, February 16, 2006.
95 The EU Resolution on Homophobia was the beginning of a new era for sexual minorities, February 22, 2006, at 
http://www.gay.hr/portal/opsirno-3271.php (29.5.2006.)
96 Archives News of Parliament and EU – January 2006, at www.sabor.hr/default.asp?gl=200602010000001
(29.5.2006)
97 All quotes from translation of resolution available at www.gay.hr/slike/opsirno/Prijevod_Rezolucije_.doc. The 
English version is available at www.europarl.europa.eu/omk/sipade3?L=EN&PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+TA+2006
0118+ITEMS+DOC+XML+V0//EN&NAV=S&MODE=XML&LSTDOC=N&LEVEL=2&SAME_
LEVEL=1#sdocta9
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unintelligible limitation of rights, which is often concealed behind justifications based on public order, 
religious freedom and the right to withhold approval”.
Among other things, the Resolution called upon EU members to “ensure protection for LGBT per-
sons against homophobic hate speech and violence and to ensure for same-sex partners the same enjoyment 
of equal respect, dignity and protection as the rest of society” and required that member states should 
“adopt legislation putting an end to the discrimination that was borne by same-sex partners in the area of 
inheritance, property relations, renting, pensions insurance, the tax system, social security and so on”.
In such a context, we have to consider the rejection of the partnership registration bill a key indicator 
of institutional impenetrability and homophobia in the current arrangement of power in the Republic 
of Croatia, as well as a reflection of social reality.
Minorities, matrimony and homophobia: examples from the parliamentary debate      
on the Partnership Registration Bill
Parliamentary debate arising from the Partnership Registration Bill deserves more attentive analysis 
than any that is possible on this occasion.   Concomitantly with the debate on the Same-Sex Unions Law 
or concerning medically facilitated fertilisation, it was a discursive field in which the legislative body was 
able to demonstrate its general level of information, knowledge and viewpoints about sexuality and ho-
mosexuality,  in which it is possible to register inveterate and widespread social prejudices concerning 
sexual and gender minorities.98
Within the confines of this case study, we would like to draw attention just to some of the most im-
portant topics of the debate and to the key sources of authority by which the members endeavoured to 
legitimise their arguments for or against the Bill. The particular topics are those of minorities, matrimony 
and homophobia, while the international framework for the protection of human rights, religion, tra-
dition and science are the key sources of authority.
The debate on the bill started as the 30th item of the agenda of the 19th session of the Croatian Parlia-
ment, immediately after the debate on the report concerning the enforcement of the Ethnic Minority 
Rights Constitutional Law.   The tone of the previous debate encouraged Šime Lučin, as one of the spon-
sors of the bill, to back up the introductory address of Ivo Banac with optimism: “Mr Vice-President, 
fellow members of parliament. At the very beginning I have to put forward a dilemma. This morning if 
you had asked me if this law would be passed, this bill, I would have told you that it would not, conside-
ring the opinion of the Government. But because I was present here today on the debate on the report 
talking about another kind of minority, ethnic minorities, where so much sensitivity was displayed, I am 
not quite sure that even this law will not be passed. For a minority is a minority, and every minority requ-
ires a special treatment from the majority.”99  But as the course of the debate was to show, minority status 
is still cause enough for the parliamentary majority to be able to admit the existence of discrimination.
In their opening speeches the sponsors pointed out that when certain rights were accorded only to 
conjugal and to an extent to common-law partners, i.e., heterosexual partners it showed “the discrimi-
natory practice of legislation, and that it was only on paper that the anti-discriminatory provisions of 
98 The Croatian Parliament did not discuss homosexuality only in the new democracy. More than twenty years earlier 
the topic of one of the sessions of the LKC had been the call of Toni Marošević, addressed on May 8 1984 in the Radio 
101 programme Frigidna utičnica to gays and lesbians to go out onto the streets and win their rights. Cf. Vuletić, Dean, 
„Gay i lezbijska povijest Hrvatske od Drugog svjetskog rata do 1990.”, in: Gordogan, autumn 2003, pp. 104-122, tr. 
Luka Bekavac; p. 118.  An audio clip from the programme can be found at http://www.radio101.hr/?section=6&page=2 
(20.5.2006.).
99 In these excepts we used transcripts from the 19th session of the Croatian Parliament of March 16 and 17 2006. There 
are no editorial interventions in the quotations, unless absolutely essential for the understanding [an attempt has been 
made to mirror this in the translation].
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the Same-Sex Unions Law was enforced”.   They grounded the justification of their bill, among other 
things, “on the well known fact that the level of democracy in a given state is measured by its provision 
of rights to minorities whose rights in no way can be considered to jeopardise the rights of the majority” 
(Dr Ivo Banac).   The opponents of the bill thought that the minority status was not reason enough for 
the admission of a discriminatory aspect, and, repeating the opinion of the Government concerning the 
adequacy of the current legal system, went on to find a whole string of reasons why recognition of par-
tnership registration would threaten the rights of the majority.
What came out in the process was disagreement about which groups could claim the right to mino-
rity identity, and a kind of minority hierarchy was erected.   For example, in his speech on behalf of the 
bill, Nenad Stazić (SDP) recalled the experience of persecution that sexual minorities shared with nati-
onal and religious minorities: “It is interesting that ethnic minorities have often through the course of 
history experienced persecution together with members of minorities created pursuant to sexual orien-
tation. I shall put this simply and succinctly.  Jews and homosexuals in the Third Reich were destined for 
extirpation.”   But in spite of the historical facts involved, HDZ member Živko Nenadić thought this 
comparison inappropriate and took the floor to “correct an inaccurate statement”. “Mr President, on at 
least two occasions Member Stazić, comparing and wishing to protect minorities mentioned and com-
pared ethnic minorities and homosexual minorities. This is a correction, this is incomparable, and I think 
this is a big insult to ethnic minorities”.  In the sequel of the session this “correction” led his fellow party 
member Ivana Sučec-Trakoštanec to a more precise formulation: “I shall not say that persons of a diffe-
rent sexual orientation are a minority…so as not to insult, then, comparing, so no one replies to me, eth-
nic minorities.”
As for the minority groups whose rights should have priority over those of sexual minorities, mino-
rity groups that have not yet spoken out, there came veterans and mistresses of married men:
“It is time for us to settle the problems of Croatian veterans so that they shouldn’t at least kill them-
selves, and this category for which you speak so ardently for you said yourselves it is about reasona-
ble persons and a reasonable category and so on.  Well then, in other words, let the homosexuals, or 
I am sorry, Croatian poofters, wait a bit” (Dr Marko Turić, HDZ).
“…there are plenty of communities that have not yet at all become aware of their minority position. 
For example, you have concubines, long-time mistresses, who can be seen in Japan today in the ge-
isha, and they are also a reality of Croatian society. Four and a half percent of such women who live 
their whole lives as concubines, mistresses of marriages and so on got into such relations often when 
they were young and have no guaranteed rights at all. They neither choose nor can they make sense 
of their position… [I would like] them to take heart and speak out in public, for their human rights 
are essentially at risk.” (Dr Slaven Letica, independent member)
However, the bill prepared by the legal team of Iskorak and Kontra and accepted by members of 
parliament Lučin and Banac did not only refer to persons of a homosexual orientation.  The minority 
for whom the law would have provided legal security included all members of the public “both hetero-
sexual and homosexual in orientation who were unable to identify with the values of the traditional 
marriage, but wished to take on the obligations and rights of living in a union with those that they love” 
(Dr Ivo Banac).
In the later debate, a minority constituted in this way, that is defined in value terms and not on the 
basis of sexual orientation, almost completely vanished from sight.  The dominating theme came to be 
the dispute about the identity or difference of matrimony and registered partnership among persons of 
the same sex.  That it was indeed marriage that was at issue the opponents of the bill concluded prima-
rily on the basis of a comparison of the wording of the bill with that of the currently valid Family Law:
“I just don’t know where you have the courage to write out this law on the basis of the Family Law. 
Well, you’ve just straightforwardly copied it out. Let me quote to you: Article 11 of  your law is the 
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same as Article 7 of the Family Law almost.   “If the registrar determines that any one of the precon-
dition is not fulfilled,” it goes in our Family Law “for the contraction of matrimony”, well you cross 
that out and put in “for entering into a registered partnership, he or she will orally inform the bride 
and the groom”, you cross that out and say “will orally inform the partners”.  “It is not permissible 
to contract marriage”, you cross it out and put “enter into a registered partnership”. “And compose 
a note thereto on the application to contract matrimony”, but “for entering into a registered par-
tnership”. So then you have completely copied out the Family Law, except that you encourage juve-
niles of 16 too, which is really unlawful and impermissible” (Karmela Caparin, HDZ).
The sponsors of the bill in their opening speeches and later contributions to the debate repeatedly 
pointed out that registered partnership was a “compensatory institute that enables the realisation of the 
application of the legal effect of matrimony in line with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 
and at the same time without impinging, I repeat, without impinging, on the institute of matrimony the 
way the Family Law recognises it” (Dr Ivo Banac) and that the laws that are mentioned in the Family 
Law are indeed concerned, but “only 40% and a bit more of these rights can be used in common-law 
marriages and same-sex unions” (Šime Lučin).
As to the charge of plagiarism, they say: “If it is an issue that in the bill several formations take over 
the rights, look here, it is about rights, well you have copy them out from any law. In this case, from the 
Family Law… if that is an issue, then we really don’t have an issue. There will be no problem for us…very 
soon, if this bill goes for a second reading, and I see no reason why it shouldn’t, to send to the benches 
a Same-Sex Unions Law where… all the rights that are contained in this law are defined in a different 
way” (Šime Lučin).
Most contentious, however, is the mention of children.  Neither the HNS nor the combined 
regional parties, however much they might have supported the bill, were ready to allow the adoption 
of children of their biological parents by their registered partners, while the opponents referred to 
their own identities as concerned parents that obliged them to “stand up” for the children:
“… I think that this Article 24 the way it is defined where it’s about birthing and raising children 
deviates from the currently generally accepted behaviour in Croatia.  Whether in a hundred years 
time it’ll perhaps become generally accepted behaviour I don’t know but at the moment this part 
that causes concern i.e., this Paragraph 4 in Article 24, we can’t accept as we can’t accept Articles 37 
and 28 either, which also stand out from the generally accepted social behaviour, and that is foste-
ring.  This part, at any rate, we cannot support, and if this part is thrown out of the second reading, 
in any case, that part that relates to the right of some minorities, we in the HNS are prepared to 
support” (Antun Kapraljević).
“We think it would be good for this law to pass the first reading so that the debate can continue. We 
personally… as a small party propose the sponsors should think over Paragraph 4 of Article 24 and 
Article 38 where it talks about fostering. I think that if they tone down their viewpoint a bit or wi-
thdraw it they would make their contribution to us discussing this law more calmly, more openly 
and for the benefit of Croatian society, because it seems that it is these provisions that are considered 
most disputable in the general public” (Nikola Ivaniš [a senior physician] PGS).
“I look upon this bill primarily as a parent, and as father I am worried about my children. Imagine 
gentlemen that you who have children too and support this law would you want your children to 
consume this kind of law?  I don’t… and I am standing up for my own children and those of other 
parents…” (Pejo Trgovčević, HSP).
Although the sponsors of the bill consented to the withdrawal of even the very restricted rights 
to adoption and fostering, their concession could not disturb the dominant idea of the primary 
inseparability of marriage, family and children.  The natural course of things, according to the 
adversaries of the bill, seemed simple and given:
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“The foundation of every society is the family and our society is as strong as the family is strong. The 
family is the union of man and woman who will have children, gentlemen, to prolong their lives as 
well as the life of their nation” (Karmela Caparin, HDZ).
“Nobody’s ideology, not yours either, no kind of ideology, is going to wipe out from humankind the 
certainty according to which marriage exists just among two people of different sexes  who with 
their own, exclusive, mutual and personal giving aspire to the union of their persons. In this way they 
mutually perfect each other in collaboration with God in the bearing and upbringing of new lives” 
(Zdenka Babić-Petričević, HDZ).
Most of the members find it impossible to conceive of a family in which the reproductive, biological 
and/or social functions are not primary.  And when such a conception is to some extent intelligible wi-
thin the democratic Christian option of the kind that suits the HDZ, it is hard to understand how it fits 
into the party platform of the IDS: “in this society there are simply some categorical values, I am thin-
king above all of the adoption of children and of marriage… I am absolutely against such possibilities, 
and just as much against the adoption of children. In my view, gentlemen, this simply cannot be natural… 
some distinction has to be made between their unions and the union of man and woman or woman and 
man” (Damir Kajin).
Finally, homophobia shows up as a separate topic, and an all-embracing frame of reference for the 
whole of the debate. Ultimately it is the key barrier to the de-stigmatisation and social integration of 
sexual and gender minorities in Croatian society. But for it to be overcome, it would seem that most of 
the members would have first of all to accept that something of this kind does exist in the first place. The 
understanding of the homophobia that can be gathered from their utterances relates primarily to the 
level of individual feelings and conduct, with all of them without exception rejecting any possibility that 
they themselves are homophobic, and at any rate, any kind of intention to discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation: “I shall tell you that to be against homosexual marriage does not mean any kind of 
discrimination, but such unions are harmful for the proper development of human society, and you have 
to be clear about that” (Božica Šolić, HDZ).
Some of them found their own “non-homophobia” on their own acquaintanceship with the “causes 
of homosexuality”: “Mr Lučin said that we who think differently about this topic that we are homopho-
bic because of fear or ignorance. Let’s talk about being homophobic out of fear or ignorance. It is com-
pletely untrue.  I have neither fear or ignorance.  I know very well what homosexuality is and I know very 
well what the causes of it are… I was against this because they want to give two kinds of union that are 
not the same, not biologically and not anthropologically, the same rights and the same labels” (Marijan 
Mlinarić, HDZ).
The assembling of reasons for or against the bill, in each of the three topics, was founded on four key 
sources of authority. In the case of the sponsors of the bill, invocation of the international-law framework 
of the protection of human rights as well as Croatian anti-discrimination legislation, and in the oppo-
nents of the bill it was primarily religious authority and the closely linked authority of tradition.  Scien-
tific (or rather quasi-scientific) authorities were most often mentioned by the opponents of the bill, whi-
le those in favour cast doubt upon their relevance in the context of the debate about rights.
Here we shall pick out a few examples of the invocation of the authority of religion and of science. 
In the legitimation of their statements with religious authority the MPs quite often stated their own 
confessional identity and quoted Biblical texts with more or less accuracy. The supreme authority is the 
Catholic Church, the highly vitiating impact of which on public debates about the rights of sexual and 
gender minorities was mentioned in one of the case studies of last year100:
100 Cf. Marina Škrabalo and Hrvoje Jurić: „Utjecaj Katoličke crkve u Hrvatskoj na politiku reproduktivnih i seksualnih 
prava i zdravlja od početka 2004. do ožujka 2005.”, in: Otvorenost društva Hrvatska 2005, pp. 166-198. In the instruc-
tions for Catholics to take part in political life that were adopted at the beginning of 2003 by the Vatican Congregation 
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“…for me as a believer my view is to defend certain principles that I acquired in church, and in my 
family as well, and I think that you’ve got certain things mixed up where the family is concerned 
where you said that it could be between a man and a man, a woman and a woman and so on. But 
you didn’t, and you should certainly have done so, mention Genesis where it says that “And God 
created man and woman, go forth and multiply” ( Jure Bitunjac, HDZ).
“I personally as a Catholic member of parliament and a member of a party that bases its policy on 
the foundations of Christian democracy and civilisation have a moral duty publicly and clearly to 
pronounce and express my disagreement and to vote against such a bill” (Velimir Pleša, HDZ).
“And I conclude with the message of the Catholic Church.  General good says that the laws accept, 
support and protect the matrimonial union of man and woman as the foundation of the family, as 
the primary cell of society. To equate, legally, homosexual unions with marriages would mean not 
only approving upsetting behaviour and risking making it exemplary in contemporary society but 
also to cast a shadow on the basic values that belong to the common heritage of mankind” (Božica 
Šolić, HDZ).
The opponents of the bill invoked science, mostly a matter of figures of speech in which the mere 
mention of some “contemporary analysts” or anonymous “physicists” and “astronomers” was supposed 
to work as scientific argument, when they were talking of the causes of homosexuality, the possibility of 
its treatment, and held the “scientifically founded” fear of the influence on the sexual orientation of the 
children brought up by same-sex unions to be particularly significant:
“Most contemporary analysts agree that for the creation of homosexual attraction there has to be 
some deficiency in the sexual identity of a boy or a girl in the case of lesbianism.  In the case of boys, 
it’s the relationship with the father that is crucially important. He longs to follow his father, to be-
come a man like him” (Ivana Sučec-Trakoštanec, HDZ).
“… a whole series of studies exist about.. the psychodynamics of the origin of homosexuality. A who-
le series of studies exists and surely we have read them, surely we know them. And it is the influence 
of the father or the mother, the flawed influence of the father and mother, that are one of the key 
reasons for the origin of homosexuality” (Marijan Mlinarić, HDZ).
An example that in the meantime has found its way onto the pages of the foreign press and that draws 
attention to the global and indeed physical and metaphysical danger of homosexuality is worth repeating 
here as well:
“And as the respected astronomer says, if equals started attracting each other, all material would im-
plode and de facto would disappear… And de facto  says that in this and this kind of nature, where 
heterosexuality exists from fly to elephant, where heterosexuality in not only the animal but also the 
plant world and if homophily were to appear, if like were to attract like, and repel opposites, the 
world would cease to exist” (Lucija Čikeš, HDZ).
Social research on the other hand can also be used as a legitimising basis for the demand for tradition 
to be respected: “Recent research has shown that the family is the most important thing in life for the 
great majority of Croatian citizens… According to all worthwhile research, Croatia is in its system of 
values a traditional, Central European and Mediterranean country and this has to be respected… Hence 
adopting this law would not only be value-violence against the Croatian mentality, but it would be aga-
inst democratic standards” (Petar Mlinarić, HDZ). 
Finally it ought to be noted that, although the stopping of the bill in the first reason shows the still-
present institutional impenetrability with respect to sexual minorities, it can be considered a success that 
there even was a parliamentary debate. As Šime Lučin observed during the roundtable about the bill, 
for Doctrine led by the then Cardinal Ratzinger, today’s Pope Benedict XVI, and on problems that derive therefrom 
when it is a matter of allocating marital rights to same-sex unions, see the article of Enes Kulenović “Ratzinger protiv 
Rawlsa: propast preklapajućeg konsenzusa” in: Politička misao, Vol. XL, (2003), no. 1, pp. 55-61.
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when it was still unclear whether the bill would find its way onto the agenda or not:
“Homophobia is in my view above all an expression of fear, lack of knowledge, lack of education, 
lack of information.  For if you refuse to talk about some topic, you cannot really know what is con-
tained in the topic. To know what the content of the topic is and to be able to take a proper position 
within this topic,  you have to know it. I know that some people find it hard to come to terms with 
their own sexuality… I believe that with this debate here today we shall move and sensitise part of 
the Croatian public. And, if you like, the Croatian Parliament and the president and the presidency 
of the Parliament to make use of what we shall say here after all to make use of their right and to send 
this bill to the floor of the house. For as I said once…for me it would be a big success for there to be 
talk of this bill in the Croatian Parliament”.101
To what extent the parliamentary debate had an educational effect on the views of the majority we 
shall see in the future. As Dr Ivo Banac said in his summing up, it is possible that the recognition of the-
se rights is just a matter of time: “I have heard today some most incredible statements, often with com-
plaints that this law is a kind of ideologisation of society. I have heard some completely inaccurate thin-
gs. I have heard some first-rate demagogues, but I have to tell you that whatever you think of this bill it 
will ultimately prevail because it is about rights, and they really cannot be relativised”.
At any rate, the associations for the rights of sexual minorities were able to use the parliamentary de-
bate and its reverberations in the media to draw even clearer attention to discrimination and institutio-
nalised homophobia.102  The rest of this paper will deal precisely with such proactive and innovative forms 
of activism, of the kind that were crucial in the launching of the legislative initiatives.
Activism and culture as spaces of resistance, provocation and integration
As pointed out in the introduction, the first Croatian Gay Pride Parade “Iskorak KONTRA [coming 
out  and against] prejudice”, held on June 29, 2002, represents the first major collective outing of the 
LGBT population in public.103  In the public memory of the gay and the majority population this event 
functioned as a watershed in the articulation of the collective identity, a subversion of the norm of hete-
rosexuality, indicator of the new self-awareness of the LGBT population and their developed capacities 
for self-organisation. As an event it was accompanied by fear, uncertainty and shock at the violence, but 
also with excitement and satisfaction.104  Irrespective of all the controversies that accompanied it, Gay 
Pride 2002 opened up new political and cultural spaces for action and affecting the LGBT population’s 
own status, both through the organisation of civil society and through institutions.
According to media and police estimates, Gay Pride 2002 brought together about three hundred 
participants and at least as many barrackers, from whom the parade was protected by a cordon of police 
with shields, helmets and other equipment for events estimated as highly risk-laden.  Pride was also mo-
101 From the Minutes of the session of the Roundtable on Registered Partnership.
102 For example, the transcripts of the debate are ready to be sent to European parliamentarians, as potential colleagues 
of Croatian members, to show them the way in which the Parliament debates same-sex unions and registered partner-
ship. Cf. M. Arslani, “Iskorak i Kontra prijavljuju parlamentu EU saborske zastupnike”, Jutarnji list, 21.3.2006.
103 The procession or parade of pride was marked on June 27-28 1969, when guests and personnel of the Stonewall Inn 
Bar in NY opposed police violence during a raid.  On the history of pride processions in the world, in countries neigh-
bouring on Croatia and in Croatia see www.kontra.hr/zgpride04/, for the 30 years of the gay movement, 1969-1999 
at www.gay.hr/portal/kategorija.php?kat=18&id=189 and the writings of Marko Jurčić,   one of the organisers of 
that year’s Zagreb Pride Parade, see e.g. Uvod u Pride 2006.: 6. Od prvog Zagreb Pridea do danas”, at www.gay.hr/por-
tal/kategorija.php?kat=1&id=3495 (25.5.2006.).
104 Cf. Sanja Kajinić, Iskustva lezbijki na beogradskom Pride-u 2001. godine i zagrebačkom Pride-u 2002.
godine, MA dissertation, School of Central European Studies, Gender Studies Department, Budapest, 2003, www.
kontra.hr/zgpride04/site/SanjaKajinic-Teza.pdf (15.5. 2006)
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nitored by a large number of observers alongside the route that the parade took. Representatives of the 
LGBT community, and of civil society organisations that champion human and minority rights, gave 
speeches demanding the elimination of all forms of discrimination, the enlargement of rights by the 
announcement of demands for the statutory treatment of same-sex unions, and the right to a life witho-
ut violence and full freedom of expression of a person’s own sexual identity and affirmation of people’s 
life style.
Gay and lesbian activities perceived Gay Pride 2002 as one enormous coming-out105: “Since last year, 
2002, it has for the first time been difficult to speak of the silence of the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual 
and transgender) community in Croatia” says the report of Kontra and Iskorak for 2002.106 Media acco-
unts pay particular attention to the presence of numerous persons from public life, and their willingne-
ss, together with LGBT participants, to be exposed to the inimically disposed mood of the observers: 
“The taunts were not avoided by the public persons who walked in the parade – Minister of Internal 
Affairs Šime Lučin with spokesperson Zinka Bardić, HNS president Vesna Pusić, HSLS-ites Durda Ad-
lešić and Vilim Herman, the MP married couple Helena Stimač Radin and Furio Radin, prime minister’s 
wife Dijana Pleština and Juan Pablo Ordonez, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.”107  Ordonez 
gave a statement to Hina, the Croatian news agency: “Today is a big day for Croatia, because  you have 
shown the world the dedication of your country to an open society where tolerance and the struggle for 
human rights have prevailed over violence” and Šime Lučin addressed to the conference and the public 
the significant message: “Love yourselves and fight for your rights”.
Lučin meanwhile, as line minister, experienced harsh criticism from civil society because he had not 
managed to prevent violence against Gay Pride itself, when near the end of the gathering, teargas was 
hurled against the participants, nor after it, when several participants or putative participants were physi-
cally assaulted. To this day, the police have not managed to establish those responsible for the teargas 
attack. 
In this country there are relatively few lasting strategic alliances among politicians and civil society 
initiatives meant to make a long term contribution to the development of democratic institutions and 
the respect for human rights, especially when it is unpopular initiatives that are concerned. From the 
perspective of the minority itself, however, the creation of alliances via invitations, lobbying, involvement, 
provision of information, exposure to experience – and Minister Lučin himself  was protected by his 
own police specials while he was walking with the procession through the streets of the capital – turned 
out to be a successful strategy.  When directly questioned, the representatives of LGBT organisations on 
the whole state their pragmatic viewpoint to alliances with political parties, or claim that they would 
vote for any party that would push through laws guaranteeing their rights and penalising discriminati-
on108.   The portal www.gay.hr included surveys directly relating to the elections; votes of visitors to the 
site on the whole grouped around the SDP and the HNS, while after Lučin took the initiative about the 
partnership registration bill, the SDP won an unquestionable majority of 49.5% of the votes109. 
Like most similar events in the world, the Croatian Gay Pride parades took place as a kind of mixtu-
105 Term by which LGBTIQ persons denote the process of accepting their own sexual orientation and/or  identity and 
of going on record about their orientation and/or identity to others, in everyday life and work surrounds and in the 
general public.  In Croatian the phrases iskorak, izlazak iz šutnje or izlazak iz ormara are used. Cf. http://comingout.
gay.hr/ (23.5.2006.).
106 “Kontra i Iskorak: Pozitivni pomaci. Ljudska prava seksualnih i rodnih manjina u Republici Hrvatskoj
u 2002. godini”, Zarez, nos. 96-97, 30.1.2003, at www.zarez.hr/96-97/z_portal.htm (21.5. 2006).
107 Gay pride Zagreb 2002.” Večernji list, 30.6.2002, nahttp://balconn.com/index.php?option=content&tas
k=view&id=125&Itemid=55 (24.5.2006)
108 Gordan Bosanac, consultative meeting, May 15, 2006
109 309 visitors to the portal www.gay.hr (May 20 2006) replied to the question “If there were parliamentary elections 
today, which party would you vote for?”
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re of carnival fun and games, improvised theatricality, urbane eroticism, multi-mediality and traditional 
political practices in the form of well devised and supported legislative and political initiatives.  At pri-
des, states American feminist philosopher Judith Butler “the theatrical and the political are mixed, the 
private and the public”, which “upsets the oppressive division into public and private space” and multi-
plies the spaces of the political throughout the public space.110  It is probably precisely in the way in 
which it put forward its performances and street theatre to the media and the public and at the same 
time persisted in its well-conceived political and legislative initiatives that one should look for the rea-
sons why this unpopular minority, in a relatively short time, achieved such important changes in its vi-
sibility and presence in the public sphere,  relying the while, of course, mainly on its own resources.
In spite of or perhaps precisely because of the gaiety of the formula that presents a challenge to the 
dominant heterosexual gender norm, neither Gay Pride 2002 nor its successors went off without aggre-
ssive and offensive attacks, from open hate speech to physical assaults. The dissenters as a whole linked 
their animosity for sexual and gender minorities with some other kinds of intolerance, as can be seen 
from the shouts or banners that said: “Go to Serbia”, “I screw your communist mother” or “Off with you 
to the ghetto”.   An interesting and telling detail is that in the whole arsenal of hatred, threats and deni-
als, throughout the whole of this time, there was but one articulated call to deny LGBT persons their 
rights.  In 2002 Zagreb theatre director Pjer Žardin carried in his hand a banner saying “No to rights to 
poofters”. In 2005, as part of the trends in the infotainmnent-isation of Croatian Radio Television, Žar-
din became editor and presenter of the TV show Genijalci.111  Gay activists reacted to the fact that public 
television was providing a venue for a person who had publicly denied human rights to a certain group, 
but without any feedback from CRT. The example is illustrative at several levels of analysis of discrimi-
nation, marginalisation and the practice of the social exclusion of sexual minorities. 
It is possible to interpret the fact that there was no direct negation of the “right to human rights”, 
neither on the streets nor in the parliamentary debates about the Partnership Registration Bill, in two 
ways. Firstly, the majority of the aggressive and mainly sub-culture groups such as skinheads and Dina-
mo F.C. supporters do not know at all and have no wish to take on the discourse of human rights, rather 
build their position and group identity on opposition to the Other and Others in general (Serbs, Poof-
ters, Niggers). But in the case of the majority religious and political groups, the absence of any outright 
denial shows that after all in Croatia today it is not acceptable to express intolerance to minority groups 
through an open and formal denial of human rights.  Denial is camouflaged in hate speech, in the argu-
ments of the moral and cultural majority, in tacit omission and other forms of marginalisation that al-
though symbolic do  of course have real effects.
From the names of the next three Prides (2003, 2004 and 2005), as determined by the organising 
committee, the concept of gay was left out for the sake of including, on terms of full equality, bisexua-
lity, transgenderism and intersexuality, with the explanation that gay on the whole relates to homosexu-
al males, and the official name of the parade became Zagreb Pride.   The question must be asked why 
none of the Prides after 2002 attained the same level of visibility and provocativeness, or of numbers, 
particularly of those who were not members of the gay and lesbian scenes, and who in 2002 made up 
the major part of the procession.  Several reasons might be adduced.   It is possible that, in spite of the 
cultural and political success of the first Pride, many of the participants were intimidated by the level of 
homophobic aggression.  Research into violence offered to the LGBT population it is true shows that 
only 33% of the population polled comes to public events such as Pride and Zagreb Queer Festival; 21% 
110 Cf. Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”, New York /London, Routledge,
1993, p. 223-242.
111 Infotainment is a term used by media theory to indicate the commercialisation of information media via the dom-
ination of information by entertainment content.  The Programme Guidelines of CRT for 2004-1005 say, for instance, 
that because of the competition of private television, public  TV has to beef up its entertainment programme and be 
attractive to the young, and the programme Genijalci is mentioned as an example of such a programme.
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avoid them because of fear of violence, and the rest for other reasons.112  On the other hand, the schisms 
and conceptual differences within the activist community probably also affected the response of parti-
cipants.  Pride 2005, after a schism in several gay and lesbian associations, was organised by the feminist 
group Epikriza, placing the emphasis on universal difference. Finally, the elections and the change of the 
ruling party in 2003 led to the absence of any political support, and once again the rhetoric of the moral 
majority prevailed in public. 
According to the forecasts of the organisers, Pride 2006 will have a much broader political platform 
than previous events. The intention is to organise in Croatia, and in the whole of the region of SEE, the 
first International Pride called “Living Freely”.  The regional committee consists of LGBTTIQ activists 
and organisations of the countries of the former Yugoslavia, and of Albania, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia.    Members of the organising committee particularly highlight the im-
portance that Zagreb’s International Pride 2006 should have as support to LGBTTIQ organisations 
and individuals from other countries of the former Yugoslavia that, apart from Croatia and Slovenia, 
have so far not managed to organise similar events in their own countries.113  Along with the standard 
demands for the abolition of all forms of discrimination, for the enjoyment of all rights and full social 
inclusion, and the right to sexual self-determination, physical integrity, gender expression and sexual 
choice in dignity, the programme of Pride 2006 also includes the following values and points of depar-
ture: feminism, peacemaking, ecology, alter-globalism, laicism, trades unionism, protection of labour 
rights and above all the elimination of all kinds of ethnic, gender and sexual phobias. But it was this very 
politicisation of the platform that excited disputes among the members of the LGBTTIQ population. 
A Pride opposition site appeared on the Internet that called for the signing of a petition of disagreement 
with the concept of International Pride 2006, saying that the ideologically and politically profiled Pride 
“unnecessarily links gays, lesbians and bisexuals with communism, exhibitionism, feminism, animal ri-
ghts, anti-religious and similar views that have no connection with sexual minorities”.114  The anonymo-
us author of the page thought that the ideologising and exclusiveness of the organisers was to blame for 
the previous year’s Pride having slumped to about 150 participants.   Some events of International Pride, 
“too much politics” and “pointless provocation of the public”115, were not supported even by the Iskorak 
coordinator, Dorino Manzin, but it was stated that most of the members of Iskorak would nevertheless 
take part in Pride.  Ideological and political differences among potential participants point up the ot-
herwise very patent fact that sexual minorities are not and cannot be a politically homogeneous group, 
as was stated by writer Mima Simić in conversation with the authors of this article116.  One of the reasons 
for the dispute and for the greater degree of stratification, according to public statements, and through 
private conversations, was the dilemma that had cropped up even earlier about whether to invite to and 
provide a public space for politicians, and if so, of what political profile?  This was even more pressing 
since the organisers were announcing the participation of European MPs, members of social-democratic 
and social-liberal parties.  Independently of the success of the regional International Pride 2006 and any 
possible associated and network resistance that it might excite, the concept confirmed the fact that the 
LGBTTIQ minority at this moment in Croatia is one of the most vibrant segments of civil society with 
a much broader action platform than literally understood minority rights and statuses, within which at 
the same time very dynamic dialogues were pursued. 
112 Cf. Aleksandra Pikić and Ivana Jugović, Nasilje nad lezbijkama, gejevima i biseksualnim osobama u Hrvatsko, Lez-
bijska grupa Kontra, Zagreb, 2006, p. 50.
113 Marko Jurčić, consultative meeting, May 15, 2006
114 http://www.prideoporba.org/7cinjenica.html (1.6.2006.)
115 “Šta će nam Internacionala”, Feral Tribune, 26.05.2006, p.20.
116 Mima Simic, consultative meeting, May 15, 2006
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Queer, KUGA, InQueerisition and DeNormativ – new entries for the dictionary of 
foreign words
The first Zagreb Queer Festival, 2003, was, so to say, single-handedly set off by gay activist and figu-
re in the arts Zvonimir Dobrović.   Dobrovič explains the phenomenon of the appearance of queer ac-
tivism, theory and culture as an opposition to mainstreaming and social integration of classic gay and 
lesbianism in the world, which can be particularly seen in the increasingly frequent demands for the le-
gitimation of partnership in a form of marriage.117 Queer politics and culture remain critical to the so-
cial integration of gay and lesbian communities, and expand the primary politics of sexual identity to all 
kinds of stubbornly other, unusual and accordingly subversive practices and lifestyles. 
Social and cultural subversion and all kinds of inversion118 seem to be a constant ethical and aesthe-
tic procedure of LGBT culture and politics.   From the first Zagreb Queer Festival of 2003, members of 
the Church of the Integrated Gospel organised protest events around the festival happenings.  At the 
third Queer, 2005, the organisers put their protest performance into the programme of the festival, 
announcing it as an appearance of an amateur queer ensemble characterised by “picturesque details of 
homemade stage setting, richness of metaphor and linguistic colour as well as subjectively unconvincing 
religious experience”119 because of which members of the Church “cancelled” their participation and did 
not hold a protest meeting.
KUGA, Croatian acronym for Cultural Street Gay Action [seen as a common noun it means “pla-
gue”], resorted to a similar subversive procedure of shaming and denunciation of homophobia; after the 
speech of MP Lucija Čikeš they pasted posters all round the centre of Zagreb that showed, in words and 
images, animals in explicit homosexual intercourse and thus refuting the idea of universal heterosexua-
lity.   KUGA defined its unconventional, radical street activism as a peaceful-anarchic-queer-feminist-
activist principle, using simple communication and messages address to the street on the street.120
During 2005 and in early 2006 two new associations were founded, both in Zagreb where, apart 
from in Rijeka and to a lesser extent in Osijek, lesbian and gay activism is on the whole concentrated. 
InQueerisition, according to the chairperson, Stjepan Pavlek, “combines the words queer and Inquisiti-
on. We chose this name intending to draw attention to the fact that what the Inquisition represented in 
history – persecution and torture – was the reality for many gay people today. In our compound queer 
breaks up the Inquisition, and this is the message we want to get across”.121 Similarly, deNormativ – an 
association for the promotion of diversity and toleration – in the very name itself shows what its objec-
tives are: “… in our society deviation from rules set in advance and imposed norms often entail labelling 
and condemnation.   We want to fight against this… The projects that we intend to carry out are our 
weapons in the not entirely easy mission of “de-normatising” first of all our own immediate surrounds, 
and then, we hope, society as a whole. 122 
117 Queer Nation http://corbis.blog.hr/arhiva-2006-03.html#1620831977 (2.5.2006.
118 In his History of Sexuality Michel Foucault finds that homosexuality started to be psychoanalysed and turned into 
a medical category at the moment when it was no longer looked at as a type of sexual relation (sodomy) but as a kind 
of sexual emotion, a manner of inverting the masculine and the feminine in the self. Cf. Michel Foucault, The History 
of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction, New York, Random House, 1978, p. 43.
119 www.queerzagreb.org/festival/theatre/crkva.htm (18. 5. 2006.)
120 http://kuga.gay.hr/about/ (22.5. 2006.)
121 www.balconn.com/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=532&Itemid=55, (29.05.2006.)
122 www.denormativ.hr/?page_id=18, (29.05.2006.)
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… and the extent to which they were accepted…
At the beginning the Zagreb cultural establishment ignored Queer Festival, but right after the first 
events, thanks to the participation of respectable queer theoreticians, academics and art groups from all 
round the world, Zagreb Queer took on cult status, and each year increasing numbers of people from 
the cultural public in general began to be attracted, alongside the LGBT population, with increasing 
press coverage. Although accepted by the cultural elite, the festival was still felt to be provocative, and 
in 2005 there was a revolt against the “poofters” by the auxiliary staff of the Zagreb Youth Theatre, once 
an avant-garde stage, who refused to provide technical services for a single performance.   As far as is 
known to the public nobody suffered any consequences for the discrimination manifested in a public 
institution financed with public money.
The phenomenon of public figures in Croatia admitting their own homosexuality is relatively small, 
in comparison with the relatively developed activism in the organised parts of civil society   Activists of 
the gay and lesbian scene explain public figures hanging back by the still high degree of homophobia, as 
well as the generation gap that exists between younger persons who are ready to make the step at the mi-
cro-level, and in the milieu of the pop-culture and civil scene, and older homosexuals, with established 
public reputations, who grew up and became socialised in the closed tradition and public of the privacy 
of sexual predilections.  It should be said however that there are also other examples, for example, the pu-
blic declaration of his own sexual identity by CRT journalist Dražen Ilinčić, who, as far as is known, su-
ffered no consequences and is one of the few persons from public life who have had the courage to come 
out.
Through the aesthetic and cultural confrontations and innovations in Zagreb in which the one-time 
important international cultural events had to some extent become moribund, Queer Festival took on 
the role of cultural and artistic avant-garde, which was anything but apolitical. In spite of all this, the 
organisers complain of the lack of understanding from the institutions: “Looking from the standpoint 
of the latitude and longitude at which the festival is held, dealing with themes such as ‘post-socialist 
queer identity’ and the ‘hetero-norms of childhood” its fourth appearance seems like just one more po-
stponed act of euthanasia.   In general it is the position of the so-called independent (or does one say 
unremarkable) scene in domestic culture and in the competent offices is subject to the whims and dea-
th rattles of uninterested walk-ons whose replacements are defined by the seasons”.123 This complaint, 
according to the statements of the organiser of the festival, is directed primarily at the Ministry of Cul-
ture, who had allocated the festival four years running risibly small funding.
Along with the standard insulting and menacing messages on portals and blogs in which the most 
frequent commentators were members of other kinds of marginal and subculture groups such as skin-
heads, Catholics, football club supporters, right wing youth and in the forums of the leading print me-
dia, Večernji list and Jutarnji list, it was also interesting to note the openness of some of the biggest Cro-
atian telecom portals (T-com and Vip), as well as the larger information portals such as iskon.hr and 
monitor.hr in monitoring and popularising gay and lesbian themes.
The media between gay extravaganza and champion of rights
In the media section of the Report of the legal team of Iskorak and Kontra concerning the state of the 
human rights of sexual and gender minorities in the Republic of Croatia for 2005124 the associations state 
that: “In 2005 we can record a downward trend in monitoring topics related to the LGBT population, 
and an expansion in the media of hatred on the basis of sexual orientation.”  A leading example quoted 
123 www.queerzagreb.org/qzagreb_2006.html (2. 5. 2006.)
124 The reports of the legal team of Iskorak and Kontra for the 2002 to 2005 period are available at www.iskorak.org/
hr/preuzimanje/ (4.5.2006)
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is the case of sexual abuse in the reform school in Pula when, as the Report says, the majority of Croatian 
media identified homosexuality, paedophilia and child molestation. Specific mention is made of Otvo-
reno and News broadcast on CRT on July 6, 2005, and journalists Ozana Bašić and Hloverka Novak 
Sržić who “gave the impressions of profound intolerance, with inherent elements of discrimination”. 
“The procedure by which crimes against the sexual freedom of children was equated with a homosexual 
orientation is not only offensive, but, when transmitted via the media, through its discriminatory angle 
is the means that encourages others to discrimination and, of course, entails criminal accountability,” the 
Report of the legal team concluded in its discussion of  this example of media bias.
The Report states other examples of offensive, ignorant and sensationalist media reports, among whi-
ch is RTL’s Big Brother, the article “Viganj is (not) Vigay” by Davor Mladošić, published on July 31 2005 
in Slobodna Dalmacija, and in particular the aggressive sensationalism with which the weekly Globus 
published in February 2005 its so-called Gay Directory, an alleged list of 800 homosexuals distributed 
around the Internet, which the legal team concluded was the crime of the abuse of personal data as de-
fined in Article 133 of the Criminal Code. 
The legal team of Iskorak and Kontra regularly reacted to such inappropriate media contents.  At the 
end of November 2004 they sent to the television corporations CRT, RTL Croatia, Nova TV and OTV 
recommendations referring to the current legislation providing penalties for discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation.  According to their assessments, however, this did not affect the practice of the TV 
companies of using terminology promoting discrimination against sexual minorities and they continu-
ed to use offensive and degrading terms (poofters, dykes [equivalents], he-she for transgender persons, 
and normal couples as against gay couples). In spite of the proclaimed ban on discrimination on any 
basis at all, including that of sexual orientation, incorporated into the Media Law, the Electronic Media 
Law and the CRT Law, the state-owned TV did not produce a single complete programme championing 
the rights of sexual minorities and educating the public.
Along with a number of notorious proponents of demonising and opposing homosexuality, who 
spoke from the position of the morality and naturalness of the Croatian ethnic majority and the natio-
nalist right, the dominant media, particularly the printed media, were more often allies and the cham-
pions of the rights of the LGBT population, and intolerance and public and camouflaged hate speech 
became a subject of ridicule in the printed media.  The honour committee of the Croatian Journalists’ 
Association condemned the sensationalism and lack of analytic writing in the articles previously referred 
to in Globus and Slobodna Dalmacija, and issued warnings to the authors.
In the period from early September 2005 to mid-April 2006 some three hundred articles devoted to 
LGBT topics appeared in the printed media, whether local or national125.  The fact is however that most 
of these accounts dealt with the sensationalist side of the problem. Incidents or sporadic crimes the per-
petrators or victims of which were homosexually oriented individuals are shown as gay extravaganza, 
and not as crime, and the idea of exotic sexuality, more often of the female or lesbian variety than of gay 
men, tended to be exploited. Still, the policy of the aestheticisation and performatisation of gay and le-
sbian activism found ready response in the media, and even led to mainstreaming and taming of the gay 
lifestyle126.
Those who compiled the Report, members of associations and experts, are undoubtedly in the right 
when in general they provide an unfavourable assessment of the media, which are anyway in Croatia 
reckoned to be sensationalist, commercialised, superficial and unwilling or unable to take on their own 
125 Media archive of the legal team of Iskorak and Kontra.
126 For example, Večernji list, reporting on the trial of the gay  murder that went on in Split in April 2006 published the 
headline “Zvonimir Čačić: moj je suprug bio krasan čovjek! / Zvonimir Čačić: my husband was a wonderful man”, 
28.4. 2006, pp. 28-29.
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proper role in the monitoring and affirmation of minority human rights. But a more careful view of the 
writings that relate to LGBT topics in the printed media nevertheless shows that the media in Croatia 
are far from homogeneous, and are not inaccessible or insensitive to the presentation and even the ad-
vocacy of the rights of sexual and gender minorities.
Conclusion
Even an incomplete review of the very lively activist and cultural scene of LGBT organisations and 
individuals and their advances in the media brings to light a disproportion that exists between, on the 
one hand,  the high degree of visibility, recognition and acknowledgement of sexual and gender mino-
rities in the media and among part of the public, and on the other the absence of full social inclusion 
and the acknowledgement of all rights, which can be seen in the inadequacy of the formal legal framework. 
The competent and innovative activism has achieved good results to the extent that it has initiated in-
stitutional and social changes, but these are still insufficient for the abolition of all forms of discrimina-
tion and the full openness of Croatian society to the rights, acceptance and de-marginalisation of sexual 
and gender minorities.
The decriminalisation that occurred three decades ago did not automatically bring in its train desti-
gmatisation as well, nor has it been able even in such a long period of time totally to obviate the social 
distancing from homosexuality.   Similarly, it is hard to expect that the antidiscrimination laws will of 
themselves contribute to the social or even the political integration of gender and sexual minorities. 
According to the estimates of activist circles, what is wanted for completion of the legal and social equ-
ality project is to build long-term alliances with both other organisations for the promotion and protec-
tion of human rights and university, scientific and professional circles.  The forging of alliances with 
political parties, and the limits of it, is one of the stumbling blocks among gay and lesbian organisations 
that will probably continue to be settled in a case-by-case manner, but most of the activists are aware that 
in the given political space, long-term institutional changes are not possible without collaboration with 
the political parties.
Examples from the media, particularly from CRT as public medium, and the parliamentary debate 
about the Partnership Registration Bill, tell of the hypocrisy and lack of understanding of Croatian in-
stitutions for human rights in their full sense, that is, the full acceptance, participation and inclusion of 
minorities into the community and national institutions.  And this, unfortunately, implicitly shows the 
lack of understanding of democracy, the degree of development of which is above all expressed by the 
level to which minority and different groups in society are accepted and included. As long as minorities 
are not an equal part of the community and do not have an equal share in national institutions, Croati-
an society will continue to be characterised as closed.
The identification of the most important topics of the parliamentary debate, and of the key sources 
of authority, perhaps provides activity guidelines for organisations working for sexual and gender mino-
rities’ human rights. Activism, in the form of  legislative initiatives, as well as of street and cultural cam-
paigns, has already touched all the individual topics and continues to attempt to scrutinise every one of 
the stated sources of authority. We hope that the previous analysis will supplement theoretical conside-
rations and strengthen the orientation to individual strategic objectives.  We are of the opinion that in-
dividual identified sources of authority provide various interpretative frameworks for each of the indi-
vidual topics, as well as various directions for LGBTTIQ activists to work in.
A step forward would certainly be any move there might be from the gallery to the parliamentary 
rostrum.  It is not most important here that the person on the rostrum refers to the characteristics of his 
or her own identity (as MPs do when they come out as “Catholic parliamentarian” or “concerned fat-
her”); it would be enough for someone to speak out about the rights of sexual and gender minorities as 
our common rights and in this manner to demonstrate that it is not a matter of any special or particula-
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rist demands, rather of universal human rights.   This latter was vividly illustrated even before Gay Pride 
2002, when Ivan David, in a column called after the vernacular witticism “Either you’re a man or a po-
ofter”, which the author concludes with his own coming-out, saying: “Well, ladies and gentlemen, it’s 
true. I am. Man and poofter!”127
127 Cf. “Rastvaranje šutnje”, Zarez no. 83, 20.6.2002, www.zarez.hr/83/z_temabroja.htm (22.5.2006.)
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Advances in the prosecution of war crimes during 2005
 Tihomir Ponoš
1. INTRODUCTION 
This case study deals with the prosecution of war crimes committed in Croatia during the Homeland 
War that members of the Croatian army and police force were suspected of having perpetrated, and 
attention is accorded particularly to the change in public perception of the need for the prosecution of 
the crimes.   The study deals in particular with the judicial handling of the Lora case, and with changes 
in public opinion with respect to the Gotovina affair, visible via the absence of turbulent reactions after 
his arrest.
As part of the Open Society Index 2005, experts hailed the prosecution of war crimes as an example 
of a welcome advance towards an open society 21 times out of a total of 209 overall references; special 
mention was made of the Lora (7) and Gotovina (9 references) cases. Some of the reasons for the move 
towards a more open society given in the experts’ references are a strengthening of political will, greater 
effectiveness and impartiality of the justice system, the very circumstance that the Lora trial was repea-
ted, the absence of any militant and nationalist reactions after the arrest of Ante Gotovina and his 
surrender to the ICTY in The Hague.   However, the very fact that the same topic was also mentioned 
6 times (of a total of 223 references) as an example as a shift towards a more closed society shows that 
the perception of the respondents was by no means unanimous.
According to data from the county courts, in 2005 there were 16 trials arising out of war crimes 
charges.128 All in all, there were 79 persons mentioned in the indictments, including 62 members of the 
Serb paramilitaries. In spite of the numerous recommendations that as far as possible people be not tri-
ed in absentia, 39 persons were tried although they were beyond the reach of the law.   Seventeen of the 
indictees were members of the Croatian army or police force.   Charges covered war crimes against the 
civilian population, war crimes against the wounded and sick, the organisation of genocide and war 
crimes committed by others, genocide and crimes of unlawful killing and wounding of the enemy.  Tri-
als were held in Bjelovar, Karlovac, Osijek, Slavonski Brod, Split, Vukovar, Varaždin, Zadar and Zagreb. 
Three quarters of the cases (12 out of 16) were retrials, following upon Supreme Court decisions. 
During 2005 an advance in the direction of openness in the trial of war crimes was made in the mere 
fact that four NGOs – Altruist Centre, Split; the Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights 
of Osijek; the Civil Committee for Human Rights of Zagreb; and the Croatian Helsinki Committee 
for Human Rights (commonly known as HHO) of Zagreb monitored the war crimes trials in a syste-
matic fashion.   These organisations had a watchdog brief over 13 trials that were held in eight county 
courts.
This case study describes the context and run-up to the Lora and Gotovina cases, and the circum-
stances that changed, including the legal framework with respect to the trying of war crimes in Croatia. 
These two cases had by far the greatest media and political exposure.   Changes in the Gotovina case from 
2001 onwards are important for signalling the changes in the government policy to the trying of war 
crimes, as well as those in the ways in which the country cooperated with the international community, 
particularly with the EU and the ICTY in The Hague.  The Lora case is important, on the other hand, 
128 Hrvatski helsinški odbor za ljudska prava, Skraćeni izvještaj za Međunarodnu helsinšku federaciju za 2005.godinu, 
p. 10., available at http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=3&d_
id=4232
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for showing the changes in the atmosphere before the national courts, as well as improvements in the 
local justice system, in the endeavour to conduct proper cases in connection with war crimes in which it 
was members of the Croatian armed forces or police that were in the dock. This study is a result of the 
analysis of press reports, specialised reports of NGOs, and reports of international organisations and talks 
held with several people with informed opinions about the topic.
2. THE CONTEXT
The direct objective of trying war crimes, that is,  more precisely those persons that are suspected of 
or have been indicted for the commission of war crimes in the Republic of Croatia is primarily a matter 
of criminal law.   However, for years, such trials, particularly during the nineties, had to proceed under 
too great a political influence, which was particularly well seen in the approach of the justice system, 
which was tempered according to the ethnicity of the suspects.   Serbs charged with war crimes were 
often tried in their absence, in spite of international advice that such procedures, if it was at all possible, 
should not be held, among other things because the persons who were arraigned and tried would have 
the right to retrial when and if they became accessible to the law.  There was a tendency to avoid trying 
ethnic Croats, in other words members of the Croatian police force and army suspected of having com-
mitted war crimes, the judicial placet to which was given by the then president of the Supreme Court 
Milan Vuković, who stated that in a war of defence it was impossible to commit a war crime.129 
An important goal in bringing war criminals before the courts was brought out by all the major po-
litical figures in recent years, particularly often by President Stjepan Mesić, that is, the individualising of 
war crimes, the objective of which was meant to be the avoidance of the imputation of collective respon-
sibility. 
Historian and independent member of parliament Ivo Banac points out that trials for war crimes are 
in the  European context a new area: 
War crimes trials were organised only after World War II, at high speed and by the victors. In this 
area, the issue was raised once again in Europe.  The trials take place in Croatia at snail’s pace, everyt-
hing goes on too slowly, and there is every chance that we shall be dealing with this for the next 
twenty years.130 
Banac sees the reasons for this tardiness in long-term political and judicial obstruction and the fact 
that society was unable to accept the idea of crimes committed in the defence of the homeland as well.
An important topic for some of the NGOs (for HHO, the Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and 
Human Rights, the Civil Committee for Human Rights, the Dalmatian Committee for Human Rights, 
the Peace Studies Centre, Documenta – CERD) was that the trying of war crimes was important as a 
way of facing up to the past.  However, to date this concept has been fairly misty to the general public, 
as shown by the Documenta report Facing Up to the Past in which there is the following comment: “an 
analysis of group discussions shows that the concept of facing up to the past is insufficiently well defined, 
that is, that it is unclear and abstract to the respondents, and that they do not know what it actually 
means.”131 The fact that most respondents to the question of whether Croatia needs to face up to the 
past replied that it did is explained as a failure to understand the question “for if the interviewees had 
totally understood the meaning of the concept – as, among other things, of facing, recognising and trying 
war crimes from their own side – it is very questionable whether they would have replied so positively 
129 “O odnosu hrvatskih vlasti spram suda za ratne zločine u Haagu [Attitude of Croatian authorities to the ICTY]”, 
HHO, Izjava broj 85, available on  http://www.open.hr/com/hho/iz85-98.htm
130 Author’s consultation with Ivo Banac, May 30, 2006.
131 Unpublished report “Suočavanje s prošlošću, kvalitativno istraživanje [Facing up to the Past, a Qualitative Investi-
gation]”, prepared for: Documenta, Puls, Zagreb, 2006. p. 59.
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to this question.”132
The trying of war crimes in Croatia, in other words the gradual change in the viewpoint of official 
policies, almost always occurred only under international pressure.  For Croatia to be able to join the 
European Union, it had to meet the requirement of Brussels to establish the rule of law, which among 
other things involved the possibility of the organisation and implementation of fair trials in cases of war 
crimes.  Although the number of trials before the Croatian courts on war crimes charges is quite small 
as compared with other kinds of procedures, because of their importance they have been a subject that 
has particularly drawn the interest of international organisations such as the OSCE mission to Croatia 
and the EU. 
An important factor in the change of policies to war crimes trials is the gradual adoption of the fra-
mework of international law and its incorporation into Croatian legislation, in which particularly im-
portant parts have been played by the Constitutional Law concerning the Collaboration of the Republic 
of Croatia with the ICTY133  and the Enforcement of the Statutes of the ICTY and Prosecution for 
Crimes against International Law of War Act134.  It was primarily the adoption of these laws, but to no 
small extent the ratification of a series of international conventions and protocols, that resulted in the 
gradual modification of domestic criminal legislation to do with trying war crimes.
One of the reasons for the prosecution of war crimes is that they are today very burdensome to Cro-
atian society. In a guest appearance on a Croatian Radio broadcast of May 15, 2006, the President of the 
Republic Stjepan Mesić and the Prime Minister Dr Ivo Sanader agreed with the view that war crimes 
should have been prosecuted earlier, in which case we would not have been burdened with them today. 
Since at that time the topic of the politicisation of war the justice system was once again current becau-
se of the Glavaš case and of this member of parliament being stripped of his parliamentary immunity at 
the request of the State Attorney’s Office since he was suspected of having committed a war crime in 
Osijek in 1991, both of them made important statements that the judiciary and politics needed keeping 
apart.  From this statement it is not entirely clear whether they think that justice has already been dis-
tanced from politics or whether this is an ongoing process. 
Vesna Škare-Ožbolt, the former Justice Minister, occupying this office from December 2003 until 
February 2006, thinks that all war criminals have to be tried and that this is a process that is no respecter 
of ethnicities: “We have to put a full stop to this. There is a lot of confusion, but actual cases are being 
taken very seriously and the atmosphere is a lot better. War crimes trials, no matter who committed them, 
are absolutely possible without any problems, as can be seen from the procedures in the Norac and Lora 
cases.  In spite of all the flaws, we have taken some seven-league strides”.135
The legal framework as precondition for war crimes trials
In the middle of 2005, the Republic of Croatia to a very large extent put the finishing touches to its 
legal background for a high quality formal law prosecution of war crimes when the International Legal 
Aid in Criminal Matters Law came into force.136 However, it had taken more than ten years for this legal 
framework to take shape.
132 Ibid., pp. 59-60
133 The Constitutional Law concerning the Collaboration of the Republic of Croatia with the ICTY, Official Gazette 
32/96
134Law concerning the Enforcement of the Statutes of the ICTY and Prosecution for Crimes against the Law of War, 
Official Gazette 175/03
135 Author’s interview with Vesna Škare-Ožbolt, May 31, 2006
136 Official Gazette 178/04
114
OPEN SOCIETY INDEX CROATIA 2006
We shall provide an overview of the changes in Croatian legislation after an article of Veselinka Ka-
stratović, “Modifications in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia” from a special number of the 
journal Kultura mira [Culture of Peace] dedicated to war crimes137.
Amendments to the Basic Criminal Code of 1993 resulted in 14 articles defining crimes against hu-
manity and international law.138  However, the BCC did not include the crime of subsequent abetting 
perpetrators of war crimes, which proved in later judicial practice to be an unhappy omission: “as when 
before the County Court in Osijek a criminal trial was held for the crime of war crimes against the civi-
lian population committed in Paulin Dvor, but there was never even an investigation or a prosecution 
of the shifting of the corpses from Paulin Dvor to a location some hundreds of kilometres distant. In 
fact, the movement of the cadavers might be referred to the crime of subsequent abetting of the perpe-
trator of a war crime”.139  The BCC also did not provide for command responsibility.
In 1997 a new Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia was adopted140 that in Title XIII stipulated 
“crimes against values protected by international law”.   This law meant that the number of crimes was 
increased, and there was a quantitative as well as a qualitative shift in legislation as against the BCC of 
1993.
The Amendments to the Criminal Code Law141 represented a further step towards alignment with 
international standards. In detail, crimes against humanity, the crimes of command responsibility, of 
recruiting mercenaries, as well as of preparing crimes against values protected by international law, and 
the revelation of the identities of protected witnesses were defined.  This has been enforced since Octo-
ber 1, 2004.
With the adoption of the Protection of Witnesses Law142, which came into force on January 1, 2004, 
an important step forward was taken in the prosecution and trial of war criminals. Although the law was 
passed primarily for the purposes of protecting witnesses in organised crime trials, its provisions are also 
applicable in criminal procedures for the violation of international law.
Croatia has adopted and ratified many international regulations governing the protection of inter-
national law. In April 1996 Parliament passed the Constitutional Law concerning the Collaboration of 
the Republic of Croatia with the ICTY143, thus formalising the way the country worked together with 
The Hague.  However, even if this law had not existed, Croatia would still, as a member of the UN, have 
been obliged to cooperate.
In December 1996 the Government of the Republic of Croatia founded a War Crimes Commissi-
on144, which gathered and processed details about war crimes during the war in the Republic of Croatia 
and kept up contacts with the ICTY and other appropriate international institutions.   For the needs of 
its own working, the Commission collects all the relevant documentation that governmental and non-
government bodies in the Republic of Croatia have.145  Although the name of this Commission has 
changed a number of times over the past decade, this body has always been within the jurisdiction of the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia and its main task has been cooperation with the ICTY.
137 Kastratović, V., “Izmjene Kaznenoga zakona Republike Hrvatske [Modifications to the Criminal Code of the Re-
public of Croatia]” in Kultura mira, Magazine of the Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights Osijek, 2005
138 BCC, Official Gazette 31-94 Articles 119 to 132
139 Kastratović 2005: p. 10
140 Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette 110-97
141 Official Gazette 105-04
142 Witness Protection Law, Official Gazette 163/03
143 Constitutional Law concerning the Collaboration of the Republic of Croatia with the ICTY, Official Gazette 
32/96
144 Decision concerning the foundation of the War Crimes Commission, Official Gazette 106/96, December 5, 
1996
145 Ibid., Article 2.
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In March 2001 the Croatian Parliament passed the Confirmation of the Roman Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court Law146 and in October 2003 it adopted the Enforcement of the Statutes of the 
International Criminal Court and Prosecution for Crimes against International Law of War Law147.
Dr Ivo Josipović, exert in international criminal law, thinks that the legal framework cannot be com-
pletely closed if it is compared with the law that is practised at the ICTY: “Our problem, which is not 
specific to us alone, is that command responsibility is not governed in domestic law the same way that it 
is in the Statutes of the ICTY.   From the point of view of classic criminal law, it is a fairly tenuous cate-
gory, and has no roots in national legislations. As for law and war crimes, we have de facto brought in the 
most up to date law, all the new departures of the Statutes of the ICTY were incorporated in 2004 into 
our criminal law. Until there is a move at the international level, probably there won’t be one here.”148
The role of witnesses and their protection
Witnesses are often crucial in war crimes trials, which can in particular be seen in the Lora case. Du-
ring the first trial in 2002 witnesses for the prosecution were exposed to particularly great pressure – 
many of them did not attend in spite of being summoned, and the actual president of the chamber, 
Judge Slavko Lozina, in pronouncing the verdict, belittled the witnesses.  In the decision of the chamber 
of the Supreme Court, which upheld the appeal of the State Attorney’s office against the first instance 
decision, it is the attitude towards witnesses and testimonies that was referred to as a special problem in 
the first trial.
During that trial, the witnesses on the whole said that they remembered nothing and recognised 
nobody.  Judge Lozina during the trial expressed the opinion that Serb witnesses should travel to Cro-
atia and paid no attention to their concerns for their personal safety, although they had reported being 
threatened.  Lozina also disallowed the letter of Vladimir Žarković, witness to the events in Lora, as 
being an irrelevant submission of the prosecution, the only aim of which was to spin out the proceedin-
gs, and yet the Supreme Court in its rebuttal judged that the court might have heard Žarković as a wit-
ness.  Explaining the acquittal, Lozina referred to the injured party Milosav Katalina: “I was unhappy 
at listening to his testimony, but we had no medical documentation to confirm the injuries. There’s no 
Rambo that could have survived the torture that Katalina was talking about”.149
In criminal proceedings for war crimes that were held in the Croatian courts in 2005 witnesses were 
the most important evidentiary resource, but it was obvious that they were terrified.  As Veselinka Ka-
stratović (reporter of the observer team for the war crimes trials) remarks, in the report concerning the 
monitoring of the procedures against accused members of the Croatian army and/or police: “Fear was 
shown through changes in testimony, reference to loss of memory because of the course of time or thro-
ugh their refusal to appear before the courts.  We recorded complaints of witnesses about pressures and 
threats to prevent them testifying, their requests for protection.”150  For example, in the reopened Lora 
case, a prosecution witness, the former military policeman Mario Barišić, sought protection, but the 
State Attorney’s Office rejected his demand and offered a police escort instead.  The witness rejected 
this, stating that in the earlier proceeding, the police that had protected him had been exposed to unple-
asantness.
146 Law confirming the Statute of Rome of the International Criminal Court, Official Gazette 05-01
147 Law concerning the enforcement of the Statutes of the ICTY and Prosecution of Crimes against the Internation-
al Law of War, Official Gazette 1975/03
148Author’s interview with Ivo Josipović, May 17 2006.
149 “Oslobođajuća presuda u Slučaju Lora [Acquittal in the Lora case]”, Damir Tolj, Slobodnja Dalmacija, November 
23 2002
150 Kastratović, V., “ Svjedoci kao ključni dokaz u procesima za ratne zločine [Witnesses as key evidence in war crimes 
trials]”, Kultura mira, Časopis Centra za mir, nenasilje i ljudska prava Osijek, p. 22, 2005
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The HHO stated that “while witnesses of injured parties in crimes that had been committed by 
members of the Serb paramilitaries generally did not complain about pressure either from the public or 
the defendants… on the other hand witnesses who have testimony against members of the Croatian army 
and police were under pressure… . In some cases the defence tried to call their credibility into question 
in a manner that to the say the least bordered on a procedural error.  Many witnesses living outside Cro-
atia refused to come and testify out of lack of trust in the independence of the courts.”151
Vesna Teršelić, executive director of Documenta, is of the opinion that the issue of witness protecti-
on is one of the biggest of challenges in the trying of war crimes. “This is a critical time in which the 
State Attorney’s Office is shaping the manner in which it works in this matter and is attempting to res-
pond to the issue of whether its business is just the protection of witness from other countries, or the 
protection of witnesses from Croatia too.  Ways and means of protecting witnesses are still in their 
infancy.”152
In spite of the fallibility of witness protection, in 2005 an improvement was achieved in ensuring the 
safety of witnesses.   A regional observer team of NGOs in the trial in the Lora case finally concluded 
that “witnesses who came from Serbia and Montenegro say that what was crucial for their decision to 
come to the trial was the establishment of collaboration between the courts and police of the Republic 
of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia in these war crimes. They were pleased with the way in which the 
woman president of the war crimes chamber enabled them to give their testimonies and with the profe-
ssionalism with which members of the police of Croatia and Serbia looked after their security while they 
were travelling and when they were giving testimony.”153  The conclusion of HHO was similar, for this 
organisation stated that “the protection of war crimes witnesses was incorporated into the legislation 
(although effective protection was not yet guaranteed) and better cooperation was set up among the 
state attorneys of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina in war crimes cases”.154
Bilateral regional collaboration had clearly resulted in an improvement in judicial collaboration con-
cerning the trying of war crimes, irrespective of this probably being more the result of international pre-
ssure and less of the political will of the political and/or judicial elites.  This kind of outcome was fairly 
much on the cards after the political elites of Croatia, BH and Serbia and Montenegro had declared that 
they saw their futures in the European Union, one of the preconditions for the achievement of which 
was actually regional collaboration.
However, it was a different matter with witnesses living in Croatia, whose response to the trial in the 
Lora case was poor.  Summonses to seven of the injured parties / witnesses were returned to the court 
without having been delivered because, according to the data of the Split-Dalmatia police administrati-
on, the witnesses no longer lived at the addresses that the county state attorney’s office had supplied to 
the court.   Two witnesses excused themselves on account of ill health.  Witnesses from Croatia, in the 
opinion of the regional team, “were afraid of testifying freely and frankly”.155 Two witnesses, former MPs, 
claimed to have been threatened and the possible consequence of this was that Barišić in his testimony 
to the court said that he could only partially remember things. Another witness excused himself and did 
not appear before the court.
As for witnesses, particularly those witnesses who were also injured parties in procedures against 
members of the Serb paramilitaries, there was a marked lack of motivation to testify.   They were not 
151 Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Abbreviated Report for the International Helsinki Federation 
for 2005, p. 11, accessible on http://www.ihf-org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id*3&d_id*4232
152 Author’s interview with Vesna Teršelić, May 29, 2006
153 Evaluation of regional observer team, November 9, 2005, available on www.documenta.hr/index.php?option=co
ntent&task=view&id=52
154 Croatian Helsinki Committee, Abbreviated Report for 2005…
155 Evaluation of regional observer team, November 9, 2005…
117
TIHOMIR PONOŠ: AN OpEN SOCIETy CASE STudy: wAR CRIMES TRIALS
under pressure but “because of the length and repetition of the procedures of trials in absentia they sta-
ted that they no longer wished to testify since they could not see the purpose of the trials.”156  A new 
departure was the ability to testify by CCTV, which was used by the war crimes chamber of the Varaždin 
County Court in the case of a testimony of a witness who had survived shooting, to shield him from a 
direct confrontation with the defendants, for which he was unprepared.157 
HHO chairperson Dr Žarko Puhovski is of the opinion that “when it’s to do with our own side the-
re is an enormous problem with finding witnesses and the atmosphere during the examination of witne-
sses and even of victims was very difficult for these people” while the situation “was incomparably better 
when it was a matter of collaboration between Croatia and neighbouring states regarding the issue of 
witnesses. It took me quite a long time to understand in 2002 that not only the Croats but also the Ser-
bs were not interested in being witnesses in the Lora case, and that they even sabotaged  it”.158  He warns 
that inside Croatia the situation with witnesses had not improved.  “There is no protection at all against 
neighbours and public opinion. The state attorney’s office, looked at from the trial point of view, did not 
use anything like all of its authority to protect its witnesses from improper cross-examination. Even if 
someone was protected in a procedure by the state attorney, it was not to be supposed that his neighbo-
urs would be amicably disposed towards him.”159
Trials in absentia and defence while on bail
NGOs have been monitoring war crimes trials in the Croatian justice system for years but in 2005 
crucial progress was made in that 80% of the cases before the courts were observed, thank to which the 
NGOs were able to obtain a more complete insight into the procedures. Thus during 2005 13 war crimes 
trials were monitored in Croatia (the Koranski most, Bjelovar, Virovitica, Ernestinovo, Borovo Selo, 
Branjin Vrh, Brnjina, Krusevo near Obrovac, Mikluševci, Lova, Lora, Frkašić Camp, Trnovo and Podu-
navlje cases), as well as the trial held in the Belgrade Special War Crimes Trial against those accused of 
the slaughter at Ovčari in November 1991.
Some of the information collected during the monitoring of these cases can give rise to serious con-
cern.  Twenty of the accused (nine Croats and 11 Serbs) were being tried while released on bail.  Relea-
se on bail in the case of indictments for war crimes is dubious practice since it is the gravest form of vio-
lation of human rights that is concerned. Among those defendants released on bail while the trial was 
proceeding was Ilija Vorkapić, the only one of the indictees available in the Lovas war crimes trial, in 
which the highest number of murdered victims was involved – as many as 69 of them.  The Lovas war 
crimes trial, held in front of the Vukovar County Court, might raise eyebrows because of the fact that 
Vorkapić was the only one of 18 accused accessible to the court.   Vukovar County Court charged the 
defendants with genocide, the gravest violation of rights then. A similar situation obtained in the trial 
related to the crimes committed in Mikluševci, in which the defendants were also charged with genoci-
de, before the same court.   Of 27 defendants, 18 were in flight, while the nine defendants available were 
released for the period of the trial on bail160.  This illogicality was identified by Škare-Ožbolt: “It is extre-
mely interesting that those charged with war crimes are allowed to be at liberty during their trials. It is 
all the same whether the accused is called Ilija Vorkapić or Branimir Glavaš.”161
156 Monitoring war crimes trials, Report for 2005, Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights, Osijek, 2005, 
p. 12, available on www.documenta.hr/dokumenti/godisnje_izvjesce_HR.pdf
157 Ibid., p. 29
158 Author’s interview with Žarko Puhovski, May 16 2006
159 Ibid.
160 “Review of trials in Republic of Croatia monitored in 2005,” in Kultura mira, Casopis za mir, nenasilje i ljudska 
prava Osijek, pp. 32-32
161 Author’s interview with Vesna Škare-Ožbolt, May 31, 2006
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Žarko Puhovski also referred to the lack of logic inherent in allowing people accused of war crimes 
to be at large during the trial: “I cannot understand it, morally or legally, that someone who is accused 
of the most serious possible violations of the criminal code can remain at home, get shaved in the mor-
ning and then go off to the court. But release on bail has become a precedent.”162
Publicness of the trials
In 2005 the publicness of the trials was also improved, as well as the accessibility about the procedu-
res for war crimes, as indicated by the fact adduced above that the NGOs systematically observed 80% 
of war crimes trails. Information was made accessible by improved communications of the judicial bo-
dies of the stakeholders, including  the media, and by the publication of reports about trial-observing 
on the web sites of the NGOs.163
Vesna Teršelić considers that it is essential to ensure unbiased coverage of the trials: “Monitoring 
must be continued, and should in part be financed out of the budget. Strategically, it would be worthw-
hile thinking about the possibilities of monitoring before the case actually comes to court, although it 
is clear that this is not possible in all phases of the investigation.   In Croatia, a high degree of publicne-
ss has been achieved for the trials thanks to the media.”164
Notwithstanding occasional outbursts from the defendants, the trials are unfolding in an atmosphe-
re that is procedurally acceptable.  The media are present and report from trials in ways that depend on 
the interests of reporter and editor.  A greater public interest was recorded in the reopened Lora case, 
while some war crimes trials have passed off with no media recognition, because the media on the who-
le reduce their role to the reporting function while there are relatively few analytical texts.  Observer 
teams that have analysed the writing of the media as well have concluded that the media at a local level 
are biased in their reporting, particularly in the case of Koranski Most.165  Media interest, and public 
interest (friends and family of the defendants and the victims) are lower in cases in which members of 
the Serb paramilitaries are being tried.  To some extent the trials for crimes committed in Lovas and 
Mikluševci are exceptions to this.
The courts can improve public information about war crimes trials. With the exception of Vukovar 
County Court, which publishes the timetable of the court each month on its Internet site, and sends 
email information to people with particular interests, the courts only inform the public via their own 
notice board, while information is also available on personal enquiry.
Observer teams on the whole have no difficulty in obtaining court documentation, and a written 
application will bring copies of court records, indictments, previous judgements and so on. An excepti-
on here is constituted by the president of the war crimes chamber in the Karlovac County Court Mari-
jan Janjac, who is presiding in the Koranski Most case, who has not approved this, but will allow an 
inspection of the files.
For Josipović, the influence of the public is important, with the media playing a great role, particu-
larly obvious in the Lora case: “Public influence shows that the same regulation can be applied either 
grotesquely or honestly.  A good trial is not that in which a guilty verdict is reached come what may, 
rather that which is honest, whatever the result”.166
162 Author’s interview with Žarko Puhovski, May 16 2006
163 Reports and materials collected during monitoring war crimes trials available on pages of Documenta, www.docu-
menta.hr and of the Centar za mir, nenasilje i ljudska prava Osijek www.cen-za-mir.hr 
164Author’s interview with Vesna Teršelić, May 29 2006
165 Monitoring War Crimes Trials, Report for 2005, Centar za mir, nenasilje i ljudska prava, Osijek,
2005, p. 12, available at www.documenta.hr/dokumenti/godisnje_izvjesce_HR.pdf
166 Author’s interview with Ivo Josipović, May 17, 2006
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Žarko Puhovski opines that the NGOs in 2005 played a major role “but only because people no 
longer had any trust in the government authorities.  They came to us as witnesses, but not to the autho-
rities…”167  Puhovski also refers to the greater impact made by the printed than the electronic media. “As 
for the media, on the one hand they made an important contribution, particularly Feral Tribune for the 
Osijek cases, Novi list reported properly about the trials and last year other papers also showed themsel-
ves ready to support people who wanted to testify.   Public TV and other television states were to say the 
least restrained, and didn’t want to assume any prominence.  It is indicative that we did not have a single 
serious documentary programme about war crimes, the numerous films shot were never broadcast, and 
HTV revealed nothing.  Something was disclosed by the journalists of the print media, something by 
the NGOs, and the electronic media were distinctly bringing up the rear.”168
3. THE GOTOVINA CASE AND GOVERNMENT POLICY IN 2005
The Gotovina case 2001-2005
On May 21, 2001 the ICTY secretly indicted retired Col.-General Ante Gotovina with war crimes 
committed during and after the Oluja campaign. It was not until March 8, 2004 that the indictment was 
made public, having previously been modified on February 24.  
“Pursuant to individual criminal responsibility”169 Gotovina had been charged with persecution on 
political, racial or religious bases, deportation and other inhuman acts (forced resettlement)170 looting 
of public and private assets and indiscriminate destruction of cities, settlements or villages.171  And pur-
suant to command responsibility172, Gotovina was also charged with other inhuman acts173 and mur-
ders174.  In the indictment, the ICTY alleges that from August 4 to November 15, 1995,  Croatia carri-
ed out the military offensive known as Oluja/Storm, the aim of which was to restore the Krajina region 
to its rule175, and Gotovina, together with Ivan Čermak, Mladen Markač and Franjo Tuđman, took part 
in the “joint criminal enterprise”176 the aim of which was forcibly and permanently to remove the Serbi-
an population from the Krajina region.   In addition, Gotovina is charged with the killings of at least 150 
Krajina Serbs in the said period.  The indictment was confirmed on June 8, 2001, when the ICTY issu-
ed a warrant for the arrest of Gotovina.
The indictment arrived in Zagreb on June 12, 2001, together with another indictment, this time of 
Maj.-General Rahim Ademi.  Six days later, the then premier Ivica Račan sent a letter to the Prosecutor 
of the ICTY, Carla del Ponte, in which he expressed his disagreement with parts of the charges  sent to 
Zagreb, drawing attention to “certain segments of these indictments that the Government had problems 
with… From the text of the indictment [of Gotovina] it can be concluded that it was based  entirely on 
command responsibility.  Never is there any indication of the direct connection between General Go-
tovina and an individual crime, except through his office and position in the chain of command.”177
167 Author’s interview with Žarko Puhovski, May 17, 2006
168 Ibid.
169 Statute of the ICTY, Articles 7.1 and 7.3 www.un.org/icty/bhs/icty/documents/old/statut-93.htm
170 Ibid., Article 5 concerning crimes against humanity
171 Ibid., Article 3 concerning violations of the  laws and customs of warfare
172 Ibid., Article 7.3
173 Ibid., Article 5
174 Ibid., Article 3
175 Case – Gotovina (IT-01-45) amended indictment, available at www.un.org/icty/bhs/cases/gotovina/indictment/
got-ai040219b.htm
176 Ibid.
177 “Račanovo pismo: Optužnice kriminaliziraju legitimne akcije i inkriminiraju hrvatske Oružane snage [Račan’s let-
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Račan contested the accuracy of the allegations from the indictment according to which the result 
of Oluja was the deportation or displacement of 150.000 to 200.000 Serbs from the Krajina “for it is a 
notorious fact that the Serb population moved out right at the beginning of the campaign, at the orders 
of its own leadership”.178  He focused on the unacceptability of the phrase “Croatian forces” for this me-
ant the “incrimination of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia as a whole”179.   Prime Minister 
Račan warned of the absence of any definition of the so-called Krajina as “self-proclaimed, illegitimate 
and rebellious invention, also raising the issue of the existence of the responsibility of Milošević and his 
associates for the aggression and the criminal consequences of the attempt to create a “greater Serbia”… 
and warned that the indictment also wanted facts about the role of the JNA, the ethnic cleansing and 
numerous crimes against the Croats committed precisely in the area of the so-called Krajina in the pe-
riod that preceded the campaigns of the Croatian armed forces.180
This letter, because of the need to accept the indictment and to collaborate with the ICTY also had 
a political connotation: “It would be good for the great majority of Croatian citizens to understand and 
accept the charges,  so that they should not perhaps be used as a weapon in the hands of those forces that 
resist collaboration with the Tribunal and the prosecution of war criminals.”181   Račan drew attention 
to the danger of the moment for the Government “was bring brought into a situation of having to arrest 
and surrender its own citizens charged with these crimes committed in 1993 and 1995, before Slobodan 
Milošević, Ratko Mladić, Goran Hadžić and others, some of whom were figures in the political and pu-
blic life of the FRY, were charged at all with the crimes committed in the Republic of Croatia since as 
far back as 1991”182
On June 6, 2001, del Ponte told Račan in Zagreb that for legal reasons it was impossible to act accor-
ding to the demands in his letter. The next day the Government went into session at which its members 
were informed of the charges and their contents. The reactions at the session and the events that followed 
caused a crisis of government and showed the dividedness of Croatian society – a minority that thought 
Gotovina had to appear in front of the Tribunal and answer the allegations in the indictment and the 
majority that thought Gotovina had no need to appear before the ICTY, that he was a hero and not a 
criminal, and that the whole of Croatia had been indicted, not just Gotovina.   At that time, the general 
went into hiding, and his disappearance and inaccessibility to justice were the main reasons for the slow-
down in the rapprochement between Croatia and the EU, and hence the main political problems in 
Croatian political life.  Militant and nationalist forces were to mobilise around the Gotovina issue in the 
following few years.
In session on July 7, the Government decided to meet the demands of the ICTY and surrender to 
The Hague two Croatian citizens whose names were given in sealed indictments.  Of the 22 members 
of the Government, 19 of them voted in favour of this decision, while three HSLS ministers were aga-
inst.  They tendered their resignations, as did Deputy Prime Minister Goran Granić “caught in a moral 
conflict between the viewpoints of the Government and his own party the HSLS”183. The Government 
decided to go for a vote of confidence in Parliament.
The second strongest party of the coalition, the HSLS, de facto opposed the Government. Because 
of the divisions in the party about the question of extradition, this party was in a state of disintegration. 
ter: Indictments criminalise legitimate actions and incriminate the Croatian Armed Forces]”, Vjesnik, July 28, 2001.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 “Vlada, osim liberala, prihvatila zahtjev Haaga: Račan najavio glasovanje o povjerenju u Saboru [The government, 
except for the Liberals, accepted the demand of The Hague: Račan announces vote of confidence in Parliament]”, An-
drea Latinović, Ivka Bačić, Vjesnik, July 8, 2001.
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On July 10 the party chairman Dražen Budiša resigned, and the crisis was meant to be halted by the 
choice of Jozo Radoš as acting chairman on July 13.   The statement of a minister, Hrvoje Kraljević, shows 
the state of mind of individual members of HSLS: “For moral reasons I could not be deaf to the deman-
ds of my party, but it is another matter what I would have done according to my own conscience.”184
The Government was exposed to attacks by the parliamentary and the non-institutional opposition, 
that is, of various NGOs that derived from the Homeland War. The same day that the Government met, 
a session of the Presidency of the HDZ was held, the biggest opposition party. Its chairman Dr Ivo Sa-
nader then stated that “the HDZ demands that until the end of the parliamentary debate and the adop-
tion of a standpoint in the parliament the Croatian Government should make no political decisions 
related to the said indictment.” Sanader repeated that “the HDZ would resolutely oppose demands for 
the surrender and possible arrest of Croatian officers and defenders for, as he said, they were based on 
unsafe evidence, particularly on those from the arsenal of anti-Croatian propaganda or on the construc-
tions of objectively command circumstances”.185
On the same day, on July 7, the national coordinating body for associations grown out of the Home-
land War expressed its “grave concern that the Croatian Government had for a month already concealed 
from the whole of the Croatian public that there were two sealed indictments from the ICTY”186, op-
posed the deportations and supported the parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties and all those 
associations that were against surrendering the generals.   The chairman of the veterans’ association HVI-
DRA Marinko Liović stated that HVIDRA, the Central National HQ for the Defence of the Dignity 
of the Homeland War and the generals in the Pride and Honour Association would not, in spite of anno-
uncements, organise the blockage of the roads during the tourist season.187
Archbishop of Zagreb Josip Bozanić spoke in measured tones during the 270th pilgrimage to the 
shrine of Marija Bistrica: “We feel that tensions are rising and that divisions are unnecessarily increasing. 
We ask the Lord to help all, individuals and organised groups, in speaking out and making decisions, to 
place the general welfare of the Croatian people, the society and the state above the special interests of 
individuals, and parties and associations.”188
On July 10, the President of the Republic, Stjepan Mesić, spoke out.  He remarked that the “charges 
were not judgements, and Croatia must not, just because something is written in them, be brought into 
a position of having sanctions applied to it, of halting the stimuli for the development of the economy, 
of destroying the anticipated fruitful tourist season.”189  Mesić also put forward a different view about 
command responsibility: “There are no double standards, and those who say that they are against com-
mand responsibility want in practice to set Slobodan Milošević free.  For Milošević, I suppose, killed no 
one himself, but he has his hands involved in the murders of our wounded in Vukovar, bears the guilt 
for Bijeljina, Srebrenica, the bombarding of all the cities, including Dubrovnik”.190
Parliament, apart from giving the Government a vote of confidence, also condemned the politicisa-
tion of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY and required the Government to make use of all avai-
184 “Kraljević: ‘Zločina je bilo, ali ne i zločinačkih ideja’ [Kraljević: There were crimes, but no criminal ideas]”, Mirela 
Lilek, Vjesnik, July 10, 2001.
185 “Udruge iz Domovinskog rata protive se izručenjima (HINA) [Homeland War Associations oppose extraditions 
(HINA)]”, Vjesnik, July 8, 2001.
186 Ibid.
187 “Liović: Nećemo blokirati ceste u turističkoj sezoni [Liović: We won’t block the roads in the tourist season]”, M. 
Franičević, Vjesnik, July 15, 2001.
188 “Bozanić: Napetosti u Hrvatskoj rastu, a podjele se množe [Bozanic: Tensions in Croatia rising, divisions multiply-
ing]”, Gordan Pandža, Vjesnik, July 9, 2001.
189 “Optužnice nisu presude i ne smije se zbog njih Hrvatsku dovoditi pred sankcije [Indictments not verdicts, Croatia 
mustn’t undergo sanctions because of them]”, Miroslava Rožanković, Vjesnik, July 12, 2001.
190 Ibid.
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lable resources in the battle for truth and justice and to seek the investigation of concrete crimes, not the 
legitimate operations of the Croatian Army.  Parliament rejected the Prosecutor’s inaccurate descriptions 
of Oluja and Bljesak, and suggested the Government should consider changing the Constitutional Law 
concerning collaboration with the ICTY.   HDZ even proposed –without getting Parliament’s vote – 
that given provisions of the Statutes of the ICTY should not be applied to those who took part in the 
Homeland War, and that a referendum should be held about the non-enforcement of these provisions.
Speculations about the disappearance of Gotovina were quick to take hold in the public mind. One 
of the first reports about his possible secret hiding place was published on July 14 when it was thought 
that he was hiding in Borik, Zadar.191  The indictments were received in the Justice Ministry by July 11 
at the latest, and a day later the Zagreb County Court issued a warrant for the arrest of “one of the indic-
tees of The Hague”.   An APB for Gotovina was issued by Zagreb police on July 22.
At that time, a group of people started constructing a myth about Gotovina, the greatest part here be-
ing played by Nenad Ivanković, who in July 2001 published a novelised biography of Gotovina, Ratnik 
[The Warrior]. The book had a launch in the Zagreb Sports Centre in front of a crowd of about 3.000.
After the Government survived the July crisis of 2001, for the next four and more years, the Račan 
and Sanader governments were to exhaust a considerable deal of their energies on persuading the inter-
national actors, primarily Hague Chief Prosecutor del Ponte, that the Government was collaborating 
with the Tribunal and that it was doing everything to locate and arrest the fugitive general. 
The initial phase of the Gotovina case confirms that war crimes of which members of the Croatian 
Army or police were accused were treated above all as high-intensity political phenomena, not as judici-
al attempts to get to the truth or the criminal prosecution of those alleged to have committed war crimes. 
At base, the government then was trying not to arouse the wrath of the Tribunal too much, but also not 
to infuriate the parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition, which to a large extent the parliamen-
tary fraction largely controlled.
All actors in political life who went on record about war crimes pointed out the necessity to individu-
alise war crimes and guilt for crimes committed. This created an interesting dichotomy in the understanding 
of responsibility for war crimes.  It is clear of course that war crimes could be committed individually, but 
also that the perpetration of war crimes can be organised by a state or government or some structure within 
it.   This has been accepted in international legal practice for decades, and was confirmed by the decisions 
of the Nuremberg Trials in which the NSDAP and the SS were pronounced criminal organisations.
An apparently essential event in the Gotovina case occurred in June 2003 when the weekly Nacional 
published an interview with Gotovina who declared: “Of course I recognise the Hague Tribunal, as I 
recognise the rule of law. I have never cast doubt on the legitimacy of the court.  Since I have been indic-
ted, I know that I have to show my innocence before this court, and that no other court in the world can 
acquit me.”192  Explaining his flight as “buying time” he stated that he was faced with a fait accompli: “A 
day before the indictment was published and the arrest warrant was made I learned by private channels 
what was in store for me”.    This statement directly excused the Račan government, which had previously 
been blamed (and would be in the future) for allowing Gotovina time enough to abscond.   He accused 
the previous HDZ government of having hidden from him in 1998 the fact that the ICTY was intere-
sted in him, which made it impossible for him to speak to the Hague investigators. Gotovina announced 
that he was ready to speak with the investigators in Zagreb, and that “if after my statement they still stick 
to the charge, then I’ll go voluntarily to The Hague”193.
191 “Ante Gotovina skriva se u zadarskom Boriku? [Ante Gotovina Hiding in Zadar’s Borik?]”, Ljubica Ivičev Balen, 
Vjesnik, July 15, 2001.
192 “Ante Gotovina: Priznajem Haaški sud [Ante Gotovina: I acknowledge the Haague Court]”, Ivo Pukanić, Nacio-
nal, July 10, 2003.
193 Ibid.
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An embarrassing consequence of this interview for the Government was the question of the Prose-
cution about “how come a journalist could find out where Gotovina was and go to see him but the Go-
vernment could not”.   In the new tangles around Gotovina, President Mesić awkwardly interfered with 
a statement that he intended to propose to the ICTY that it should reconsider the charge against Ge-
neral Gotovina and that he was “prepared to guarantee to the Tribunal that General Gotovina would 
respond to any summons of the Tribunal if it gave him a chance, as a suspect, to make a statement to the 
Hague investigators in Zagreb”.194 Prime Minister Račan had a much more realistic viewpoint: “It would 
be a good thing if Gotovina could make a statement only as a suspect, but this is hardly likely.”195  The 
Prosecution replied to the Mesić proposal that it would respond in line with the law, that is, with the 
Statutes and Standing Orders of the court.196
The parliamentary elections of November 2003 put the HDZ back into power, and in spite of the 
rhetoric it had employed  in opposition, it decided on cooperation with the ICTY and full integration 
of Croatia. In April 2004, the EC gave its positive avis concerning Croatia and its application.    It was 
stated that Croatia was in full cooperation with the ICTY, and the case of Gotovina was not mentioned. 
In June, Croatia officially became a candidate country.
But in autumn 2004 it was heard that the Prosecutor was no longer totally satisfied with collabora-
tion with Zagreb. In response, on September 24 2004 the Government carried out a raid on the premi-
ses of persons whom the EU had stated as being Gotovina’s harbourers197, to wit of Zdenko Runčić, 
Željko Dilber and Ante Žoni Maksan, calling the latter two in to be interviewed.
The resolution of the Gotovina case in 2005
Governmental policies concerning and resolution in the location of Ante Gotovina (the whole time 
the authorities had stated that he was not in the Republic of Croatia) were stoked by a document that, 
according to Nacional of February 1 2005, had been sent by the 1st Secretary of the British Embassy in 
Zagreb, Gareth Lungley, on behalf of HM Government, to the Government in Croatia. Lungley gave 
the chief of the POA a nine-point demand entitled “Proposal for the improvement of cooperation in 
intelligence”198 that were probably later on distilled by the Government in its Action Plan, which was 
never fully published.  In these nine points, operational measures to break up the network of Gotovina 
abettors and to block channels of financial aid to Gotovina were outlined.
On March 8, the State Attorney’s Office, pursuant to the International Restrictive Measures Law, 
demanded the assets of Gotovina be frozen, and six days later, Attorney General Mladen Baić confirmed 
that his assets had indeed been frozen.   At that time the Government announced that 625 of the 626 
demands of the ICTY had been met.  In mid-March, however, in spite of all the protestations of the 
Government about full collaboration with the Tribunal, the beginning of accession negotiations with 
the EU was put back, the only reason for which given was the fact that Gotovina was still not in The 
Hague and that the authorities were not doing their best to locate and arrest him.
The biggest coup of the Action Plan came in the end of August when the fugitive Hrvoje Petrač, 
suspected of complicity in the kidnap of the son of retired general Vladimir Zagorec, was arrested in 
194 Ibid.
195 ”Mesić spreman jamčiti Haagu za Gotovinu, ako general bude pozvan kao osumnjičenik [Mesić ready to warrant for 
Gotovina to The Hague if the general is called as a suspect]”, Gordana Petrovčić and Dada Zečić, Vjesnik, June 12, 2003
196 Ibid.
197 The EU had already forbidden entry to Ljubo Česić Rojs, former MP for the HDZ and Darko Bagić, former ad-
viser to President Mesić, on suspicion that they were abetting Gotovina.
198 “Britanska ucjena Hrvatske u devet točaka [British nine-point blackmail of Croatia]”, Ivo Pukanić, Nacional, March 
8, 2005.
124
OPEN SOCIETY INDEX CROATIA 2006
Greece. Petrač was reckoned to be the main financier of Gotovina’s flight.   Attorney General Baić soon 
flew to Greece to talk to Petrač in connection with the search of Gotovina. 
At the beginning of October at a meeting in Luxembourg, the Council of Ministers of the EU once 
again had to consider starting accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey.   On the last day of Sep-
tember, Carla del Ponte travelled to Zagreb, and then, according to what is known now, the key event 
for the starting of negotiations occurred. According to information that was leaked in spring 2006, at 
the meeting of September 30, Prime Minister Sanader played to del Ponte a tape of a bugged telephone 
call of Ante Gotovina that helped to locate his hiding place.    Del Ponte later stated that that day she was 
convinced the Government was fully cooperating with the ICTY.  She also stated that “this assessment 
concerning full collaboration was based on 130 reports that her office had received that year from Cro-
atian services involved in the search for Gotovina based on practically day-by-day contacts between her 
office and Mladen Baić and other contacts with Croatian and international sources… From May this year 
the implementation improved remarkably”199  Thus the years-long barrier in the way of the start of ne-
gotiations between Croatia and the EU was torn down and negotiations were symbolically started on 
October 3, 2005.
Ante Gotovina was arrested on December 7, 2005, in the Bitacora Hotel in the Canary Islands.   The 
news of the arrest was broken by Carla del Ponte the day after during her visit to Belgrade, and confirmed 
a few hours later by Prime Minister Sanader in a communication to Parliament. In the evening there were 
small-scale demonstrations in Zagreb, with some five hundred youngsters, including juveniles, organised 
by HVIDRA and taking place on the main square, Trg bana Jelačića.   The protests then shifted to the 
space in front of the Government’s offices in St Mark’s Square, although the law bans public gatherings 
in this area.  During a mild scuffle with the police, three windows were broken on the Government bu-
ilding. The next day, in closed session, the Government sacked police chief Ivica Franić because of his 
failure to secure the building of the Government, and appointed Marijan Benko instead.   Gotovina was 
transferred from Spain to The Hague on December 20, and pleaded not guilty to the charges he was fa-
cing before the court on December 12.
However, right from the news of his arrest, it was fairly obvious that the atmosphere in the public 
had changed considerably since 2001 and 2002 when powerful negative reactions followed the serving 
of every indictment, such as that to General Janko Bobetko.   Sanader’s determination that the Gover-
nment should preserve order in the country came out: “I understand the people’s emotions, but those 
who think that he [Gotovina] can be helped by the street are wrong and this Government is not going 
to tolerate disorder”.200  He also announced that the Government would help Gotovina, and all other 
Croatian indictees in The Hague, and that Croatia would be involved in the procedures as a third party, 
in the quality of amicus curiae. 
On the whole there were no more violent or numerous demonstrations in the days to come. On De-
cember 10 about 2.000 protestors gathered in Zadar and a meeting in support of the general in Narodni 
trg lasted about 20 minutes. Wartime commanders of the Split Army District asked the Government to 
ensure Gotovina a trial in Croatia “with all the necessary legal and financial aid and to enable him after 
his statement to be tried while at liberty on bail with all the necessary guarantees of the Government of 
the Republic of Croatia”.201   The best-attended demonstration took place on the Waterfront in Split on 
December 11 2005, with about 40.000 gathering to express their criticism of the Sanader and Račan go-
vernments and to state that the bishops too had knuckled under, which tells of their perception of the role 
of the church hitherto in the Gotovina case. However, unlike the demonstrations after the publication of 
199 “Hrvatskoj pregovori! [Croatia – Negotiations]”, Bruno Lopandić and Jurica Körbler, Vjesnik, October 4, 2005.
200 CRT news, www.hrt.hr/vijesti/ShowArticles.aspx?ArticleId=3565
201 “Miran skup u Zadru popraćen pljeskom [Peaceful assembly in Zadar to clapping]”, Ana Vučetić, Slobodna Dal-
macija, December 11, 2005.
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the indictment of Mirko Norac, organised in February 2001, at the 2005 protests, nobody of political 
importance spoke, and in spite of the acrimony, the speakers too were somewhat more moderate. 
On December 13 a Report on Reactions to the Arrest of Ante Gotovina was drawn up by the OSCE 
Mission in Croatia, in which the moderation of the reactions was stressed: “In the political establishment 
there was a prevailing feeling of relief that the greatest potential obstacle in the way of Croatia’s joining 
the EU and NATO had been removed. Official statements of most parliamentary parties and some of 
the veterans’ associations were of a relatively peaceful tone and called for peace.”202  It was also said that 
the mood of the public was that now the fate of Gotovina was a legal issue: “The incidents that occurred 
soon after the publication of the news, mainly in the Zadar region, were limited in number and scope. 
The big meetings held in Split and Zagreb over the weekend were peaceful, lasted a short time and pa-
ssed off without major incident”.203
Nenad Puhovski, owner of the production firm Factum, which deals with problems of human rights 
in Croatia, thinks that the public reaction was crucially conditioned by “the fact that plenty of time had 
passed and that he was no longer present in the country.  I think people started considering along the 
lines of ‘why should I be for him, and the fellow was travelling round the world and living in hotels?’…” 
It is clear that today only a small number from the active right are actually connected with Gotovina, 
which does him objectively only harm.  It is certain that the lukewarm reactions were enabled by the fact 
that it was Sanader that was Prime Minister, not Račan.   It is true that Račan did not have the political 
will to settle the Gotovina issue, but it is also true that he did not build his position on joining the EU. 
He built it on a timid and necessary deconstruction of the Tuđman rule, and Sanader, since he construc-
ted his own position almost entirely on the EU, which could easily come back to bite him, simply had 
to do it.204
Josipović also thinks that the reason that Sanader, president of HDZ, occupied the post of premier, 
also affected the low-grade reaction to the arrest of Gotovina: 
At the time of the Bobetko case, the biggest opposition party, HDZ, which had been in power ten 
years, made use of the emotions. We had a major political party that organised protests and resisted co-
operation, but today this party is pushing cooperation, and the opposition is in agreement. Today, apart 
from the marginal right parties and the well-standing HSP, there is no one who is seriously against co-
operation.205
The relatively mild negative reactions in the public, as against what happened, in 2001, can be expla-
ined by a number of factors. One of them is certainly the passage of time, which led to fatigue and a 
reduction in the ability to mobilise the masses.   Another is that at the moment of Gotovina’s arrest, it 
was Sanader, from the right hand side of the political spectrum, in power, not Račan, from the left, who 
would find it harder to resist charges of lack of national feeling.   It should also not be forgotten that 
Gotovina, at the moment when the general opinion was that the social situation in Croatia was bad, was 
arrested in a fashionable summer resort.  Everyone found his arrest a relief (apart from the HSP and 
marginal extra-parliamentary parties) as well as a removal of the last formal barriers in the way of Cro-
atia to full membership in the EU.
202 “Spot Report: Reaction in Croatia to the Arrest of Ante Gotovina”, OSCE Mission in the Republic of Croatia 
December 13, 2005, p. 1
203  Ibid., p. 3.
204 Author’s interview with Nenad Puhovski, May 6, 2006
205 Author’s interview with Ivo Josipović, May 17, 2006
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4. THE LORA CASE AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN 2005206
The history of the Lora case up to 2005
On June 13, 1992, against the decision of the examining magistrate of the Military Court in Split, 
Nikola Knežević and Gojko Bulović, among others, were put into the military jail in Split.  According 
to the ruling that they should be remanded and investigated on suspicion of having committed the crime 
of armed rebellion against the Republic of Croatia, they should have been quartered in the District Pri-
son in Bilice, Split.  The warders led them to what was called C Block in Lora.  Emilio Bungur and Ton-
či Vrkić foiled an attempt of Nenad Knežević to escape, inflicting on him gunshot wounds in the arms 
and legs, which were not life-threatening.   Knežević was brought back to the prison compound where, 
while he was lying on the ground, they beat him and inflicted such wounds on him that he died in the 
main hospital in Split on June 23, 1992.  In the night of the 14th to the 15th of June, several MPs went to 
C Block, where they beat up Gojko Bulović, inflicting numerous injuries on him, from which he died 
the same night in the prison corridor.
In the Military Examination Centre, Mirko Šušak, Lazo Ostojić, Branko Borović, Tomo Krivić, Rade 
Krivć, Uglješa Bulović, Duško Galić, Jovo Prkut, Milosav Katalina and Đorđe Katić were tortured and 
maltreated. All of them were ethnic Serbs who had lived in Split or in the general neighbourhood of the 
city.
The first hints of the events in Lora came out when Slobodna Dalmacija journalist Zvonimir Krstu-
lović published an article in 1993 called “The case of Đ. K.”. After that, the Lora case appeared in the 
Croatian media and in public from time to time. It was first of all the writers of Slobodna Dalmacija that 
wrote of it, then the journalists of Feral Tribune, and for keeping the case in the eye of the public, much 
of the credit must go to Tonči Majić and his Dalmatian Human Rights Committee. 
Nenad Puhovski, whose production firm Factum shot the documentary film Lora – Testimonies in 
2004, thinks that the case is unique in that it happened with at least vague knowledge on the part of the 
members of the public. 
“This is the only war crime in the Republic of Croatia of which it cannot be said that the public had 
no knowledge. What the citizens of Split did not know was that so many prisoners of war were bro-
ught in. But the fact that Split citizens of Serbian ethnicity were taken to Lora was a fact known 
almost from the beginning.  Some of the media did their jobs in time. Lora is interesting for a num-
ber of things. It lasted quite a long time, several years; people knew about Lora, and things were 
made public.”207
During the nineties, in spite of broad hints that crimes had been committed in Lora, not only against 
the civilians mentioned, but also against POWs, members of the JNA or the Serb paramilitaries captured 
in Bosnia, the state showed no will to investigate and try, with the exception of a few examinations that 
led to nothing – the criminal investigation department of Split police on September 27, 1992, searched 
flats and other premises of the accused, on June 14, 1992, a scene of crime investigation was carried out 
in Lora, of which there is a record, and on September 1992 a report about the situation in Lora was 
drawn up.
Any more serious investigation had to wait until autumn 2000, when the witnesses-victims made 
statements.  Pursuant to these statements and the documentation collected, in September 2001, the Mi-
206 The review of the course of the first and second Lora trials and the quotes of statements of participants are based 
on reports of the regional observer team charged with monitoring the trials from September 12 to November 25 2005. 
The reports are available at www.documenta.hr/index.php?option=content&task=category&sectionid=16&id=22
&Itemid=65
207 Author’s interview with Nenad Puhovski, May 6, 2006
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litary Police jointly with the Splitsko-dalmatinska police force filed criminal reports. Those indicted 
were: Tomislav Duić, Tonči Vrkić, Miljenko Bajić, Josip Bikić, Davor Banić, Emilio Bungur, Ante Gudić 
and Anđelko Botić, all members of the MPs at the time the crime was committed.
The trial started on June 10, 2002, the president of the chamber being Judge Slavko Lozina.   The 
trial attracted great public attention, because of the nature of the case, but also because of the verbal ou-
tburst of Judge Lozina, the clear memory-losses of the witnesses, the threats made to prosecution witne-
sses and the highly emotionally charged atmosphere, much contributed to by friends and relatives of the 
accused. “They were particularly het-up against the journalists, whom they accused of being Serb mer-
cenaries.”  Judge Lozina let the accessible indictees out on bail, which made it all the easier for them to 
tamper with the witnesses, or, which partially happened, to put themselves beyond the reach of the law 
(Duić had previously not been available, and then Bajić and Bikić also fled).
Just how the prosecution witnesses fared (their state can generally be described as one of intimidati-
on) can be best shown by the statement of the witness Rado Krivić of Kaštel Lukšić on the second day 
of the trial, on June 11, 2002.  He was taken to Lora on June 13 11992 and recalls neither who arrested 
him nor why, and said: “No one beat me, just during the interrogation two uniformed young chaps whom 
I don’t know and cannot describe nor would I recognise them again, connected direct current to my 
ears.” The day after, Zlatko Suleimanović, former warder of the military prison in Lora, was meant to 
give his testimony.  In the trial, he said of his statement, in which he gave evidence against the accused 
Bikić, Bajić and Banić, that he had given it “to the police and the examining magistrate under great pre-
ssure and I don’t recall what I said. I had had an interferon injection and after that examination I had to 
take tranquillisers”.
The problem that witnesses from Serbia and Montenegro would not come was seen on the first days 
of the trial.  Thus on June 17, not a single one of the five witnesses called from Serbia and Montenegro 
showed up. Judge Lozina and counsel for Emilio Bungur Ankica Luetić blamed the media for this, as 
well as NGOs.  Lozina claimed that “the media [were] spreading lies and untruths” and said that all wit-
nesses from S and M were called via diplomatic channels, their safety being guaranteed at the same time. 
Attorney Luetić claimed that “considering the way the press has been writing it is not surprising that the 
witnesses did not come. I venture to say that some of the NGOs have made a normal trial impossible, 
openly calling on witnesses not to attend. Hence I expect the State Attorney’s Office to take certain 
steps”.
The first trial in the Lora case ended on November 22, 2002, when the court issued a unanimous 
verdict acquitting all the accused.  The five who had been first released from remand by Lozina and then 
sent back by the Supreme Court, were let out again on the same day, and the APB naming the three fu-
gitives was cancelled. The County State Attorney lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against this 
decision.
The first instance judgement in the Lora case contributed greatly to the statistical  bias in verdicts as 
compared with the ethnic affiliation of the defendants: “Of the 77 persons tried for war crimes in 2002, 
67% were convicted, while 33% were either acquitted or had the charges against them dropped. But the 
cases that were monitored by the Mission showed that there were considerable differences in the rate of 
convictions and acquittals depending on the ethnic origin of the defendants.  While 83% of all Serbs 
(47 out of 57) were found guilty, only 18% of the Croats were (3 out of 17) (a sample on a limited num-
ber of cases) were convicted”208 and further “observing in more detail in 2002, in that year verdicts were 
announced in the cases of 18 persons (six Serbs and 12 Croats) who were accused in 2002: all six Serbs 
were convicted, all 12 Croats acquitted”.209
A legal turnaround in the Lora case occurred in summer 2003 when on August 19 it was announced 
208 OSCE in Croatia, Report on War Crimes Trials before Local Courts in 2002, February 2004, p. 10
209 Ibid.
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that the Supreme Court Chamber presided over by the woman judge Zlata Lipnjak Bosanac allowed 
the appeal of the State Attorney and quashed the first-instance verdict, primarily because of the incom-
plete establishment of the material state of affairs. The case was sent back down to the Split County 
Court with a request that the court chamber be completely changed. 
The retrial in the Lora case in 2005
The retrial of the Lora case started before Split County Court on September 12, 2005, the presiding 
judge being another woman, Spomenka Tonković.   The same people were on trial, eight of them, with 
four being fugitives, on the same charges as in 2002.  The ruling of the Supreme Court overturning the 
decision meant that the indictment could not be enlarged, although it was clear that the victims of in-
ternational law were prisoners of war, and not just citizens of Split and the surrounds who were ethnic 
Serbs.
Although at this trial too it might have been possible to complain of the limited scope of the indic-
tment and the problem of the witnesses in the Republic of Croatia, it was in general better organised 
and carried out in a calmer atmosphere than the first.  The first two days of the trial did not arouse a 
great deal of interest and it was only on the third day that a larger number of people came to the cham-
ber, mainly relatives and friends of the defendants, since that day the evidentiary procedure was started. 
The second trial was different from the first in that there was a lot less obstruction of the War Crimes 
Chamber, less clapping, whistling, fewer interjections and less belittling of the media.  The beginning 
of the trial was marked by the absence of many of the witnesses. In the first week of the trial it was ma-
inly witnesses from Croatia that were meant to appear, but of the 11 called, only two appeared (Uglješa 
Bulović and Rade Krivić). For five out of nine witnesses that did not appear before the court, the sum-
mons was sent back as undelivered. 
Former military police ought to be singled out as constituting a group that responded well. Most of 
them, however, referred to the passage of time and memory loss, and could not recall how the Military 
Examination Centre of Lora was structured, whether C Block existed. However, from the circumstances 
that many commands were given orally, it is clear that the situation in Lora was somewhat chaotic and 
no proper organisation had been established, which tended to encourage arbitrariness and ultimately 
made it easier to commit crimes.
But some of the testimonies were important for the clarification of what happened in Lora, and of 
the state in Split in mid-1992.   Witness Davor Perišić found that Gojko Bulović was in a certain cell, 
heard his dying sounds and attempted to revivify him.   In his previous account of September 25, 2001, 
he had never mentioned the attempted reanimation of Bulović, and stated that he did not know anyt-
hing of the case, only learned about it later.   In the MP witnesses group, Mario Barišić gave evidence 
again, but toning down his testimony from the first trial, claiming that he had forgotten all sorts of thin-
gs in the meantime. Particularly important was the testimony of Zdravko Galić, first commandant of 
the 72nd Battalion of the Military Police. According to the monitors’ report, Galić “established that he 
had received an order to bring in civilians of Serbian ethnicity, but the order did not say which persons 
were included. He refused to do this without a court order, and when they got it, the military police and 
criminal investigation personnel acted on it”.
Some MP witnesses were exposed to defence counsel vilification during the 2005 trial, for example, 
during the reading of the statement of the witness Marko Ivčević from the investigation and the main 
hearing of 2002. At the retrial of 2005, Ivčević did not appear out of fear and because of the threats.  In 
his previous statements Ivčević had claimed he had seen the beating of Lora prisoners in 1992, and at 
the main hearing of 2002 he stated that he abided by the statement given in the investigation, but that 
he did not dare say more because of the menaces of the Central HQ for the Defence of the Dignity of 
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the Homeland War run by Mirko Čondić.  At the trial in 2005, counsel Luetić attempted to discredit 
the witness Ivčević, alluding to his mental health, which she did not wish to specify “for she was not of 
the medical profession and would not dare to use the expression that would describe this kind of witne-
ss or his credibility the way that, in fact, ought to be done in street slang”.
A strong reaction came from some of the defence counsel of the accused at the testimony of witnesses 
from Serbia and Montenegro.  Among others, this group included Vojkan Živković, who was captured 
by Šibenik, and was in Lora at the beginning of March 1992.   He described what happened in Lora, at 
which defence counsel Ms Luetić endeavoured to discredit him, among other things to his being allowed 
to give his testimony in a language that was not in official use in the Republic of Croatia. She asked the 
witness if he could understand her, to which he replied he could, and that if necessary he would give his 
testimony in English.
How much the atmosphere had changed between the two trials can be seen from the testimony of 
Velibor Tomović, who did not give evidence at the first trial, but “this time had come because in the me-
antime the viewpoint of his state had changed, and it now sought security “for our witnesses” and gua-
rantees had been received concerning the complete protection of the witnesses”.  Similar testimony was 
borne by Nenad Filipović and Darko Milijanović.  Although witnesses from Serbia and Montenegro 
appeared in far greater numbers than at the first trial, the observer team noticed that many of them were 
afraid all the same, including Velibor Tomović.
Not only was there evidence by people from Serbia and Montenegro, but at the retrial there was te-
stimony from witnesses coming for BH. They tended to be unanimous about having been brought to 
Lora as POWs, and said that they had been treated in a way that violated the provisions of international 
law. But nobody had been indicted for conduct towards prisoners of war, which the defence counsel at 
once attempted to exploit to discredit on the evidence of the witnesses. One more suspicious case came 
to the surface too. According to the testimony of the witness Bjelica, the witness Mićko Koprivica had 
been offered money to abstain from testifying. Although it is impossible to check out the facts of the 
story, it this is really true, it would represent an interesting shift, from intimidation to bribery in order 
to keep witnesses from giving evidence. 
As the end of the trial approached, the conditions for work deteriorated.  In spite of budgetary in-
vestments in the justice system, the chamber was not big enough, there were frequent power outages and 
the chamber was unheated.
On March 2, 2006, the President of the War Crimes Chamber, Spomenka Tonković, pronounced 
all eight defendants guilty and sentenced them to terms of imprisonment. Tomislac Duić and Tonči Vr-
kić got eight years, Davor Banić seven, and Miljenko Bajić, Josip Bikić, Emilio Bungur, Ante Gudić and 
Andeljko Botić all got six years each.
Nenad Puhovski thinks that the essential difference between the first and the second trial was the 
witnesses from Serbia and Montenegro giving testimony: 
“I think that in the second trial there was a will to hold the trial properly, without the thing getting 
too big.  I think that a subsequent trial would make sense only if the aim was to show that there was 
a system that lasted for years and that, to say the very least, the government knew about this system, 
and perhaps even ordered it.”210
It is interesting that the main figures in political life did not go on record about Lora, in line with the 
rule of not discussing issues sub judice. In general, in the last few years there has been a distinct trend for 
politicians, including those outside institutions, to speak about the need for trying war crimes before 
indictments are read.  How individual political figures are going to adopt an attitude towards the justice 
of the Croatian legal system, i.e., whether they expect an acquittal or the maximum sentence demanded 
210 Author’s interview with Nenad Puhovski, May 6, 2006
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by the prosecution, tends to depend on their political and worldview options, as well as the ethnicity of 
the defendants.  After the indictment, and particularly after the trial has started, everyone leaves the 
outcome to the actual judiciary. 
In the Lora case Puls arrived at interesting information about the ambivalence of the citizens of Split, 
preparing the report “Facing up to the past” for Documenta, based on 10 focus groups that were held 
before the reading of the first-instance verdict in the Lora case: “Respondents of the general population 
of Split do not independently mention Lora as a war crime on the Croatian side. When they are asked 
about Lora, you can find out from their replies that the crime in Lora should be seen only as a product 
of the circumstances of the war, not as a separate event.  They also say that the Lora case had been bede-
villed by politics, but were of the opinion that it should be investigated further.”211
5. CONCLUSION
The year 2005 saw an advance in Croatia towards greater a more open society with respect to the 
trying of war crimes. A number of factors are to be credited with this. The political elite had realised 
that without trials of the crimes that had been committed by members of the Croatian military and 
police, it was quite simply impossible for the country to get into Europe.  Similarly, all the important 
figures in political life accepted the official pro-European policy, which included respect for human ri-
ghts and the rule of law. Gradual changes in legislation and the strengthening of the justice system, par-
ticularly in connection with war crimes trials, and the damping down of militant nationalist rhetoric in 
public were the result of international pressure and the pragmatic decision to give way to this pressure. 
On November 1, 2005, the ICTY officially transferred the Norac and Ademi212 cases to Croatia, con-
firming the proposition that Croatia had made progress towards an open society.  
Josipović213 points out that the current course is a good one and should be maintained, but mentions 
that history shows how undesirable changes of course are always possible.   As for domestic legislation, 
he thinks that as far as the trial of war crimes is concerned, it is extremely up to date, and that the further 
development depends on the development of international law. Certain improvements might be possi-
ble to do with the law of criminal procedure, but this will happen sooner because of the needs of the 
classic kind of criminal procedure, and not because of the need to try war crimes.
A positive change can be seen in the attitude of the younger population. Although Documenta re-
search was done on a small sample “an advance in seeing war crimes from all perspectives, that is, the 
acknowledgement that war crimes could be committed by one’s own side was shown only by young res-
pondents from Pula, and they were joined by some volunteer defenders from Zagreb”.214
Certainly, it has to be pointed out that some trials unfold in inappropriate conditions, which was 
shown by the observers in the reopened Lora trial.   Teršelić for example says that if so many procedures 
continue to be heard in the county courts, it will be necessary to equip the courts with the right tech-
nology, and mentions particularly the Vukovar County Court as one with an inadequate chamber. 
Notwithstanding the claim of Škare-Ožbolt that during her term of office she had provided funding 
and launched the process of equipping and furnishing the chambers up to ICTY standards, it is clear 
that investments will have to be made in this direction in the years to come.
Since in the last few years Croatia has incorporated the new instruments created by the development 
of international law, it is obvious that in the years to come it will have to go on with systematic training 
211 Unpublished report – “Facing Up to the Past, A Qualitative Investigation” prepared for Documenta, Puls, Zagreb, 
2006, p. 39
212 ICTY, available on http://www.un.org/MKSJ/bhs/frames/cases.htm
213 Author’s interview with Ivo Josipović, May 17, 2006
214 Unpublished report, see no. 213.
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of justice system personnel, not only of judges but also of those in the state attorney’s office.215 This is a 
job for the law faculties, the law academy of the Justice Ministry, and it is certain that some will be par-
tially trained within the context of international cooperation and the organisation of special courses. 
It can be assumed that the interest of the public in procedures in war crimes cases will be less in the 
future, and no new and particularly importance discoveries can be expected.   Greater public interest 
can be expected in the procedures in which the accused are high-ranking members of the Croatian army, 
police and political elite of the war period. A the moment of writing, public interest is being stirred by 
the case of Branimir Glavaš, suspected of war crimes against the civil population of Osijek in 1991. An 
important reason for the decline in public interest lies in the fact that 15 years have passed since the 
crimes were committed, and 11 since the end of the war. Many of the crimes committed have already 
been tried, and in the course of time public interest naturally tends to die down.
It might happen that procedures for crimes committed in Sisak and perhaps in Požega and Zadar in 
1991 will be reopened.   More than that, with respect to crimes that members of the Croatian army, 
police and political elite are suspected of having committed, there is no need to expect. On the other 
hand, when it is crimes committed by the JNA and Serb paramilitaries against the Croats and other 
non-Serbs, at the moment of writing this case study, 35 persons suspected of having committed crimes 
against the civilian population of the village of Berak have been indicted.   It is possible that there will 
be more reports made to the prosecutor about other crimes that have been committed and not yet tried, 
such as that in Sotin.
One danger for the trying of war crimes, apart from any change of political will there might be, is in 
the possibility of media sensationalising certain cases, which would make the work of the state attorney’s 
office and the courts much more difficult, and might aggravate the position of defendants vis-à-vis the 
courts and the public. The more interesting a case, the greater likelihood of press sensationalism.
Žarko Puhovski is of the opinion that in the coming period “there will be a reduction of pressure 
from abroad, but from at home too, which is more important. No one particularly needs war crimes 
trials, and not one will be very much against them.  A standard that is much better than what it used to 
be has been achieved. Procedurally speaking it is important that in agreement with the state attorney’s, 
witnesses, people giving state’s evidence and victims be given more active protection.  It is important to 
handle the issue of witness giving state’s evidence very carefully, so that those who have committed gra-
ve crimes cannot get off lightly. There is no doubt about the big trials being well handled.  However the 
thousands of small cases that are not war crimes still have no chance of being settled and for improve-
ments to be made, no matter who is in power. We are coming to the phase in which the judges will have 
to learn that there is in fact no political interest in most of such cases.”
Banac urges a pragmatic approach, as a result of the elapse of time and the ever-diminishing possi-
bilities for the thoroughgoing investigation of every perpetrator, and proposes that justice should focus 
on the most important cases.
Teršelić is encouraged by the office of the state attorney having in the last two years started to work 
better and the current existence of a political will to try war crimes, but points out that there are still 
some inherited problems: “However, what is discouraging is the lack of any investigation of all the cri-
mes of 1991.  If the state attorney’s office does not launch these investigations, it will be hard to make 
up for everything that has been omitted at all levels, political and judicial, during the last 15 years.   The 
objective problem is the oversights and omissions in the inquiries of 1991, which will be hard to make 
up.   The question is how many procedures should really be moved from the county courts to the four 
select county courts in Rijeka, Zagreb, Split and Osijek. Some cases ought to have a change of venue, in 
215 As Škare-Ožbolt pointed out, training about how to run procedures in war crimes trials have been organised for 
the last three and a half years for personnel of the county courts and the state attorney’s office.
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particular the Koranski most case, which is being heard before Karlovac County Court, where there is 
major public pressure in favour of the defendant Hrastov, former member of the Croatian Army.”216
A key factor in trying war crimes in Croatia and legally proper procedures is political will, but also 
important is the change in the public perception concerning the need for trying war crimes. Although 
the change in political will is partially the outcome of external pressure, it is also the consequence of the 
clear commitment of the political elite to getting Croatia into Europe. This option means the elite has 
decided on improving the quality of procedures in war crimes cases, since this is a precondition that the 
international community insists on from Croatia as a candidate for accession to the EU. The domestic 
public, the media and NGOs will in future have the role of independent observers able to act in such a 
way as to warn of failures and weaknesses of procedures, and hence influencing the maintenance of the 
level so far achieved, as well as improvements thereto. 
216 Author’s interview with Vesna Teršelić, May 29, 2006 
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Žarko Bajić, Biometrika Healthcare Research, Zagreb
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The Sample and Method of Data Collection
The Index is based on expert evaluation society as relatively open or closed in 6 dimensions: educa-
tion, economic freedoms and entrepreneurship, media freedoms, rule of law, economic freedoms and 
entrepreneurship, freedoms and rights of minorities and marginalized groups. 
The research was conducted on a sample of n=92 experts in 2006 and n=128 experts in 2005, who 
are experts in the areas in which we measured the openness of society. Our approach, then, to the open 
society has been through the viewpoints of the experts as people who on the basis of their knowledge 
and experience with the issue can be assumed objectively to be able to judge the level of the openness of 
the society they live in.  According to the number of “research areas”, the research included 6 groups of 
experts – i.e. every expert evaluated only “his/her” area.
The sample was obtained based on the snowball method. The “initial sample” with which we started 
the “snowball” selection of experts fulfilled the three following criteria:
The initial sample can be objectively described and therefore replicated in other countries/ time 
periods;
The initial sample is diverse in the area of expertise, and also in the sense of disciplines, viewpoints, 
ideologies, politics, and therefore also more representative;
The initial sample is large enough to ensure the adequate size and accountability of the final expert 
sample.
Every snowball initiator is determined according to the institutional area concerned: 
Academia
Civil society
State institutions (non-academic)
Media
Practice
Unions / professional associations
Initial correspondents are asked to name 5 experts in their area, bearing in mind   regional represen-
tation. In the next round, the nominated experts are contacted and also asked to name a 5 further experts. 
The snowball process is realized in three circles. Thus, a base of experts with 401 names is formed. At 
the beginning of 2006, the questionnaires were sent by e-mail to more than 350 addresses. The final 
sample included 92 respondents.
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Table 14   Example of initial sample structure for the dimension:  media
Head of the largest social institute that deals with media as well Academia
Dean of the largest (or the only) faculty of journalism Academia
One of the senior lecturers at the second largest (or the only) faculty of journalism 
(random – alphabetically according to surname)
Academia
President of the largest nongovernmental organization dealing with freedom of 
media 
Civil society
Coordinator of the governmental body in charge of concessions for electronic 
media
State institutions
Deputy or assistant minister of culture (random – alphabetically by surname) State institutions
Editors-in-chief of two best-selling and most widely circulated political 
weeklies 
Practice
Editors-in-chief of two best-selling and most widely circulated daily newspapers Practice
Head of the largest news agency Practice
Editor of central news program on the national television 2 days before sending 
of questionnaires
Practice
Editor of central news program on the largest private television 2 days before 
sending of questionnaires
Practice
Editor of the best-selling women’s magazine Practice
Presidents of two (or the only one) largest journalists’ trade unions Unions / 
professional 
associations
President of the largest journalists association Unions / 
professional 
associations
Instrument
The research was conducted through six different questionnaires intended to evaluate the openness 
of society. Each area that was part of the research was covered by a specific questionnaire. The questio-
nnaires consisted of numerous items the content of which covered different aspects of an open society 
relevant for the evaluation area.
Every respondent – expert evaluated each item on two scales – the scales of importance and estima-
tion of openness:
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The scale of importance – evaluation of importance of each item / statement for achieving “an 
ideally open society” – implies the estimation of how important the content of the statement is 
for the achievement of the “open society”.  
The scale of estimation of openness – the estimation of current situation in Croatia regarding 
the content of statements/items.
Both scales range from 1 – 7. 
The scale of importance: 
1 – not at all important for achieving an ideally open society  
7 – extremely important for achieving an ideally open society  
The scale of estimation an open society: 
1 – not at all present in Croatia 
7 – very much present in Croatia . 
Figure 28  Example of original questionnaire (area: transparency of political processes)
(A) Importance 
for achieving 
an ideally open 
society
(B) Current 
situation in 
Croatia
Readiness of all key state and political institutions to 
engage in democratic political activism. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7
Existence of institutional channels through which 
citizens can successfully express their suggestions, ideas, 
needs and demands to relevant institutions of political 
power.
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7
Readiness of authorities to accept the suggestions of 
citizens and interest groups. 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 1   2   3   4   5   6   7
Terminology
There are four different levels:
Dimensions
Areas of society such as  education, economic freedoms and entrepreneurship, media freedoms, 
rule of law, economic freedoms and entrepreneurship, freedoms and rights of minorities and 
marginalized groups
Criteria
Basic analytical units inside  each dimension 
Represent basic criteria of an open society in separate dimensions, i.e. “pluralism in education” 
in the education dimension 
The openness of specific dimensions is based on them;
Subcriteria
Accompanying analytical units that serve as a basis  for estimation of the openness of each spe-
cific criterion;
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Items or indicators (questions in the questionnaire)
The basis for creating subcriteria.
The Method of Data Analysis
Items or Indicators
The average value on the open society estimation scale and the value comparison in the period 2005 
– 2006 was calculated. 
Table 15  Total number of items in dimensions
Dimension No. of experts
No. of 
items
Economy 13 74
Minorities 29 66
Media 12 66
Education 8 67
Politics 13 81
Law 17 86
Total 92 440
Subcriteria
The average value on the open society estimation scale in each subcriterion was calculated. The ave-
rage value of each subcriterion is the average estimation of openness recorded in all items comprising 
that subcriterion. The grades range from 0 to 100. 
Subcriteria originated in the following way. Based on the data collected in 2006, we conducted factor 
analysis of all the items inside specific criteria, using the principal component method. Then we checked 
those factors on the data collected in 2005. The subcriteria (factors) we accepted only when all those 
three analyses, the content analysis, the componential analysis of data for 2005, and the componential 
analysis of data for 2006, gave compatible results. 
Criteria
The average value for each separate criterion was calculated. That is the average   value of all subcri-
teria comprising that criterion. The grades for each criterion range 0 – 100.
Dimensions
The open society index for each separate dimension  was calculated. It was obtained as the average 
estimation of the openness in all criteria within a specific dimension. The index ranges from 0 to 100.
The relative importance of each dimension was also calculated. At the end of every questionnaire, 
every expert had a chance to estimate the importance of all six dimensions of society, the one they had 
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been chosen for as well as five other.  The expert evaluated the importance in a way that they divided the 
available 100 points among specific dimensions according to their importance for the total openness of 
society. The relative importance of each dimension is the average grade.
The Open Society Index
The composite open society index is the average value of openness of all six analyzed dimensions.
Public Opinion Poll
The research in Croatia also includes a public opinion poll, the purpose of which was to see to what 
extent the public understands the concept of the open society, and how it evaluates the Croatian as an 
open society. Over the long term, the public opinion poll enables the monitoring of the efficiency of 
advocacy activities based on the OSI analysis. 
The public opinion poll was conducted in order to show whether the public recognizes, and to what 
extent, the idea of an open society, and how it evaluates the Croatia as an open society. The importance 
of this estimation is shown in time perspective, in which the dynamics of public estimation points to (in)
efficiency and the level of advocacy activities resulting from previous expert estimations.  Efficient and 
publicly recognized advocacy should result in the perception of growth of the level of the openness of 
the mainstream society. The public opinion poll included a question on what an open society is (5 defi-
nitions were offered) and the question on the relative importance of six basic dimensions of an open 
society (6 items).217
Connection between the Index and Case Studies
Besides the calculation of the general level of openness of society, the Index enables several important 
insights: (a) ranking dimensions according to their relative importance of the openness of mainstream 
society218, (b) ranking dimensions according to the degree of their openness in the master society219, and 
– combining these two insights – (c) perceiving the dimension in which a closed society is the biggest 
problem. Next to this, the final part of the questionnaire is used for the identification of “critical points”, 
as well as “successful examples”, out of which the most frequent (a good and a bad example) are then 
processed in detail. The qualitative part of the project is therefore based on the experts’ answers in the 
last two questions in the questionnaire, which ask for a description of (up to 3) cases/situations that 
tended to generate a closed or open mainstream society. The most frequent positive and the most frequ-
ent negative examples become the topics of the two case studies.
217 The research was conducted in February 2006, on a sample of 1000 citizens older than 15, and it was conducted by 
the agency Puls.
218 The range is determined according to the arithmetical mean of relative importance of dimensions/areas.
219 According to the arithmetic means of the openness estimation of each separate dimension/area.
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Dr  Dražen Lalić, Faculty of Political Studies, Zagreb
Marina Škrabalo, MAP Savjetovanja, Zagreb
Determining the methods of case study220
The Open Society Index combines quantitative and qualitative research methods to identify the dyna-
mics of an open or a closed society, to recognize the “critical points” of this dynamics, as well as to create 
conditions necessary for the longitudinal monitoring of that process in Croatia and other countries. 
A case study examines events or cases that are not, due to their complexity and specificity, appropri-
ate for other, “classic” research methods.  Although it emphasizes qualitative data and interpretation, a 
case study may include a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data and analytical procedures.  Simi-
larly, although the usual emphasis was put on direct monitoring and researching of real instances, case 
study research uses written primary and secondary sources about a single instance or event, its context 
(statistics, media coverage, and existing expert and scientific analysis). The special value of case study as 
research strategy lies in the possibility for a detailed, in-depth examination of a single instance or event, 
or complex relations between certain events, influence of the relevant context as well as examination of 
situations that will not find other examination methods suitable. 
Taking into consideration the fact that case studies leave less opportunity for generalization in com-
parison with other methods (e.g. researches based on representative samples, or diachronic researches), 
a case study is a particularly useful complementary method involving an in-depth, longitudinal exami-
nation of an event or aspects of a wider occurrence that is being examined. 
On the basis of the case study it is possible to make certain generalizations by comparing the case 
study conclusions with the theoretical presumptions and conclusions of research with the same topic by 
use of different methods, where, in the long term, it is useful to create a base of case studies dealing with 
the same general occurrence, and make them comparable in the sense of consistence of key research qu-
estions and focus on questioning the process and reasons that cause a certain occurrence, and not on 
distribution and intensity of those occurrences.
A case study is based on the following methodological principles: 
1. Continuity – preparing a case study for an open society is set up as a successive, continuous study 
of previously determined aspects of the openness of society, within previously determined yearly or 
bi-yearly periods, through case study analysis within previously determined social occurrences that 
are relevant for the understanding of the open society.
2. Comparability – methodology should be unique; since we are dealing with action research that 
encompasses a period of up to two years, the accent must be on prompt implementation and appli-
cation. Although comparison is here limited, it will probably be possible through the use of unifor-
med techniques of research and research questions, with the focus on societal occurrences that can 
be examined through different cases.     
220 Case study is a research method used in social sciences for exploration, description or explanation of social occur-
rences where it is especially important to describe and explain the interrelation of occurrence and its social context. 
Case study is used for exploring time and space –limited segments of contemporary, changeable social occurrences 
conditioned by the context. From: Yin, Robert K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, London: Sage Publica-
tions, 2003.
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3. Reliability – in the preparatory phase, reliability is secured through the existence of a protocol 
(research draft), triangulation of sources and methods, including of key respondents in the process 
of interpretation of findings, and finally comparison with existing analysis of the examined occu-
rrence in the literature. 
4. Coherence – different research phases are logically correlated in the manner where the choice of 
a case study is based on estimation of experts included in the experts poll on most important dimen-
sions of an open society during the period of estimation. Similarly, it is suggested that during the 
development of the overall framework of this research, guidelines should be developed and used for 
the procedure of complete interpretation of findings obtained through different methodological 
phases. Finally, the findings should be linked to theoretical and action level. 
5. Action directionality – choice of methods will be guided by their interactive potential for the 
articulation of recommendations for improving the diagnosed state and achieving visibility of con-
tent and purpose of the whole project. Similarly, it is necessary to include the perspective of indivi-
duals and groups directly affected by the examined occurrence, especially when it comes to the pro-
blem of marginalization. Thus, the research method promotes the experience and judgments of 
those affected a society that is insufficiently open and at least within this research the reproduction 
of exclusion is prevented.
Description of Selection Procedure of Case Study 
During the preparation of the Index, the following three criteria for the selection of case studies were 
established:
a) Establishment of selection of a specific case based on expert estimation 
All experts, regardless of the dimension they evaluate, were asked the following open questions, whe-
re they were able to list examples connected to public events as a whole, and not only to “their” area: 
1. Please list 3 rather illustrative examples (situations, cases, and incidents) from Croatian public 
life (recent social, political, economic events) that, in your opinion, indicate that Croatia is an open 
society or is becoming more open.
2 Please list 3 rather illustrative examples (situation, case, and incidents) from Croatian public life 
(recent social, political, economic events) that, in your opinion, indicate that Croatia is a closed so-
ciety or is becoming more closed.
Examples that the experts listed were grouped according to their topic, and their frequency was esta-
blished. In total, there were 204 examples of a relatively open and 223 examples of a relatively closed 
society.
b) Relevance for encouraging public advocacy 
Although the selection of cases is primarily based on their frequency (in experts’ answers) the final 
decision takes into consideration also the factor of the action-orientation of the project, i.e. the use that 
case studies could have for encouraging public advocacy for an open society during the future period. 
That use is related to the interest of the topic or the interest of the public in it. Public advocacy could on 
the one hand influence important processes in which the society is not very open and on the other hand 
it could emphasize positive trends towards the creation of a more open society. 
c) The need for achieving continuity of observing social topics and occurrences connected to 
an open or a closed society.
An effort was made to achieve continuity in observing social topics and occurrences connected to a 
relatively open or relatively closed society by having two examples from social practice highlighted during 
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the evaluation of  society as closed or open serve as points of departure for the definition of the analysis 
of the case study in one of three different but interconnected social phenomena that related to:
1. Marginalization of social groups (with emphasis on manifestation and marginalization 
process, and chances and obstacles of lowered marginalization of one social group. Thus, the 
focus is directed towards the social group relevant for understanding the openness of society 
and its interaction with societal institutions and public policies).
2. Open or closed public institutions (with emphasis on manifestation if and reasons for in-
stitutions being open or closed and the respective chances of and obstacles to greater openness 
being achieved.  Thus, the attention is directed towards the structural basis of an open society, 
and the interaction of public institutions with social groups and public policies).
3. How open  public politics are (with emphasis on transparency and participation in making 
and implementing public policies. The emphasis of this case study is put on the contextual as-
pect of politics that is relevant for understanding the openness of society and on its interaction 
through public debate and others with social groups and state institutions). 
The preparation of case studies inside the mentioned categories raises an abundance of possible in-
sights into specific features of a closed or open society and possible bases for case studies. Such choice of 
case studies categories is based on the perception of an open society and its key integral parts, since in-
side every case study category it is possible to include all criteria of societal openness - (1) inclusiveness 
/ possibility of participation, (2) availability of information, (3) possibility and efficiency of criticisms 
and public debate, (4) readiness for change / innovation and (5) accountability. 
The following topics were chosen on the basis of the described criteria: 
 * As a case study of a relatively open society, a topic that occurred 21 times in 203 listings: Positive 
steps towards trying war crimes, 
* As a case study of a relatively closed society, a topic that occurred 31 times in 223 listings: Dyna-
mics of marginalization of sexual and gender minorities.
The Overview of Methodological Aspects of Creating Two Case Studies 
Researchers used the protocols for creating case studies. The protocols are the basic methodological 
instrument for compiling case studies: they are like “mini” research outlines. Every protocol contains 
specific instructions connected to all crucial steps in the creation of case studies: defining specific goals 
of case studies (diagnostic and action goal); defining units of analysis or cases; explanation of the choice 
of a specific case; key questions; selection of methods and data sources; guidelines for interpretation and 
structure of case studies; guidelines for structuring conclusions and recommendations; suggestions for 
publication and implementation of a case  study; overview of needed resources (profiles of researchers 
and associates).
For the purposes of this project, three protocols were prepared depending on the type of occurrence 
meant to be described and analyzed in the case study: (1) status of marginalized group; (2) function of 
institution; (3) process of (creating/structuring) public policies, with emphasis on public debate. A case 
study is specific for the diversity of research methods and procedures available. These studies primarily 
include qualitative methods, such as document analysis, semi-structured individual and group interviews 
and monitoring of relevant events. Besides that, the existing research results obtained by quantitative 
methods were used or additionally interpreted.  In both this year’s case studies, the key data sources in-
cluded:
Official reports and documents of different institutions 
web-pages and forums of different institutions and associations
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media articles
people directly involved/connected to the topics of the cases
results of other relevant research
literature in the field. 
The coordinated use of these sources achieved triangulation of data sources. Finally, it should be 
emphasized that the existence of three complete, developed protocols, enables the future creation of se-
veral case studies related to three types of social occurrences– marginalized groups, institutions and pu-
blic policies. The existence of protocols enhances the possibilities of comparing case studies within the 
same type of social occurrence, which is primarily important since the comparison of case studies is ge-
nerally limited. That is why this project will in the long term try to enrich the previously relatively poor 
documentation of contemporary social processes related to the open or closed society that are manife-
sted in concrete cases that take place over limited periods of time. Such an approach also enables a higher 
consistency of methodology, or the protocols for preparing case studies, and also easier implementation 
of research, which is important regarding the long-term and applied nature of this research project.
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RESEARCH RESULTS OF THE 
OPEN SOCIETY INDEX-CROATIA 2006
Open Society Index-Croatia 2006
2005 2006 Change(abs.)
Change
(%)
Open Society Index 40.8 42.1 1.3 3.1%
The Open Society Areas (dimensions)
Achieved
Sorted according to 
scores
Mean Mean Rank (2006-2005) (2006-2005)/2005
2005 2006 2005 2006 Change (abs.) Change (%)
 Media 44.6 45.6 1 1 1.0 2%
 Economy 38.9 44.9 5 2 6.0 15%
 Education 41.1 44.5 4 3 3.4 8%
 Law 42.3 43.8 2 4 1.5 3%
 Minorities 42.2 43.0 3 5 0.8 2%
 Politics 35.0 31.5 6 6 -3.5 -10%
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The importance of areas (dimensions) for the openness of society (expert evaluation)
The importance of areas (dimensions) for the openness of society (public opinion)
Comparison of estimation of importance of areas (dimensions): experts and public 
opinion poll
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RESULTS 
HOW OPEN SOCIAL AREAS (DIMENSIONS) ARE AND THE 
PERTAINING CRITERIA
Media
 2005 2006
Change
(abs.) (%)
Autonomy, independence
General media freedoms 56 52 -4 -7%
Pressure of executive power 56 38 -18 -32%
Independence of political options 53 46 -7 -13%
Independence of economic interest groups 45 45 0 0%
Professional associations’ independence 72 67 -5 -7%
Union independence 73 69 -4 -5%
Professionalism and rationality  
Objectivity and professionalism 57 55 -2 -4%
Rational and fact-based critical perspective 45 36 -9 -20%
Development of committed, investigative journalism 42 36 -6 -14%
Equal treatment of all sides 43 40 -3 -7%
Absence of monopolies and equality of competition
 in the media market 
Absence of media monopoly 40 41 1 3%
Open media
Attention of private, commercial TVs towards minorities 34 35 1 3%
Attention of public TV towards the disabled 
and the handicapped 45 45 0 0%
Attention of public TV towards ethnical minorities 43 44 1 2%
Attention of public TV towards sexual and gender minorities 39 42 3 8%
Attention of the press towards disabled people and people with 
disabilities 38 43 5 13%
Attention of the press towards ethnical minorities 42 49 7 17%
Attention of the press towards sexual and gender minorities 45 40 -5 -11%
Abundance of media articulated viewpoint/editorial 
commentaries options and civil society 38 42 4 11%
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Quality of media legislation
Openness of the process of gaining broadcasting licenses. 46 49 3 7%
Quality of media legislation. 50 46 -4 -8%
Efficiency of civil society institutions
Union freedoms in the media. 44 42 -2 -5%
Civil society as a control of public TV. 52 47 -5 -10%
The Rule of Law
 2005. 2006.
Change
(abs.) (%)
Quality of legislation
Clear and complete legislation. 42 43 1 2%
Transparency of the intentions of the legislator and comprehension 47 50 2 6%
Laws in accordance with the Constitution and  protection of basic 
human rights 42 53 11 26%
Without unnecessary  severity of laws 52 64 12 23%
Certainty of enforcement and control of enforcement of laws 39 40 1 3%
Democratic orientation in the work of the legislature 43 42 -1 -2%
Constancy  and stability of laws 38 29 -9 -24%
Availability of legal protection for all citizens    
Equality of legal protection 42 45 2 7%
Availability of legal protection for citizens 48 43 -5 -10%
Control of the performance of the judiciary
Monitoring, ethical code and  competence as the only criterion 34 44 10 29%
Responsibility, sanctions for low-quality work, abuses punished 35 38 3 9%
No corruption in the state attorney’s office 43 42 0 -2%
No corruption in courts 57 46 -11 -19%
Transparency of appointments and promotions 34 43 9 26%
Civil control of the judiciary 39 45 6 15%
Efficiency of supervision of public notaries and lawyers 43 34 -8 -21%
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Efficiency of the judiciary
Performance and impartiality of the state attorney 46 43 -3 -7%
Efficiency and  speed of courts 42 35 -7 -17%
Speed of work of examining magistrates 50 47 -3 -6%
Autonomy of the judiciary 
Independence of courts 40 49 9 23%
Transparent and expert criteria for selection 38 46 8 21%
Independence of courts of public pressure 43 50 7 16%
Trust in the judiciary
Trust of citizens in courts 35 32 -2 -9%
Trust of citizens in state attorney 40 37 -3 -8%
Availability of information on the work of the judiciary 40 50 10 25%
Minorities and Marginalized Groups
2005 2006
Change
(abs.) (%)
Formal protection of the rights and freedoms of minorities and marginalized groups
Inclusion of minorities in decision-making processes 45 51 6 13%
Status and rights of sexual minorities 44 34 -10 -23%
Efforts invested in equality for people with disabilities 41 47 6 15%
Respect for cultural and religious rights of ethnic minorities 59 60 1 2%
Discrimination of minorities and marginalized groups
Non-discrimination of ethnic minorities 37 38 1 3%
Non-discrimination of minorities and marginalized groups in 
employment and promotion. 38 36 -2 -5%
Non-discrimination of women 41 42 1 2%
Existence of control mechanisms of the protection of rights of minorities and 
marginalized groups
Institutional efficiency in protecting the rights of minorities and 
gender equality 38 41 3 8%
Quality of public debates on the status and rights of minorities 42 45 3 7%
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Development of civil society in the area of protecting minorities 
and marginalized groups 59 70 11 19%
Attitude of the majority towards the minority and the correctness in public 
communication
Absence of hate speech and discrimination in the media and 
public speech 43 41 -2 -5%
Minorities accepted by the majority 37 39 2 5%
Public sensitivity for discrimination of minorities and 
marginalized groups 44 49 5 11%
Activities for sensitizing the public to the needs of minorities and 
marginalized groups 37 43 6 16%
Absence of discrimination against ethnic minorities by the 
majority 36 34 -2 -6%
Education
2005 2006
Change
(abs.) (%)
The possibility of participation in education
The potential of the educational system to  achieve the possibility 
of participation in education 39 37 -2 -5%
Educational programs and processes adapted to the needs of 
specific populations 39 45 6 15%
Basic availability of education 56 53 -3 -5%
Pluralism in education
Tolerance for the pluralism of educational contents and programs 39 45 6 15%
 Pluralism of educational programs, methods and goals 44 46 2 5%
The possibility and efficiency of public debate
Openness of the educational system towards suggestions and 
recommendations of interested parties  31 35 4 13%
 Openness of dialogue about education 40 42 2 5%
Transparency / information accessibility  38 42 4 11%
Autonomy and efficiency
Efficiency of education 37 40 3 8%
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Autonomy of educational institutions 43 60 17 40%
Control and lawfulness
Possibility of  real control of the work of the educational system 32 33 1 3%
Quality of legal instruments regarding the work of educational 
institutions 52 62 10 19%
Efficiency of eliminating corruption in education 35 38 3 9%
Economic Freedoms and Entrepreneurship
2005 2006
Change
(abs.) (%)
The possibility of participation in market competition   
Possibilities of start-up activities 40 51 11 28%
Availability of start-up activities  39 42 3 8%
   
Equality in market competition   
Market equality 56 52 -4 -7%
Legislative and institutional equality  48 50 2 4%
   
The possibility and efficiency of public debate   
Existence, frequency and efficiency 35 44 9 26%
Readiness of state institutions for public debate 36 46 10 28%
   
Transparency / information accessibility   
Availability of information 48 56 8 17%
Transparency of state institutions’ activities 34 36 2 6%
   
Independence and efficiency   
Efficiency in incentivising entrepreneurial activities 40 41 1 3%
Independence of economy of political  influence 35 37 2 6%
   
Lawfulness and control   
Lawfulness of entrepreneurial operations 34 40 6 18%
Quality of  legislation for freedom of market competition 43 49 6 14%
Competence and efficiency of work of regulatory institutions 31 35 4 13%
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Transparency of Political Processes
2005 2006
Change
(abs.) (%)
Possibility of participation and vertical openness
Vertical openness of political parties 36 34 -2 -6%
Possibility for citizens to influence the government and public 
policies 41 35 -6 -15%
Decentralization and respecting the subsidiarity  principle 38 37 -1 -3%
Possibility of control and lawfulness
Efficiency of civil control of the machinery of repression 35 39 4 11%
Efficiency of control of public institutions 37 31 -6 -16%
Respecting for the tripartite division of power  44 35 -9 -20%
Efficiency of elimination of corruption 25 23 -8%
Transparency / access to information
Availability of information on the work of public administration 
bodies  37 38 1 3%
Transparency of  the process for making political decisions  41 35 -6 -15%
Accountability
Accountability of executive power to citizens 33 25 -8 -24%
Accountability of legislature and political parties to citizens  29 25 -4 -14%
Efficiency of institutions 34 37 3 9%
Autonomy
Independence of state businesses and state administration of 
politics 33 26 -7 -21%
Independence of civil society institutions of politics 46 37 -9 -20%
Professionalism and rationality
Rationality of political actions 33 31 -2 -6%
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